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CHAPTEH I 
l N'I'HODU C'l'I ON 
I . THE Cl\ ·1PA.f.GN 
In Chicago on July 28th, 1960 and then aga1n i n .ihJ.GUS t 
of 1968 Richard lV!. Nixon \vas nomJ.natMI as Hepublica n 
cand i date for president . 'l'he nominaJc:i.ons \ver•e the beg i nning 
of' t wo historic campa ign~3 by Nixon for the presi dency. He 
vJas to l ose the first c ampai gn by one o f the n a rro\vest · 
mar·gins in history a nd to Hln the s econd Ct'..lnp a.ign eight y ears 
J.t:.. t er 1Jy n small rna:.•[; in of t.he popuJ.ar vote • 1 
OT o 
J . () 
stG.rt \·Jl th, it i·W.s tr.e fl:r·st. ~L-ime t~·.'o r.wn so youn g had r u n 
for the office of president . Election of either one would 
put Ame rica f s youngest e l e ct. e d presj.dent in office . More 
important from the viewpoint of t his thesis i t was t he 
beginning of an era in the field of c ommun.L cat ir:ms . Dnri ng 
the 19£10 c ampaign for· the firs t ti r te i n h:i story , the h10 
pres i denti a l c an d i.date s f~ced eacl1 o t h er in a national 
l . . d b J. 2 t e e VlSlOD e a COo 
On. 01 ove~nber 8 th, 19 6 0 whe n t.he r>esults were tabulated 
voters had gon e t o the polls and ele cted SenaLor John F , 
1 Ne;.J York '1'5.mef (r1et·J Yorkp N. Y. . ) , Decembe r 16 1 1.')60 , 
p . l. 
') 
r_I b:L d • , p. l o 
2 
Kenne dy , the Democrati c nominee for Pres i dent of the United 
States . 'J:he first campai gn ended in \vhat the No~. Ygs)S ~l'ime~ 
stated, 11 ~vas the c l oses t presidential race in seventy-·s i x 
years . 113 'l'he vole mar gin of the winner John F' . Kennedy was 
tabulated as bej.n g 112 , 601 out of 68 , 000 , 000 Americans v oting . 
Then i n 1968 , aft er overcoming the losers image which 
h e had a cquired in two defeats (the presidency in 1960 uno 
t he California gov ernorship in 1962 ) Nixon was t o r eturn and 
win the p res idency . He defeated vice- presiden t Hubert H. 
Hu_mph.rey the Democrat l_e nomj nee by the slim margin of )10, 000 
voter~ out of tho ?3,()00,000 cast ~!~ 'J:hue. Richo.r cl M. Nixon 
a ftor two maJor de f eats ret urned to win and be come Presiden t 
role 1n holih of .R ichard f"i. . Nixon 1 s presidential campaicns , 
televisjon played an increasj_ngly i mportant role , .over 
previous political ca:'lpB ..i.gn::> . 
II • 1'HE P.HOBI.E.I1 
The o b j e ctive of this thesis is to ffi~ke a comparative 
stuoy ~ r Pres i dent Ni xon ' s use of television d~r5.ng his two 
9residcnt i ttl cumpaigns . Specific ernpha:d.s wi lJ b8 pl::,ced on 
3Ibi.d. , P• lo 
( 11·chEn'les Horit.z , ( e.J . ) c~~~?::-~!l-~.J:~2.[!;_~~l~!..!..Y. s Y9.J:· :fJ, :U.J 
, Ne \-: Y. or·k, N. Y .: 'I' he H . 'vJ . W1_ l::;on Company , l.Jecembei' JS 69 ) , 
p . .3 0 . 
-' 
3 
Nixon 1 s usc cif televisi on i n bott1 oL the political campaigns. 
The final obj e ctive of thi s the s is is to record for future 
researchers one pres ident i al candidate~ us e of televis ion , in 
t Ho pol:l.tica l c ampai gns for t he presidency. On e of the 
carnp tllgns he lost by a narrow mar g :i.n of r.;he vot e , ond the 
second one he Hon by a small percentage of i;hc: popular vote. 
The accomplishment o f the objectives will answer the 
questi.ons ; How \-IBS televisi.on u sed in .Pr esi dent Nixon ' s tv1o 
pres iden r;i a l campaign s ? HoiJ did it var-y tn the t vJO pres i-
den t ial campaigns of 196 0 and 1968'? This thesis is not 
J.n tended to de a 1 wi t;.h s oma of the o tiler q ues t ions that might 
be a s ked a b out t he two campaigns, su~h a s how d i d Nixonls 
relat.ionshir- vary Hi ~h the press , or h ow d:ld he use th~) mo des 
of proof in his televis i on speeches. 
III . Tlffi MAN 
Richard M. Nixon was born in Yorba Linda , Ca l ifornia 
I 
on .fanuary 9th, 1913 , the second son of Hannah and Frank 
Nixon ' s five sons . He g r e w up in 1;he Quaker community of 
W'nlttler, C1:1.l.ifornia , \-!here he completed elementary and 
J secon clar·y schools and als o attended vihi -cr.i er College . 
During t.he time he l.Jas in hi g h school and college 
Nixon worked in his father ' s combinati on gas station rutd 
general store . ~t Whittier Col l ege he ma jored in history and 
excelled in deba ting , p~us he took ru1 i ntens e int erest in 
4. 
student government and ln his senior year he bccwne stt.tdent 
body president. Nixon also p l o.ye d footbalJ at \..Jhitt:i.er and 
according t o his biographers h e p l ayed it not good, bu t with 
determination . In 1934, he reccj.ve d his B. t . degree with 
h onors . 
As a result of his s cholasti c achievement in college 
Nixon won a full tuition s cho l a rship to Duke University ' s Law 
S chool . At Duke h e became stude n t body pre s i den t , was 
elected t o the Order of the Coit and in 1937 , g~aduDted fr om 
Law School with honors. Then he rA turned to Whittie r and 
joined t he lKw firm of Wj.ngert and Bewley , which soon bec~1e 
Rr~H1 •:: y } Kn00p and l-Ii:xon., 
In Sanuar·-y of 191.1.2 , aft r; r t h e Unit.e d States enter~d 
World ~v'ar I I , !Hxon vJent t o \.Ja.sh i ng t on D. C. a s an at t orney 
in the tire rationine:; section of t he Office ot' Emergenc-y 
Hanagement. Su bsequently he entere d the Navy i n Augus t 1942 
as a Li eutenant (j . g .) and served as a g round officer for the 
Comba t Air 'I'rans.port Command 1n the South Pacific. He wEs 
dis c.he.r ged with the r ank of Lteu tens.nt Conunan der in January 
of 191~6, 
Shortly aft e r' hi s r e l eas e from t he Navy Ni xon be c ame 
a Republican cand i date f or Congre::;s fr om the 'rwe l ft.h 
Congressional Di s tri c t of Ca J.ifornla . I n what was de:~cr·i bed 
a s a hard- hi Lt ing c amp a .ign h e heat hi.fJ Democratic opponent. 
J·e .Pr'Y Voorhi s ? Durin g t he caJnpaign Nixon assePted tha~ a 
vo t e f or h1m and against Voorhis ~wuld be a vote against the 
Poli t ical 1 cti on Commit t ee of the CIO , ~1h.lch h e regarded as 
crnMtunist - dominated . He won the elec t ion i n Novcnber of 19~6 
and was r e - elected in 1948 by both parties under the Cal i for-
ni a c ross-filing sys t cm o 
Nixon ' s e oll!lllittee assi gnments in t.he House h a d a 
l as t ing effec t on his politicn l future . Whi l e a member of 
t he Educati on and Lab or Commi t tee , he worked with the sub-
c omrni tte e that d r afted the Taft-Har tley Act i n 1947 , thereby · 
e stablishing himse l f as a conservative on domesti c polic,. 
Ho-we\·or he (!j_cJ favor ehanges on civiJ. r:i..ghts issues 
sup;ort .i.ng -'~bo n.ni:.i- r_, nJJ. tax bill in l9LI.9 and tho Fair 
ErnpJ.oymE-nt .Prncti. r. e ~; ;:'. ct of l9)0o L8.ter dtlring the se.tr•e e£•a 
as a rnember of a Select Commit tee on Ji'orcj gn Aid ( kno•.<n f<G 
t he Herter Corr:.  .>nH.tee after it ' s cl:air·man , Chrj_stian A. Herter• 
o f Mas sachuse t ~s) Nixon ccntri bu ted to the g.e oun d\vark for the 
Harshall P l 3n.o His vcttng record proved hlm to be a strong 
i nLerr,ationall:st , an el\.poaent of programs for• fore i gn a i d and 
mu -c. tw 1 [.;e cu ri t y . 
A.lorLg \•Jlt't Ka rl E . f.hmdt , cl'~ ::ti:cman of the Hous8 
Un-Aine.l'i. can J,cti vi ties Committee to Hhi ch he had b0en 
appoinLad, Nixon col~aborated on a bill requi ring ~ommunist­
front o:cg~ni zations to reg i R te1• \.·J :L th t he Attorney Gen eral. 
'l'h eir proposal \.JP..S inco:rporn. ted i t t po.rt in t he Internal 
Seeurity Act o f the Ei ghty - f irs t Con[:;r e,::;.s , 'l'h e Un- Amer•ican 
A c. ti vi ties Conuni t tee r s invest i gation in 191+8-- 1~9 of Al ger 
Hiss, a fo rmer S t ate Department official, brought Nixon 
nationul prominence . Nixon at the time insisted on a 
confrontation be b1ee n Hiss and his acc user , Whit t aker 
Chambers , vlh:i.ch led to H:t ss 1 s c onvi ction on p e r jtu•y ch.a r ges 
6 
in 19~0. Discussing hi s role a t thi s time Nixon ac~1owledged , 
that the Hiss case l eft a re s i due of hatred and host il ity not 
only among Communists, but among substa t-.tial seg111ents of' t h e 
press and in te1lcctLlal community , vJhi ch rema ins to this day . 
Still another source of hostility tow &r d Ni xon was his 
condLlc t of h i. :=3 19~)0 c.ampaign , again;;t Helen Gaha8€ll1 Dou(sla ~; 
f or l·,he S~HUJ "l· 6 • ~l8.!'!,V observers (',allf,d i t the dirtiest 
c arnya.:i gn on .r.'e(;ur·d. Nixon exp l o:i. t e d the issue of the 
corn~nunis t threa t t o internal security, vJh:i. ch at the time was 
a major conc e:C'n to the n at ion . He charged Jv1rs . Doug l as with 
being soft on communi sm in her voting record as a repre sen -
t a tive from Californi a . Dur ing the election he de feated her 
by B. v ote of 680,000 v ot es , 'I'hen in De cember of 19SO, h e wa.s 
appo inte d t o fill t he unexpired t erm o f retiring Senator 
Sheridan DO\mey . 1'his gave Nixon s enior i ty o ver the other 
Republica n freshman Senator s of t he Eighty-Second Congre:os . 
As a result h e was assigned to the Labor and Public We l fare 
Conm1it tee and the Expenditures in Executive Dep artme nt s 
Commi.tt.e e . During t he time he was a Senator h e continued to 
s upport fore ign aid and colle ct1.v e security measures . 
Meanwhile on domestic matters he voted for a. proposal to 
establi sh title of the states t.o ttdelands and t he h • 
resources , and f or reductions in funds for floo d control and 
soil conservation . 
7 
In 1952 at the Republican Na tionn. J. Convention Nixon 
vJD.s chosen to be the running mate of DvJl.ght D. EirHmhm.Jer , 
the Reptlbli erLn n01ninee for presiderlt. As tho c ampaign 
rhe toric incre~sdd he accused the Democrats of indiffere~ce 
t o the conununi. s t threat and of c.::>rr·nptio:1 in government . 
However the l atte r all8ga~ion backfired, when Nixon was 
c.harged \-J lth :i. mpcoperJ.y rceeivi.ne; an eight een thousand dollar 
.fuG.d !'J> om Cf).1.ifc)r·nit!. 1:aekers~ v.J ilih. bu,".>ine sr- inter~ ~t.s. 'l'hj_s 
ch<-->.rge a }_m0s t. c :J.:u;ed ~- he Republ i cans and lUsenho'.rler to drop 
Nlx0n from the Repub lican ticket. However to defend himse lf 
Nixon made a nation-wide televis i on speech , now known as his 
famous 11 Checkers Speech" . I n the speech h.;~ maintained that 
the money from -che .fund paid only political expenses , an d 
that not one cent was used for personal expenses. During the 
speech he referred to his wifa 1 s r espectable Republi c an 
"cloth coa t'' ( some Democrats repor~edly accepted mink coats 
in retarn f'or favors ) and also to his family dog Checkers 
that vi as , admi t tedly , a eirt·. r1any list en0rs r·idiculed his 
speech as maudlin , but enough letters poured into Republican 
headquarters supporting Nixon for him to be ' reta ined on tho 
ticket as vice-pres iden t ial nominee~ 
8 
In the e lection Eisenhower nnd Nixon de f eat ed Adlai E. 
Stevenson and Senator John Sparkman o f' JUabama in November of 
1952. Nixon was subsequent ly s worn into office as the second 
younges t vic e - president in history , one week after his 
fortieth birthday . 1'hen again i.n 19 .S6 along \·lith Ei.sen.hot.Jer· 
he was r e-elected after running agaj_nst the Democratic 
nominees Stevenson and Senator Estes Kefauver. 
As vic8-president under .President Ei.~enhower he t ook 
pa1•t in the administrat i on and ~-Jas l<ep t well informed , a.bou t 
the presi dent 1 s policies anc1 plans . 'J.'hen Hhen Eisenhm-.Jer had 
a heart at.tack in 195~) , and was later ill in 1956 , and 1957 , 
N l xoE assLUJ'!E' d c;; .. N:mcn~ial and exe cut i.ve du t:i..e3 , beyond the 
tradi t.i onal r ou t ine func tions of the vice - pr"3sident's of'fiee . 
In 19.:)0 the president and Ni xon drevJ up an agreement dele--
gat ing power to the vice - pres i dent in case of presidenti a l 
disabi l i ty . Several times in Eisenhower's abs ence Nixon 
presided over meet ings of the Cabinet and the Nationa l 
Security Counci l . While he served as chairman of the 
President. 1 s Committee on Government. Contrac t s , N:Lxon con tr i.-
buted gr0atl-y to the red uc t ion of racial discrtm:Lnation, in 
companj es engaged in v1ork for the federal governr:~en t . 
In t he eight years that he was vice-prestdent Nixon 
visited f i fty - four countri es on goodwill tours an d d iplomatic 
mi ssions . These goodwi ll trips included two of speci al 
signi flc n.nc e . On a trip to CaJ>aca.s, Venezue l a he pr•oved his 
capad.ty for coo1ne s s in an emergency , when he and h i s wife 
v1 ere mobbed by anti-United States demonstra tors . 'l'he next 
y e ar on a visit to Russia h e exchanged vi evJS on a number of 
i ssues ~tli.th Soviet Premie r Ni kita s . Khrushchev • . 
During t he 5_mpromptu segmen ts of his ta!_ks wi th 
ID1r u shche v on American-Sovi et differences , whi ch were 
t e l e vi sed to the Uni t ed States , Nixon stood up to Khrushchev 
in a confrontat i on on the d i fferecces . 'l'he meeting betwe e n 
the two world leaders took place i n Mosc ow at the Americ an 
Na t ional Exhibition 1 D sh ow room of kitchen appliances , so it 
Ha s subs equently g i\ren the n an:e of 11 t~.itchen Debate n. 
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In 1960 Ni xon won the Repub lican p r esi dential 
nom:i.natio~1 vi :LLb li t tle opposition . He th(~n carr ied out a 
cm11pai gn pleO.g.:: t o e au1paig n in a l l fi.f ty o f t h e sta tes. 
Nixon faced h~_s young er Democrati c rival, Sena tor John F . 
Kennedy of Hass :il.chu.s ct t. s in fou·c n a t ionally t(;J.e vised debates 
tha t p rob ably influenced the outcome of the e l ection . The 
vice-president was defeated alon g l-Ji th his r unning mate Henry 
Cabot Lodge , by one of the n arro1.ves t mal~gins of presldential 
c andidates in American hi s tory . He l os t the election by j us t 
over 100 , 000 vote s out of the 60 , 000 , 000 cast . 
After bein g defe a te d Nix on j oined the Los Ange l es law 
firm of Adams , Duque and Hazeltine , in 1961 . At the s ame 
time he remai n ed .. ti tular l eader of his pa:rtry· a n d made his 
vi ews kno-vm through p ubli c speaking t ours a n d a newspaper 
10 
column. for the Los An ge le s 'flmes - Mirror syndicate . 'l' h en i n 
1962 in an a t tempt to re-es t ablish h imse l f poll t.Lc a lly he : an 
for governor of Cali fornia.. Although h e \·Ja s successful ln 
gain i n g the nomination h i s fi ght in the primary split the 
party , and t h e incwnben t Democra t :Lc Gov ernor, Eclrw.md G. Brm-m 
defeated h:lm at the polls . Aft er· being defeated by almost. 
J.ooo ,ooo votes out of the 6,000 , 000 cast Nixon blame d the 
preRs fo~ his California defeat . On the day after hi s tiefea t 
he said , 11 You won ' t hav e Nixon to kick aroun d an;rm.o re , 
because , gentlemen, this ls my l ast pre ss conf erencE. . " 
Shu~t ly afterwards Nixon left Calj.for~ i a . I n J une of 
J.96J he J.r:oved to Ne t-.! York City and j o j.n od tho l.a1--1 f1.r-m of 
Nudg e ) S t e r·n , I3al d\vin nnd 1l'odd , ~1hi ch lo. t~.~r made Nixon a full 
p artner. Du. ;:ing tile next six y e ars he earned a t least 
200 ,000 doJ J.ars annu ally. Meamvhi le dis clai ming poll tica l 
ru~bition he devoted a great deal of thi s s ame time to 
re-uniting t he Republ:i.can party . He campaigned for the 
presidentia l nominee Senator Barry Gol dwater in 1961~, then 
for congres sional and gubernator i a l candidates i n 1966 . Als o 
he held many p r ess conferences and on business trips abroad 
often commented on Ameri can for eign policy. 
Then in February of 1968 Nixon annow1ced tha t he wo ul d 
be a candi date f or the Hepubl i can pres ide n t i al nomination ~ 
After being succ essful in the pr i mar ies he picked as his 
rllnning mat e Gove rnor Spiro 'l' • .b.gncw of Marylan d . This 
ll 
caused some cyn1ca l speculati.on , denied by Nixon supporte r s , 
that Nixon had promised Southe rn suppor·ter s , sueh as Senator 
J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina a vice - pre3ident 
accep t able t o the South . 
The n as i f t o e r ase his loser ' s i mage, a more se lf 
assured. Hixon emerged at. the h eHd of a v!el1 orgo.n5.:3ed 
campaign. 'l'he CU.."lllJaig n Y.J&S aimed at hi~ De[llocratic opponent ) 
vice--presi dent Huber t H . Humphrf'ey . 
The subsequen t election \-vas \v On by Nixon as h e de i.'e rc .. lG (i 
Humphrey by _5 10 , 000 votes_, out of the 73,000,000 cast . After 
t.hi;; election in l·Jc v c:11ber of 1968 Ni xon took office as the:) 
Prc~idont o f the United S t a tes on J anuary 20 , 1969 . I n hla 
:l.nnugu.ral addres !:l o.:-, J'anuury 20th the t h eme was 11 Let Us •• • • 
Go Fortvar d Together ': . Also in the j_nn.ugure.l he made a plea 
i'o.r r econci l iatj.on among Americans in dealin g lvith t he 
conflicts abr oad <U1 d r acia l w1rost and other forms of dis cord 
at b o:ne . 
S ince be c omi n g pres ident Nixon has been g iving top 
priori. ty to e ndj.nt;; the V.L e t- fT am \~Jar. He has sou.ght among 
ether n.eans t o Vi e tnami ze tho vw.r· a nd rt;duce American 
c ormn i tmen t s in Vi etnarn . However a t the vJr i ti.ng or this :papBr 
the Vie t n ::tmi :0 a t; j_on policy was proc ee ding s l o <v er t. han scrme 
critics would like . 
On the posi tive side accordinc to s ome crlti cs have 
been Nixon ' s attempts to n egotiate wi th the Sov i et Union , on 
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strategic arms limitat ions , and his proposals for refor ms of 
the Selective Servi ce Sys tem . Also he has been praised in 
some quarters for his proposed r eforms of the welfar·e program, 
wh ich rJOuld pr ovide a guaranteed basic annual lncome for 
fami lies . 
President Nixon ' s wife and the First Lady is th~ 
formeJ• 1'helma. Catherine Patr:i.cia ftynn who \vas a teacher of 
business subjects at 1'1'hittier High School , when she 111et Nixor; .• 
They met at tryouts for a. play of a loca l e.mate u. r grour , and 
vJere 1narri ed on June 21st , 1940 . The Nixcn 1 s h a ve tHo 
dnu~hters, P~trl cia (Tricia), ~or~ 1~ 1946 , and J u li e , born 
in l9 t~8 . '.f. rv~ i:· y ou,:;ge s t dau,ght e r b~ c ame tb..e wife of 
Ei se rl.!J m~ex· 1 .s t;r <:u:d:>on, David Eis enh o,,1er in De c embe.r of 1968. 
The presj_de nc is a spor t s !:'~Hl and keeps ln shape by 
playj ng golf in the summe r, in the cooler months he takes up 
bowling . After being elected preside nt he sold his Fifth 
Avem.J.e apartment house in Manhat t an and bought ttvo seas:i.de 
hous es in Key Biscayne , Florida . ~hen in 1969 he acquired a 
'' ~lhite House dest 11 a c1o.ssic Spani.sh hollse in San Clemente, 
California his native s t ate . 5 
IV. DEFINITION OF 'r~RHS 
While most of the terms u sed in this thesis a r e 
c 
:.J Charles Hort tz, ( ed. ) • C~_Ien t Bio~.?L.~[ry , Y..2..l· ).Q. , Lf. t 
(New York , N.Y . : 'l'he .tL W. \-.iil~on Company , 196<1 ), p . JO. 
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well known , it i s sti ll deemed necessary to define two terms 
for their meaning , as used in this thesis. 
Communtcations MedJ.a . · The term comrnunicat,:i.ons media 
refers to the electronic media of radio and televinion. 
Prcs~ c '.l'he term press in t.his thesis means all 
news papers that cover nation al political cmnpaigns. It 
includes news magazines and periodicals that report national 
political c e.mpaigns . Al so for the purposes of th:\.s thesis, 
a~l of the major wire services and news representatives of 
radio ~n~ t~levision stations are ccnside red to be members 
of tho p ! ' e s 8 • 
V ~ ,JUS'IIF'I CA'riON F011 Srl'UDY 
There is an increasin g need for s tu·dyinG political 
leaders use of cmnmuni cations media . It is justifi ed by the 
J enormous wealth of k.nm-Jledge that po l iti cal sctenti s t s , 
rhet orj c:5.ans , historians , and joilrnalis t s have analyzed 
tlu·oughout his t ory . Many scholars. past and present have 
cho sen to analyze political communications of all types, and 
g i ve ample jus tifica t ion for fu rther study in their studies. 
Thi s is particul arly true of current presidential candidates 
use of the elect ronic media of t elevision~ The followin g 
theories nnd ideas about the new and emerging age of 
-• 
J 
! 
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poli t ics , and t he r eason s behin d them a r e the jus tifi c a t ions 
for this s t udy , of on e presidential candidates use of 
t e l e vi sion .• in t wo d i ffer-en t presidential c ampa i gns . 
Along wi th the chang ing n atur e o f po l i t ics c omes t he 
a ttendant ne ed for cri ticism t o keep peopl e abre a3t of what 
is t a king place on the pol:i.tlcal s c ene . I n his book , ~h~ New. 
PC?,.l~ tic~ , r eporter .and poli t ic a. l observe r J ames Perry 
de scr i be s some of the n ew technique s. He des c r i bes some of 
t he nevJ political techni ques o f pol it i cal management intra·· 
du ced by po litical management firm;; . Some of the f irms he 
c:S. tc s r..~.s ~~8:; .i. ng helpe d c on:cr.i bute nev; pol i t.ic a l tcchn:\.qnes 
i n rec ~nt el~ ctio~s ~re ; Spen cer - Robert s and Whitaker and 
Ba xt e r i.n Co.l 1forni rJ,; Jos eph Napoli t ian , Fred Ga vi er, a n d 
Halter De Vries in Hichigar. ; plus Dr . h':i. l l.iam Ropan and J a ck 
. . 6 
Tinker du.etng the 1966 Ro ckefeller c mnpal gn . .Per r-y drav.Js 
t he fo l lowing picture of a p res i dentia l c andi dat e in t he 
f Ll ture: 
The candi dat e ' s trave l s will be s che dul ed by a 
comput er . 'l'he c amp a i g n \.Jil l be l a i d out by t he· cri ti cal 
· p a t h me thod. Polls wi l l be taken ov e r and over , · 
analyzed an d cross anal yzed. Spot commerc ial s i·Jill be 
prepared weeks in advan c e of the eJ.ec t ion , and t heir 
impact. Hi l l be a l mos t subl i minal .. Researcher s wi ll re a d 
t he p o lls and st•..1dy t he data f r om a " simul ator "; t he 
i ssues they deve lop wil l • •• •• • be aimed l ike rifle sho t s 
a t the ~11o s t rec e p tive audience . • •• a n d t he c andi dat es? 
6Lewis Ches t e r , Godfrey Hodgson , an d Br uce Page , An 
!.};In~_!::ica~. ~~~.Jodr~~~ ( '£ha Pr·esidential Campai gn o f 1968 ) , 
New York , jew York . fhe Vi king Press , 1969 , p . 377. 
They will be out front, mo ving wi t h a robot-lik e 
prec ision , being fed wi t h data f r om the polls and t he 
simulator . He \·J) l l no doubt be ar t iculate, and probably 
he will be h andsome and v i gorouso 1U1d he mo.y or ma-y not 
be qual~f ied to be the next President of the Uni ted 
States . 
Anot he r c onLempor ary wri ter on the politics of t he 
f uture Co lumbia professor Penn lUmbiill analy7..e d t he politic s 
of t he coming de cades . Professor Kimba ll, who i~ L()Uis 
Ha r r is ' s , ( t he po lit i cal po l l ster) , right han d man s de f ine o. 
t he n ew po l it ics in 1968 this way : 
The contemporar y contes t fo r political vower 
character:lzed by primary r eliance on person&.l org3ni z.~- -
t iow.1 ~. n preference to party machinery , empha::; is orl 
consolld n~ing vcters rather t han on divi jing them along 
trad i tJc~al llnes of class or regi or1, prcject ion of 
poli~i~al style ~bove issues, and exploitation of the 8 
.fu)J 1·ruse (I f rnc:dern t echniques for mass comrr.uni. cat ion . 
:.. f"ormer- Philade l phia n evJspaperman J"oe l'1cGinniss who 
wrot e ~he §.e l lj_ng of t he President l 9fLt2. h ad this to 3a.y about 
f uture nat i onal po liti cal campai 8ns . 
All coming e l ections wi ll be decided by telev i si on 
c aJTipa :Lgning , but I be li eve the way i t will be u.secl Hi ll 
differ from the way t he Nixon people used i t . Ni x on 
was ult imately hurt I thin~ and lost streng t h l ate i n 
the Cfu"'Tlpaign . Tha t was because t.he public came t o 
recognize and r esen t t he fact that hj_~ televi sion 
crunpaign was so carefuJ.ly con~rolled . 
one o.f t h e most so ught after experts i n te l e visioil 
7 Ibid . , p • 3 Tt • 8 I b ld . , p . 378 . 
9
•.rhe Stockt on B~9rd, S t ockton, Calif or nia ) , Janua ry 
7 , 19 7 o , p • Ii' -T~:-----
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c ampaigninG in politics today , !"ie. !!::>.~:. fH' O(}!.;.cs0 f.i :r.!:;: -:,rJd 
de~dgned iBlevl s i on appeare.nct-.!8 for· P!c.tny }.(:.J:.dj_nz pol iti.~ ~) 
Nixon , and Ne l son Ro ckefeller . Wyckoi'f ft:;RJ.s ~:l1i::. :; <:.:y c.~ bou t 
t h o politics of the f uture : 
'fhe most promi nent c andidates :f'o::o tl:"i f; mc~·t. :; tr:i;t:'rtf.l.r~\.­
publ:ic offices j_n t he Unit.e cl 2t,ates todo.y c:.m e;<p(,r.t a. 
good amoun t of telBv:ts ion ne...,!.:: cover·e.ge and s~}'.:·u.·;_c: 
expe ct t o make libera l. paid-political use of th6 m~d i~~ . 
The ;;e candi datef> arE: eoing t o be ir.w.~e e~H!ci 'i. c.;n~es , tnc: ll' 
ahilt~y ~ o exploit) or to pro~ect the~sel~ss from tbR 
. . f ·· 1' ·1 . . . ll b ' . LG un:Lque :J!J. .L·.1e~1cc o ~ e. evJ..s::.on vn .e ~~- ne ccss1 'GJ. · 
Internati on a lly known journalist Rater~ MacN~~l 
Napo~itan l n May of 1967 . Napolitan s. c ampr .. ip:. . . ... o~rnc ... c.r on 
the ~a~ional scene stated: 
\4hen f:ither> paxty b~s option s l n the sal.e~ tion o f a 
pr·•~s :i. den c. inl cnP did 3. t. e ) m; e of the :'18. j O!.' co:-rd i tj c:ts 
t hat they are going to make is the capehili~y of th~t 
?_a.nci .i. d:tte to c?n~)<.lign through Lh? teJ.evi:::; ,j·?~ me~li~.r'1 J 1 He has to ba aole to ge t the musn out of n~s moubn . · 
Columbia B:road canti~1g f -yster.1s presi d0at F'ra.ttll. S t.; an!.ion 
\·wuld disagree vlith I!'los t television c;dt1c8 IJ.oou.t t.l:-H~ nse cf 
t he med.5.t<rn. He stutcd in an article on _pol i ti ea l debate; 
The r e is no suc:.h ;~h.i.ng as G. 1 TelegE:n~. c 1 persona:~i.r, y 1 
it. c an only g :i.ve a p c rsona li. ty that exlsts a wi de r· 
10 
G-3ne ~~/y cko f.f > ·~J-~ .I ~f.!._'i.~ .Q~_nclt~a ~.§.~. . ( N r.: ~.J Y. o rk , 
N .. Y . 'l'he f'Jnc i<l i l ] an Co . l 96U) , p . i-.t.'orwar· d . 
1 1Hobert NacNeil , 'l 'h§ .. P.eo..r.J..e f·lc..chi.~~-~. 
~vr.n~tor·., ~-Hlci. T_.ondor~. H<:rpex· ~~nd r-:rm . :LO.f.H) .. 
( N~H York~ 
p. ll.:O. 
J j 
audience . . .• Far from creating sy9~hettc personali tie s 
televi sion c nn only ur.mas l\ l,)Jeln. ·-c:. 
Hm-Jever Robert l'1.8cilleil i nG0t'nat j onal new.~ cor!'espon-
dent who obse rved the J.9(l t3 pr6!ddent i a!. ca:npa i gn.} i)lus t h e 
assa ss i.nations o f C1La ::.'tln Luther Eing ~md t<ober•r. I\ erui t:d :.v .• 
would disagr•ee ht i t l·: C: 1.:.-3 j: rcsi ci.ent Frank :::; tar.. tC'n on t:r:.•21 us e 
of television . MacN e ~ l ~ ~ates : 
I believ e that televi sion ca~ . ~n are~~ sens~ ; 
11 create 11 a personnli ty by f~ lt(·.'.' i nf G'Jt scme f' ac:et:.o o f 
a mun 1 s pers onality an d l ett incs t!-H'GL:t:t. ccr<:~~.::. n o tne:!."' 1 
a s h a ppened to Nixon i n 1960 . The telcvj.sion nudien~e 
is c onditioned t o expec t ce r tain tr a i ts as c~ tract ive 
by its prolonged expos~re t0 the star orien~ed 
entert ainment system. l 3 
l<~ven Lefo-:·e the adv ent o f' modern te levision or! the · 
n ationaJ. p 0 l it i cal ~ cene poll t l c~l wri ters fe l t that t he 
comrnnnic::.ticns media affec ted vot~_ng h ab itE. ~·fri t i ng a b out 
hoH voters make up t he i r· m) nds i n a pre ~;i dentie.l oloction 
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Pau l I<' . Lazars f f: ld, Bernard Here lsf.:n und H&ze l '.J.aade t after 
study ing the ~.940 presidential car.1palgn C!;l-.r.lo to these 
con c lus ionD: 
'l' o the ex tent that t he forma l ;11edia exer ted a11y 
influence a~ a ll on vote int entions o r a ctual vote , 
r h dj o pro\'ed. .nore efi'ect. ive t h s.n the nei-Jspape r s . • .• 
A political conventi on i s broadeas t , and the 
l istencrf\ c an vlrtu.al J.y p·art1cipate :Ln the ceremonial 
occasiQn; !lC r::.n respond t o audtence e nthu.siasrn , he 
can direct l.y experience t.he ebb and f loH of tension • •• • 
12r., 1 <.C t 
l ' r <3.nt< 0 tan on 1 
'l'ele vi ~ion . ( N eH York , 
-.,- --c--···r:-\'"" 
.!.9 , l 9 L>4J . 
13Ro bert Hadle il, op . 
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Politics on t he air more readily becomes ru1 active 
experience for the listener than politics in "he nevJs -
paper does f or the r e ader . lt represen ts an F:..pproach 
to a face-to-fa ce contact with ~he principals in the 
case. It is closer to a perspna l. rel a ti onship. and 
- lL.J • h ence more effective .•. .. • •• 
Nm-1 vJi th the wi d0spread u::>e of televisi on i n mo dern 
political campaigns it is deemed t: ven moi'e important to 
evaluate ' s use of television in n ational political campaigns . 
President Nixon ' s use of television i s not an unprecedented 
study in t t .e fi e l d o f cornmun ication:::. . Hov1evcr it i s 
justLficd b~~ c. a 1J..se ~--:-.~di c c.tions are t h a t fut ure presidential 
campaigns ;.;ill be bt~ilt primari ly on media politica l 
campa i gns , r s.t her than the tradi tio:1al political method of 
meeting the p eople , face to f ace . Al so it will c ompa re two 
crunpaie;ns by the se.me man and shoul d provide some insi ght 
into h ovJ national presi dent i a l media ca.mpait;ns a r·e planned o 
Plus if we are gettin g to the point -where c:audida tes \·Jj. lJ. be 
more rernove d from the p eopl o , it is important tha t we u.nder-
stand h ow they u.se te l e vi s ion to get our vote . Bence the 
need for• better under standing of the political 11se of 
televis ion . 
14Paul F . La~arsfeld , Bernard Berelsen , and Haz el 
Gaude t , T!}~ Pe_s:>J2_le.!_~ _9holc~ , ( How the Voter Makes Up His lV\ind. 
ln a Pre siuen cio.l Campai gn , New York, }! . Y . Duell Sloan and 
Pearc e; 19 1!4 ) , pp . 128- 1? 9o 
J 
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Supporting the theory tha t pre s identi ul c andi de. t es , 
and aspirants to the office will face an increased possibi· 
li ty of assassination , Yale Law School profes sor AJ.exander 
M. Bickel had this to s a y: 
No s ociety will l ong remain open and attached to 
peaceable politics and the de c en t and contro lJ. e d use 
of public force if fear for personal i~fety is the 
ordinary experience of l arge numbers . / 
Three British journalists writlng about the 1968 
Presidential c ampai gn also wr·ot3 about the chan g ing nature 
of politi cal c ampaigns i n the United States , hecause of the 
i ncreased possibility of assass i nat ion . Authors Lewis 
Che8ter , Godfrey Ji0 i_j.!:':son , and Br uce .Page writing in the i r 
I t ~ny wel l b~ that mo dern polit i c i ans aspiring t o 
t he Pres i dency will face specia l dangers and t hat 
assas s ina tions will more frequently occur than in the 
past. There are two kinds of c au s es that contr ibu te 
19 
to the in cr easing danger of the Pres i dency , one is the 
seeming ly cont imling tren d to personal i ze and dramatize 
t he Pres i dency, making it overshadow all other offices 
:i.n this countr·y , j_n a manner pr obably not forseen by 
the foun di nG fathers of the cons titution. 1l'he se c ond 
c on tributing ca use i s the t endency of television to 
increase the 11 penetra t;ion 11 of political images . If not 
of poli ~ical informa tion in the public mind . ~oday the 
atte n tion of ever yone, lunatic and norrn~l citizens are 
concentrated on one man the Prcsident . l b 
Stati s tically there is support that the trend is away 
from personal appearances bec a use of the increased incidence 
15 
Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson, Br uce Page , op . 
cit • ' p • 3 69 c 
369-· 370~ 
~ 
I 
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of assassination attempts . During the Truman adminlstre.tion 
deranged people locked up for threatening to kill the 
president were ten-per-year . Thjs increased to seventeen 
per-year during Eisenhower ' s tenure ns president. Then , 
there was a dramatic increase to thirty-five per-year during 
President Kennedy's years in office . This increased 
42 r:' • J ' r f . t . ff . 17 as trononri cally to ,·_ ./ 1n onnson s · J.rs year 1r1 o 1ce • 
.Also the National Commission on the Causes and 
Prevention of Violence , ha s recommended that presidents and 
other political leaders, cut back appearr.nces at mass public 
meetlng:s L'"). an effort to reduce the da11ger of assassination. 
The eomn· i. :: n ~- on :i.n &. 1~80 pae;e report on ass ass l.nc-t ion and 
political v.ic.lence j_n the United States mude several r·ecom-
mendations . lncluded were some of the followin g steps 
designed t o r educe the violence potential : 
Steps to be taken to ensure the safety of politi cal 
candidates and civil rights leaders . One of the steps 
wo uld be to rely increasingly on televi sion to reach 
mass audiences . It urged enough free time be made 
available toward the end of presidential election 
campa.:i.gns to change the present sys tern of in tensl ve 
per sonal appearances . Chairman of the eorr.misslon Dr . 
Mi.l ton Eisenho~1er inC.icated the value of public appear--
ances may be overrat ed anyway . He said the report 
doesntt quite say po)itical candidates shouldn ' t appear 
in public ••• but some situations are ~JOrse than others . 
Large outdoor mass -meetings probably reach less then one 
per- cent of the electorate . You1gr..n reach more than tha t in one night on television . 
--·---------
17Ib:id ., P • 371 . 
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St oekton Record . Peri 1 to PoJ i tice.J Leaders _Live~, 
(Stockton, Ce.lifornia) , November]rd:-- 1969-, -p 71:----
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'l'he c ommission stated they were not predict.ing an 
outbreak of poli~ ical assassinations , but they warned that a 
number of conditions do exist today th~:t.t make the ground more 
fertile for such acts. 19 
Also , the National Broe.dcasting Company has recently 
as ked for the repeal of the 11 equal I; ime a requirernen t of the 
FederaJ_ Cornmuni ca ttons Act as it applies to presidential 
campaigns . The National .i3roadcasting Company in e.sldng for 
i te .r·e pi;'al h a s promised that in return it would grant liberal 
pr i me ~i~e coverage , free of charge, to presidential and 
vice -p r Gn5 dent inl c undi d&tes of the major parties i n the 
1972 CEL!r!p a:\.gn . In e. n ed.i torial in the San I•'rancls co Chronicle 
the following points in f av or of the suspension were mad&: 
That such coverage has been a pl.' act ice.l impc s si bi 11. ty 
under the offending provisiorJ. , which requires equal 
coverae;e for all opposing candidates of all the minor 
parties. As dozens of minor partie s crop up through 
the ye a rs and produce scores of candidates who are in no 
practical sense contenders, this regulation has backfired 
by keeping the leading candj.dates as well , from tele-
vision confrontations and discussion of the issues . Also 
congress has more than onco acknm~le dged the a.b11urdity 
of the regulations by suspending it for specific candi -
dacies on specific occasions. its e xistence has injured 
the elective system by stemming the free flow of 
information , and its repeal would confer great benefi l; , 0 upon the candidates , the parties and the voting public . L 
19 Ibid ., p . 1 . 
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Editorial , Srut Franci s co Qhronicle , San Francisco , 
California $- J tm.e 8 s l970-;-p . 36" 
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'l'hese t Ho trends , the changing nature of presidential 
campaigns , \v :i. th more r eli ance on the use of t elevision image 
building , than personal appearances , plus the possible 
changes of Federal Communi.cation rules toward presidential 
polit i cal campaigns , creates a continuing need for crit i c i sm 
of' polit1c<>.l campaigns . It esped ally creates a n 0ed for· 
evaluation of nation al political campaigns an d the use of 
t elev:i.s:ton during those campaigns . 
leaders~ The criticism of politica l l eaders is not new , but 
i s a eontlnuing t h i.r:g since the days of Aristotle . In the 
defi ned the nee d r or rhetorica l critici sm of political 
l eade r s in America. thus :: 
We live in a worl d of t a lk-----talk t hat influences 
our lives , from the minor acts of a loca l c lub to the 
policy - mo.king de cision s of our governmen t . In a demo-
cracy such as ours , this i mpli es a very real obligation 
upon the citizenry to appraise intelligently what its 
representative s say; thus is the criticisn1 of speeches 
mad? neces sa21 by the nature of our politica l and s ocial 
envlronmen t . ·- . 
Although televi s ion as a means of r eaching the 
populace i s comparative l y new a s a politica l device, speech 
h as existe d as the primary method since the advent of 
civilized cultures . This g ive s historical justifica tion for 
21L t B . d C . A Th S h ' ' iti es ·er alr , ralg • - onssen , peec vr c ism , 
( NeH York, N. Y. , 'rhe Hona l d Pr·ess Company-~ 194B),p-.-v;-· 
I 
• j 
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analys i s of the contemporary medium of te levision, t.Jhi c:h 
today i s the prima ry method of c ornmunication between the 
22 
n a tional po l it icians and the public . It also gi ves 
credence to the study of this thesis , Hhich seel!.:s to analyze 
and compare the use of t elevis i on by one presidenti al 
c and i date in two campaigns . 
Po litical use of te levision should be the subject of 
anal ysj_s , criticism and eva l uati.on , just as s imple s peecr:es 
were in t he time s of the Greek and Roman cultures . Today 1 s 
citizens living in a much more populated worJd , with less 
diract cont~c~ ~it~ their leader s , undoubtabJ~ need mor e 
expe.r·t. help l n evalt:!.a tion of poli t.ic a l :Leaders and their 
p oL1 c1es . ihat thsn , is the main justifica tion for the 
anal-y sis of the Li.SG of communicati on.s media in politi ca l 
campaigns • 
HE'l'HODS OF' ANh.LYSIS AND SOURCES OF DA'l 'A 
range all t he way from a histori ca l approach to a simple 
co;:npara t i -v-e study . 'l'he me thod deemed most appropr i a.te for 
this study t.vas a simple comparison of Nixon 1 s use of tele-
v:t s5.on in t\vO different poli tical c ampaigns . This approach 
-------------
2~. s. , CCnp;re ssional Hecord , 9 l s t Cone;re::;s , 2nd 
Session , S- 36 37 , - a len<:lar-No . 74.7 , ~~eport No. 91-·'151, t1arch 
"5 1°70 ' J s t:.. ) 7 ' 1 l • 0 
was considered t o be the mos t pruct1.cal for this study , 
because of t he recency of the campai gn s , which provides an 
abundance of material readi l y av&ilable f o r use in t he study ~ 
~~he methods of analysis and sources of do.tu Here 
de emed to be of great im~ortance in the writ ing of thj.s thesis . 
They ·.wre considere d to be i mportant to answe r the que~tion, 
of how Nixon u s e d television in t\VO p res i dential campai gns. 
Only by relying on ma j or s ources and report s of au.thori ties 
who were observ e r s dur i n g the c ampaigns cculd the re s ult :i.ng 
study be authenicated . So only experts in the areas of 
.journali sm, poli i.::lc~ and televis ion Here us e d as prima.r-y 
s ource s after an ext~nsive survey of avai l able matez·ial on 
the tvw car.1pai gns was made.. Pnbli ca tions lnc luded books 
based on both campaign s , ma jor ne\~s sources , including Hire 
wi r e service reports, were analyzed , an d selectivity used for 
the extrac t ion of the major items of importance, that 
affected the televis i on campai gns of 1960 and 1960 . Th ese 
Lf t hen \v ere c onsolidated in this thesis to r eflect Nixonf s 
J 
over a ll ::,trategy and use of t e lev1. s ion in the t\w c ampaigns. 
Of coui· se it reflec t s only the j udgment an.d op inion o f the 
writer of this thesis in tho sel ect ion of ma terial. Therefore 
the wri ter t a kes full credit for any inaccuracies or bad 
~ 
t 
.. 
1 
d 
judgment contained in the thesis . 
OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZA'fiON 
Chapters II and III of this thesis will be entitled, 
Cfj:npui gn 1960 and Curnpaic;n 1968 r espe c. t i vely . .Each chapte r 
·Hill start with the backgrou . .>1d of ~he ti:nes , wi1ich w:ill 
consist of a summa ry of ~he iss ttes and problems of tha t 
period in history. ~his will be followe d in both chapte r s by 
a sy~tematic study of Nixon ' s use of television as a politJ. -
cal vehicle, designed to elec t him President of the Unit e d 
S&atcs . ~side fro~ this ~oth chapt0rs will v~ry somewhat in 
content . 
c.r~ :q~ t.6 r.' IV ,,~ \ J.J. bo a genera 1 survey 1n brief , of' 
Nixon ' s use of television sinc e h is inaii~Lt.raticn chrout:;h 
January of 1971. The last chapter, Chapter V will cont ain a 
sumrna.ry of the comple t;e thesis, conclusions and implication:3 
of the s tudy , plus sugges t ions for possible f urther studies 
in the same general area . 
CHAPTER I I 
CAMPAIGN 1960 
INTRODUC'J: ION 
This chapter i s concerned with the foll owj_n g questi ons : 
How did Nixon u se televi sion in his 1960 presidential 
Cf\l.npa:Lgn? 1:/hy did he use te levi sian t h e way he did'? 
Th e -bas ic ques tion however , is how the vice-pre sident 
us ed the Media of television dur i n g his 1960 presidential 
c ampai gn . To answer that question it i s also neces sary to 
toi)Ch on Hixon 1 3 pe:r•0 ona lity and the ba ekgrounct of t h e t i mes . 
BA.CKGHOUND OF 'l'HE TH1BS 
Events that~ toolc place and became :i. ssues of' th e 
cH.rnpai.gn l n 1960 t-Jere Reveral . 'l'he first ma jor j_ssue o:f 
wor1 d - Hi de i mpor·tance h appened on Hay .5 , 1960 , l.Jhen Soviet 
Premi e r Niki t a Khri.l schev t o l d hi s congress about the shooting 
down of a U-2 plane~ ThiG c a used world- wide repercussions 
and American dip lomacy seemed to border on t he br1.nk of 
d i[;a s t. er . ~~polcesma.n for the United States m~.1.intained tha.t. vJe 
had no sp y p l anes flying over Russ ia . Then the fol l owing 
events happenfld in 1'1ay [lnt;.~ June l~o set the car.1paign t emper 
for the 1960 p·ce s identi a l campalgn . 
1 o 'L'he U - 2 plane was shot down and our spokesman vJas 
exposed as false . 
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2~ Presi dent Eisenhower• flew t o Paris for a summit 
conference that i:'mnedia t e 1-y- collapsed . 'rhcri 
following the collapse o f the c onference h e vl. s 
denounced to the \•lOrld by Sov:i e t Fr•em.l.er 
YJlrushch.ev as a 11 hypocrit e '1 and a. "liar", 
3 . Hioting in '1' urkey crea ted chaos a.nd near-J.y wiped 
out a frien dly government . 
!t . Student riots in Korea top p l ed the €;overnment and 
ousted President Syngmon Hhee . 
5. He l aU.onships vJ.Lth Ct1.b a and Fidel Castro graJ •.!a lly 
deteriorat ed t o total host ility , with Cas tro 
expropriat i ng Amerlca n in t ere sts in Cuba, and 
vielcoming Khr:.1shchev and h is r o ckets . 
6 . B, inally President Ei s enh mve r was excluded fr c.m 
visiting J a p a n on a peac e mj.s sion , becaus e o f 
riots and prote s ts a gainst h is scheduled visit. 
The p1'e s i d e nt had. t r a v e l ed 60 , 000 mil~s on a 
'.NO('ld - ;! ::.de p eace mi sfd. on during t he p r e vio us 
e i g h t e -:'n month s t o e nd np he t ne h nm:i.l i e t e d ::md 
exr lJ ~~d frrnn J apan <l 
~~ he se. v-:e:.(' e sume of the ma jor problems and i s sues the 
pres i d entia l eandi date s f a ced, as r.he 1960 preside ntial 
campaig n got under way . 
Another important f actor that must be c.onsi.dered :i.n 
any s erious study of n c andidates use of television is hj_s 
personal5.ty. Because that pers onality rnay well affect his 
deci s ion::; and hm-1 he cari'i e s them out. Also that basic 
per3onality may greatly affect the type of television irnag e 
he portr·ays as a poll tical candidate • 
., 
J.'l 'h e odore H . White, The Hn.k in_g 9f .~h~ .t.r·es ide !"l_t }.960 , 
(U e v.• York, New York: Athen eum Hous e, J:nc . 1961), PP • 138-139. 
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So befol'e examining Nixon's use of televis:i.on in the 
1960 pre s i dential campaig n it is de e med i mportant to t a ke a 
brief look at his personalit y as v iewe d by e xperts . J ourna-
list 'l'he ouore Hhite who has vrr·itten extensive l y on presiden-
tial elections give s the follotving impre s s ions on Ni.xon the 
man: 
Poor frorrt b oyhood , a b le , intense , da r l< a.nd wat chf u l 
as he survey s the ~wrld about him . Richar d M. Hixon 
has brought from h is i mpoverished mi ddl e -- c lass y out h 
rn~:~.ny ~ trD.nge q ualities , t he t hrus t of en ormous intern8.l 
drives , an overwhe l ming des ire to b e liked and whe r e 
he i s re buf fed, a bit te r L11p uls i ve refl ex o f l ashbacks . 
Having ma de it on h is own he h as had t o l earn t o c our t 
people whom h e ha s n e cessarily dis liked . He h as h ad 
to :· ~; ?. 1i z.<J h o >·J v n J.ner-ab l e a n a k(:: :1 man v-1l1i t hou t money o r 
f' a rd.ly pr<::: sl~ "i g<J '~an b e i n a h os-c ile 1,--JOr.ld , t h at over 
s n d ove r aJBi n sav ages h im for no reason h e can define . 
He ha .~. t;h ~ l s come to ress.rd the t.Jorld a bout h im w:l th 
a wa~y, f o r bj.dding . A broo d i n g , moo dy man, g i ven to 
J.ong stret ches o f int r ospec tion , be ~rus t s only h ims e lf 
and h is '.vi fe - - and a f ter t ha t hi s conf i dence in any 
situat i on i f.; y i e l ded only to t h e smallest poss i ble 
numb e :r o f peop l e . No oth er man for examp l e , j n s uch a 
si.tu.ati on o f Amer ican po litics as tha t i n \vhi ch Nixon 
.found himse l f during ~he Chi cag o c on vention i n 1960, 
would h a ve concluded a s ecr et c omp a ct with Rockefeller 
ln New York an d l eft his clo sest p e r son a l ai.des tota l1y 
and merciless ly un-· i n f ormed of the trans action. No 
other c an d i date of t h e top seven operated in 1960 with 
fewe r- person al or kep t more of t he crit i cal decisions 
in hi s own han ds . Richar d M. Nixon is a man of ma j~r 
talent -- but a man o.f solitary , uncertain impulse • . 
Theodore \v'hl t e also sta tes , there wa s ali·Jays this 
sens .L tl vi ~-Y in N1xon , thi s s eeking of a fixed point and a 
fixed por~it i on of his o-vm in Alneri.ca."l politics and leadershj_p . 
2 
Ibid. , pp . 8l-82o 
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So as the 1960 pres:Ldcntial election approached , this de s il'c 
to establish his own politicaJ. independence, separate from 
President Eisenhower , was apparently among the strongest of 
hi s motivation~ •. 
'l'ELEVISION STRATEGY 1960 
Alt hough al l of the aspects of Nixon ' s usage of 
television in hi s 1960 pres i dential campaign were important, 
the debates bet Heen N:i. xon and Senat or ,Tohn F • .K.ennedy ar·e 
considered t o be the most important for the purpose of this 
thesis. Therefore the debates wi ll ~ . ue g1vcn more coverage 
th3.:o. ot.her u.spe12·ts -:Jf.' Nixon ' s televi sion usage jn the 1960 
pres :i. d entt al c:-1Inpaig~ . However all of his rna jar methods of 
using television and the communications med1a during the 
crunpaign will be touched upon . 
'ro look at the deb a tes with a cr:i.tical eye , i t is 
neces sary first to examine the Nixon telev ision strategy for 
hi s 1960 presidential campaign . In order to do this, it mus t 
be viewed from t~o viewpoints ; the proposed Nixon telev ision 
strategy , and the ac tual Nixon t ele vision strategy . 
rr.BE PROPOSED TeLEVISION SrrttATEGY 
T1o major concepts were proposed fo r the Nixon 
television strategy i n t ho 1960 pre s l dent:iuJ. campaign . rl'he 
fir st concept v1 as to prodtlce f ilms that vJould ere ate a. 
30 
favorable image for Nixon . Then the second concept was to 
u se the mass marketing technique of t.he communicat ions med . a , 
for t; h.e over- all strategy of the campaign to adver tis e the 
cand:i..rlate . This se cond concept was designed to mold the 
televis:i.on eampaign i n t o a peak of image i mpactJ jus t a t the 
end of the can~aign. 3 
Basic to the implementation of the two orig inal 
concepts f or Nixon 1 s 1.960 television c::unpaign TI'J as a par-ty 
planning board to be set u.p in Washington, D. C. The membeJ•s 
of the board woul d consist of top executives of t he Hepubl ican 
Party, who were expe~ ts in politica: campai gns and the use of 
t~ levJ. [; lon i::1 po}.iti.cs. Ac. origlnal l y conceived the board 
woul d have complete authority over the det~ils and planni ng , 
once Nixon had sot poli c·y for the o '!er -· all c mnpa i gn . l\l so 
the vice·-presjdent would make no committments without the 
1 appr oval of the board . The agreement was to meet with the 
j board once a week for planning and revie\.J of the campaign . 
During the weekly meetings the board would plan 
-
• national str&.tegy for the Republican Party and t he candidate . 
They would also period:i.caJ.ly f eed into the mas ter plan f or 
y winning such political per;;onali ties as ; Pres i dent Eis enho"wer, 
Rockefeller, Goldwater , Lodge, Mitchell and others as neede d . 
,.,_,: 'rhose nationally prominent Republican leaders would be u.s ed 
3Hobert MacNeil, The Peopl e Machine . (New York , N. Y. 
Harper a.n cl. Rovl, 1968 ) 1 p :-197 ~ 
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on televis ion during t he campaign to enhance the Nixon i mage .4 
The members of the p l a nn ing board were all high 
caliber men schooled in the art of po litlcul persuasjon, and 
ima.ge building . fliembers ~-.~e re c ampa j t;n chairman Leonard \'f ~ 
Hall , campaign director Hobert Finch, p l a nning director J ame s 
Bassett , nat ional chai rman Thurs t on B. Morton , n a tional 
c ommitt ees publicity director L . Richard Guy1ay , d irec tor of 
t e l e v isj_on Carroll Ne-vJton , and L~ lias on man from Eisenhower ! s 
\</hi te House staff , Hober t I1e :rrian . t h ese v1 e re the experts , 
selec ted to gu i de ll!ixon ' s campal.gr1 s trateg:y, a n d use of 
te l evisjon :i.n his 1960 b i ci for the ; -:-"estdency . 
'J~o csr:r·y out. t he p r oposed c oncepts of t he Nixon 
c eJnpalgn it :-.Jas dec ~. de d. that regj onal t elevision would be used 
extensively. I< Lsv sched•..lling o f the cand.:i.d.ate would be firmed 
up before September 12, 1960, for travel and use of television . 
Only the last t<.-Jo weeks of the c ampaign wou ld be left open 
for extreme flexibility.S 
Ha j or plans f or the use o f televi s ion in the 1960 
campaign <.Je r e prop osed by Carroll Ne-vJton 1 a member of .Nixon ' s 
p l anning board , and his pei•son9.l televis~.on Hdviser Ted 
Rogel'S . Theodore '1:h.i te a u thor of , The ~1~_kigg ~.f. ~he 
L' 
"I'heodore H. 1:.h i tc , op . cj t . , pp . 316 - 317 . 
slbld. , P · Jl6 . 
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most f ertile and i magina tive minds in t he use of mode rn 
te l evis i on, 11 Dl ld Hot;er s as a skilled and experienced expert 
h ] •t• 1 ftl . . 6 on t e po .1·-1ca use o e e v.LSlon. 
Both of Nixon ' s television advisers had good plans for 
the use of television ln the 1960 presldential campaign . 
They insistBd that television should be used more extensively 
than in the pas t . One of their suggestions was that t he 
vice - president shoul d not in the old manner face the camera 
direct ly and talk in the ad-lib manner as he normally did , 
about h ar•d political facts. Instead they suggested 8_ prograrn 
of five b:Lg shcn·J s to be us ed during the campai gn of 1960 . 
One of the p~"ograms would be a. televi sion sho\-J cal led 
"Khrushchev iU1 I KnrAJ Him , 11 with fi.lm clips o.f Nix on abroad 
and i n conflict with ·Khrushchev . 'rhe second one 'tJO uld be a 
film entitled , "You and Your F'ami ly in 1960 , 11 i n which Nixon 
could get out of the political context and present himsel f as 
a family man \-Ji th family probl ems . Then the t hird show \-Jo uld 
J be a progr am about Nixon ' s first cross country swing during 
the early stages of the campa:i.gn . The f ourth show would be a 
closing show depict i ng highlights of the campaign . Finally 
t he fifth show would be a well p l anned telethon at the end 
of the campaj_gn o 
Several o t her i deas for the use o.f tele vis i on were 
6 
lbld ., p . 317 . 
I 
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offered at the start of the campai gn . They included a 
p i ctori al analy sis of the Democratic failures in the summe r 
c ongr essional session, to be narrated by Pr es j.dent Eisenhower 
o r Nixon . Plus various regiona l telev ision shows were 
suggested t hat would get the idea across that ~he vice-
p r esident was very concerned \·: ith loc a1i.zed pr(lblems in key 
'( 
electoral areas of the country o 
These, while n ot a ll of the proposed televis i on p J.an s 
for Nixon ' s 1960 presi<ientia.l campai gn wer e t he major propo-
Gals , as viewed by the author of this thesis . 
Hov/0\f~l' the r-~oposals , and t h0 ac t ual use of telev ision 
val'ic~d co:nsidern.":.Jly, as it shall be come clear later i n this 
thes :l s . 'rbe p1'L 1c c~;xample of th:i.s is that; no proposal to 
debate Senator J"ol:m F . Kenned-y 1-1as nmong the ma,jcr ones p u t 
forth . Yet the debate itse l f was probably the most c r itic a l 
factor in deciding the election as fa r as telev ision i ma.ge 
building was concornAd . 
The debate :L ts€'! l f i...Ji ll be c overed later in t he thesis . 
Que::; t ions that wi ll be answer•ed are ; Hhy the debates t ook 
place? Why d i d Nixon dec i de to debate Kennedy , vlhen h e was 
t h e bet ter known of the two? What were its effect s on the 
e lec tion~ Before an a-ctempt i s made to ansl-Jer these 
ques t ions, howev er·, it is import ant to l ook a t the a ctual 
strategy for unage of te l e v ision duri~g the 1960 campaign , 
7I bid . , p . 301 . 
us contrasted with the proposed strategyQ 
TELEVISI ON S'I'RATEGY 19 60 
'I'he major campaign strategy for the creative use of 
t elevision in the 1960 presidential campaign as laic.i out at 
the s tart of the campai3n , was to be J.argely i enored. It was 
t o be i gnored for t he one main reas on; the eand.ida te vice--
president Nixon, never acted on the strategy proposals, nor 
did he often contact his staff to inform them of his n~xt 
move . As the c ampaign progressed it soon be c ame arJr:ar-e.!:. t; 
t hat the eGretegy wc~ld be whatever Nj.xon decided i~ would be . 
1'ho vi. ce-}i i'e :d. dent 1 s deei s :i.o r: that he would ba.ve 
complete c cn~rol was also Nixon ' s t heory of pace . His theory 
to\>Jard political campaigns at :he time was, that there is a 
rythm and natural tide in any great· camp a ign. Ac cording to 
the Nixon theory a ca:npaign has its high points and lm" 
points , 'cut o.f g:r·eat im~~or·t.:.ance :Ls for the c arrp ~.5.gl:. not to J peak "Leo e nrly. If' it ~rwu 1 d peak too ear '!...y , the- ~'-\ oli c may 
j 
grow weary, so it is essenLiRl to chgnge mood and peak at the 
8 
rigr.t t1nw . 
J Far.::...Lo·~?.. ~.f_[c e tin~ ~ i X.?_~~~ 'J.'e~e vi s ior~ ~-l:-J n. tegy_ 
One C!.' itir; a J. factor thttt .hol;,e a ga~ge Nixon ' s. 
decis ions far use or lack of use of ~elevision , wua ~ls viows 
d Ibid~, p. 302. 
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t owar d the use of t e l ev1slon for polit ica l p urpo s es . 
Although he l ooked upor1 t h e press as h i s enemy a nd the r e f o ·e 
deci ded to us e te l e vision extensively , he was no t comfort abl e 
using t e levJ. s:l. on , ~md mistrusted it a s a political vehicl e . 
a c cora ing t o Ca rroll New t on one of Ni x on 1 s chi e f 
tel0v.Lsi on. &dv i s e rs an d a mmnber o:f hi s s t aff , t he v i ce·· 
_pres i de n t. dld n ot '"ant hi s 1960 campaign to be associa t e d 
wi t h a l a r g 9 Madi s on Aven u e fi rm . This crea~ed a ma jor 
confl ic t in the Nixon t elev ision campaign and s ubs equent 
usage of t e l evis i on . For on the one hand , Nixon was on e of 
t he fi r st uolitlcian s t o r eal ize the p otential s of te l ev i sion 
f or use Ln pc].:i t i.<:si. c ampa i p;ns , on the oth e r hand he ~-Jn.s not 
co~nfor·tabJ e exploi. t~.ng i t . Su bs t antiat i ng t his theor y , 
N1xon 1 s s t af .f' f or me d a sep ~,!· ac. (O; organi zati on calle d Campaign 
As soe .ia.ted to han dle t he medi a aspe ct s o f h is 1<)60 campaign . 
Even t he l1e a dquart ers for the newl y creat ed firm wa s loc a ted 
off or Mad i son Avenue on a s i de s t r ee t . 9 
I n s umma r y t h e stra t egy of Nixon ' s us e of t e levis i on 
in t ht?. 1960 1:..res i denti a l c a111pa i gn wa.s vJ.hat eve r t he· vice-
president dec i ded it sh oul d be . 
THE DEBA'l'ES 
The D0c i::3ion t o Debate 
·-----·- - - - - --··---- -
Dur i ng t he 1960 p re s i d e n t ia l c amp a i g n vice - pr es i de nt 
0 
' Hobert ~ac~ e i l , op. c it . , p. 19? . 
• 
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Ni xon brok e a rul e of historical po l iti cal precedent , that 
may hav e cos t him t he elec tion . 'fhis being: t h at when yon 
are in the lead and bet t er known , one s houl d not sha re his 
p1 b t.form -.! i tll t he other candida te. 'fhe r•eas onj ng be hind t his 
political r~le of thumb is ; that before yo~ share you r ~lat -
fox·n you. are the one i.n the l ead , better informed an(} b~·t.t..er 
10 
k n O'tiEo 
Prio r to examining t he deba."Ce. itself i t is necessary 
t o look a r, the 1·easons leadi ng up to Nixon 1 s deci:; ion t o 
debat f! Senator Jolm F. Kenr.edy . 
The ac t ual dacj.sion t o dehat~ th~ senator f rom 
politi~lans i~v ol~e d in the 1960 ca~paign. ~his ~ncluded 
lrtaD y of Nixon 1 s top polh.i cal s trtd. eg:'L~ ts . - . ·\ . .r.a.r1J.. e:c .J.n the 
cw~aien ~i xun had led h is staff to be li eve debate was out of 
the qLt8f.: ti on . He had s tG. t ed ; 11 ahsolute l.·y I w.t 11 never jus t 
sta nd up i r. fror1t of a Ccl ;-;: t;r~"'. a nd talk and J '..J i ll not; debv.te 
ll 
o:r~ diSC•.lt:. s :1-:;bp_ ::.eo 11 Ho t·Jever, as vJas typica l of :Nixon he 
chenged .rr,:l.. na s leav i.Jt8 1Gt:':::.t; o.f hj::; s t aff unaH a.re o f the 
fnet to th~ ~1 . ..-d:d; 111in.i.l~E: , f h •': r::.t:tj o:city of hJ.s staff leur-ned 
tr ... e vle0 - pr0si G.IO;.nL mar.'.o r.:.ti .I.Ji~'~ n.5.ri.d ·c, o cienate Kennedy i n 
l.G -:- '1.-.. . ·, r;. ,·l · 'L'l- lf ' l"'- · .... ~-. ( '" -·- · 11' St . 
"o. ln ,. .. lc:. c, ~- :.::. --"-~-1. ::_~.: :~·.::. 5i.s:_ , ,., at..nl __ ""'~ 
Tv .. . ,-.t-) t "" ' ·-.• n.-.... J · rj ~- -·, .-. ,:z lU ~C) , ~(- 6 
.t .. , l., .n .3 , ... ~.:. .~, _,r.'L on; .. Jt< ,,J.c .. n,.~ ... , v , ~ ~ • 
165. 
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spite of objections by his staff, and even President 
Eisenhower . The President ' s objections were practical , Ni; on 
was wide ly knmvn , Kennedy v1as not, as a result debat es would 
12 
only help Kennedy . 
The start of the idea to debate Senator John Fo 
Kennedy evidently began on the night that Kennedy accepted 
the Democratic nomination on television in Los Angeles . 
Hhi l e Kennedy was accepting the bid of his party in Lo s 
Angeles , Nixon and two of his associates had decided ~o watch 
their enemy on tele vis ion in Washington, D. C. W!1at they sa\..J 
acccrding co Theodore White ~as : 
The r sp i d del ivery , t he literary l a nguage , the 
ob •Ji.uus exhaus t~) on of t.he Democ.ra.t J c e~wdi <.~ ate , the 
mech~nic nJ. flaws inherent in an open- air t elecast from 
r.. c<i~ue).,t"- o~e hu:id r ed feet av1ay in uncontrolled conditions, 
all combined in the~n a sense of con;.bative go od f eeling . 
The vice - president offered the observation that he 
thought it v.1as a poor performe.nce , \·Jay over people r s 
he ads , t oo fast. He could t2.ke the man on television , 
so he felt. 
The vi ce-president according t0 tho8 e who discussed 
it with him, was now un- worried by the ti red image on 
the screen be f ore hi~1: cl:1a t night .: he eould not f01"s ee 
what time , illne.ss and s train would do to his own image 
on s~ch i 3screen in the fall ; he looked fo~ward to the meetu1g. · 
'.Chu.n i~ j.x.on 1 s ob ser vat i on of Senator John F . Kennedy 
acc.epti rjg the Democratic nomination for the presidency was 
the otart cf a ma jor political mi s take, that would go down 
---- ----
12 John \·rb ] ~ a .e , op~ cit., p . "{6 . 
l) Theodor8 H. White, op. clt., p . 206o 
in history . However , Nixon ga ve a dif f eren t explanati on of 
his reas on for debating Kennedy two years aft er the 1960 
debate s. He sai d t h at while he had been dubious a bout 
building U? r.n a1..t<.U.ence fo r Kennedy , he had to st::md up fo r 
t he Ei~enho,,·er record _, or Ze r~ne dy vwuld se.;; i-u-; 1-w s afraid t.o 
t d ._._ lt~ s an on 1. v . This explanation ~o~ever , docs not suppor t 
the concJ.usicns of the \-.Jritt:.r of this thesis. The c onclusion 
is that Nixon made the decislon because he actually felt it 
would enhance his image to the voters and help him Hin the 
election. Nixon ' s explmtation of why he debated seems to be 
simply a way fo r ~lxon to explain a bad t actical error . This 
.jlldgmor·, L is b aneu or. the fact that even Pr•esiden t Ei senho1·1er 
had e ar ~t er advi~ed a Gains t deba ~ing Kennedy . Thus Nixon r s 
s t. a.t.emen t that be hud to s UJ.lport Lh0 I!:isenho~1er record , i s an 
excu se for bad judgment in the use Qf television durj_ng the 
J 1960 c arnpaign . 
These then , were the major events that occurred behind 
the scenes, that subs equently led to Nixon ' s de cision to 
deba te Kennedy. It also sets the s t age for a crit ical look 
at. the television debates bet\-Jeen two presidential candidatE:1s , 
dur:i.ng the 19 60 ca:"tpaign . 
THE 1960 'l'ELE:VISION DEBATES 
To ge t the overall vie \•i of the effec t that. de bating 
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Senator John F . Kenne dy h a d on Nixon ' s televis ion image, it 
is n0ce~eary t o review two items . Fi rst t h e negct ~&~ions 
priDr t.o ~he de bat es , be tVIe en the Democrats and Hepub l icans 
c oncer~ lng t he f ormat. Se cond , event s such as planning an d 
l .lJ ficss t hat ef f ected Nixon ' s image~ 
'.rhe format. .for the debates \>IUS decided in tHelve 
mee t, inr?,s beti.;een a c ornrn.i tte e of netlwrk news execut ives , p llw 
repre ~ entatives n amed by e ach of the candidat e s . Negotiators 
fo1· Ni xon -v:e r e ; ? red C . Scribner, Jr ; Under Se cretary of the 
TreaJurJ c~J. ~f n~so ~ tator , Her bert Klein and Carroll P. 
?~e:..J t on c:. . .: ii~ f. :; ;y ;-·3 f' or- r adio nr.d televis ion , plus E:d~Jard rtog e rs 
-vJl.1o 1:::. t: e.t' ~~ -~ r e c·. ::!.S ·:·~chnlc sl adviser for r P.dio and television 
15 dt;_ring 'th e a c t na l c a.mpaign . 
Pr i or to the debates ne gotiators for both of the 
caudl cle.te s me t t o di s c uss the f ormat and terms f or the 
deba tes . The f o rmat that finally emerged was; a controlled 
pa nel of f0ur ques tione~s , no notes , dignity to be safe-
gu.?..rue d , c: p EHd.n g st.:.t ements of e i ght 1rdnutes by each c andi -
da te ln t he f :: rs t and l as t debates , tv:o D.n d one hulf minutes 
fov re sponses t o ~he q ue s Lions o 
Durinz; t he neg o lJiations Nixon ' s r epresenta tive s \-am ted 
to :C'e::.; tr ict t he numb er of debates . 'l'hey thought t hat Ni x on 
1£' ~J ~. idn(; ~i .Kraus , { ed a), '.l'h e Gr ca t De bu t es ( BLx mtington , 
J··tc- ~ r.· ·· • <' ~ '\Tn~ vc.. ··><.- 4 t u L.;res s l96 ';.j\-- --9:; - ---
-• _ . u . n - ~ ·-- •J-L .1 J. •s - C:./ 1 P • C:. o 
i 
I 
\-I ns thi::: 1!1 8. ~1 t.er of the debate format and could win vJi th one 
sudden death debate . Also the Nixon people viewed the 
insi stance of the Kenn edy people for more debates as belng a 
weakness . 
Nixon and his s taff fell into the trap set up by the 
Kennedy negotiators . I f t hey were not scarerl , said one Nixon 
st affrnen , t hey would be willj.ng to let one deba te decide t he 
whole show. However , tho Kennedy representatives insisted 
on at l eas t five debate s , and then let thems elves be talked 
into limitj.ng it to four. Meanwhi le Ken nedy ' s televisi on 
advi ser ~a~ thinkinB different than Nixon ' s . His televisi on 
adviser, ~~ , Leorwr d qe i nsch , st£.ted; 11Everytime He get tbor.; e 
t Ho f e"l l oi·: ::; o~ the ~c-reen , side by side , Hc 1re going t o gain , 
16 
and he's going t o :lose . " 
Finally it was sett led tha t there would be four 
debates , September 26th, October 7th , October 13 th, and 
October 21s t . The .f i r s t debate would be produced by CBS 
in Chicago, the se cond by NBC in Was hington , the t hi rd by 
ABC out of New York and Los Angeles , then the fourth and 
l as t one by ABC from New York . After the debates had ended , 
estima tes of the number watching the debates ranged from a 
low of 65 , 000 , 000 to a h igh of 10,000 , 000 for each debate ~ 
on . 
-
cit ., p. 321 . 
of the c a n didates prior t o the debates is significant t o t~ i c 
thes i s , in Lhat i t r eflects th e at t itude o f each man tow&rd 
the up -coming debates . To get the true picture j_ t i s 
necessary to see the c ontrast bet~veen the Hay 6GJch mm1 ) f aee d 
the up-com) ng debates . 
Senat o r John F' . Kennedy prepared for the deba.tcs by 
goin g over several pos s ible quest ions a n d ::m~n~ers with hi~ 
staff . Kennedy prepared for the debate by going over the 
questions and answers in an a lmos t c asual manner . 'l'he 
s e~1&.tc- t' ~nd me~nbers of 1:..: s s t aff spent mon t o f the day using 
17 j_n ~ ques tion and ~18Wer period . 
'::.'l-.. e vice --pre~; i. dfmt ' s strategy and preparation for the 
deb ate v ar-ied eonsic!ernbl~ f:ror.: Kennedy 1 s . Nixon spent the 
day before the firs t debate in virtual seclusion , in his 
hotel room ·by hirr.self . He was tired , and had i g nored h:i.s 
staffs advice to arrive in Chicago on the Saturday before the 
de bate , to ge~ a full day's rest; for the debate on Monday . 
~ However, Nixon's s t aff was unable t o reach Nixon , and c ould 
i!Ot c·\fe!"l reach his pres s secre Lary fi,~.rber·t Klein . So Nix on 
re:.o.~lled Chic .st;o late Sur.d!).j ni ght , unbri e f ed on the magnitnde 
J 
o f the up- cond.r12_; t clcvis:i.o11 debe.L-e . 
~'ben to J!Jak:e n& t; ler·s worse on Honday morninp; , Nixon 
J 7 , .. h ' H I 'l- j t • t 3 .... ·:> '3 ..., 3 l.'. eoaore . /ilt · . :e , op . c1 . 1 pp . r:..r_ - c.. • 
J olncrso This turned out to be an unfortunate piece of 
scheduling , be cause the union was hostile toward Nixon . As a 
resul t Nixon ' s television advi sero fe l t it damaged t he 
c andidates ps ycholog ica l ou~look on the morning of the first 
debate ('I 
Another problem \-las the \-Jerking ou t of last minute 
pr oduction detajls . Nixon could not be reached all day by 
the televi sion technic ians 1,-1ho p l anned to brief him on the 
teclmical as pects of the first debate. He received only one 
vi s i tor during the day of the first debate, and wa.s finally 
bri e fed d ur 5.nc a. t en minute r:ide to the station on the night 
o f the debate. 
F'ina:J.l;\~ t;o a cid to Nixon 1 s problems on the n ight of the 
fi r s t. debate t !_.Je v i.:;e - pres i dent agt~ravar.. ed an old physic c..l 
injury . As he s t a rted to get out of the c a r at the st udio 
he stru c k his knee on the door of the c a r, thus aggrava ting 
the injury that had bos pi ta.lized hirn earlier in the c ampaign. 
One observer reported that his_ face went all uwhi te a.nd p as ty"; 
but that he quickly recovered a nd. ent ered the stud io . 18 
These t hen , were the major events tha t ·too k place just 
pr·ior '~c_) t.h.;: Ge levi~ i on debat e~> bet ween Nixon and Ker>..nedy A 
t he two presidenti a l a s pirants in 1960 ~ 
18 
Ibid.~ PP• 323-324. 
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been nervous ull daJ before t he firs t debate , about the 
t echnical setting of the studio . The major reason for their 
c oncern was caused by the fact t hey had been unabl e to reach 
t he candidate for consultation on the debate . In spite of 
this t hey made the best preparations possible without 
consulting the candidate hims e lf . They had earlier requested 
t hat both of the candidates t alk f r om a lectern , and Kennedy 
h ad agreed to this condi t ion for the televised d ebates . Then 
on the day of the first debate t he Nix on staff tried to pay 
attent ion to each detail without the h e l p of Nixon . 
" O~e 01~ t b.e de tail s that the !1ixon staff was concerned 
ao cut -..J r. •. :~ the deep f;; ye shadows l n Nix on 1 s face . So they 
request~~ · the adjustment of t wo smal l spotlights that would 
shine direc t l y i nto Nixo n 1 s eye wells and take r.wHy t h e 
shadows . Thi ~ was a gr eed t o and t he l i ghts were adjusted . 
) Also the Nixon aides asked t hat a t abl e be put in front of 
t he moderatoz·, which wa s also agreed t o . Then f jnall y , they 
j 
r equested t hat no shots be t aken of Nixon ' s lef t profi le 
during the debate , and t h i s was agreed upon . 
In contrast to the several requests of the Nixon 
s t aff , the J<>:; n :w dy people had no r eq ues t s , and seemed as sure 
of themse lye :3 a s Ker)nedy appea r ed to be . l 9 
~he hour before the first debate . Vice Pres i dent 
19 
I bid . , p o 32) • . 
! 
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Rtchard H. Nixon entered the studio about an h our before air 
time . He inspected the set , let himself be televised on 
camera monitors for an inspection by his a.dvisers . He then 
paced around the studio f or t-he re st of the hour , prior to 
the time the actual. debat e started . 
The other presidential candidate Senator John F . 
Kennedy arrived approximatel:y f ifteen minutes a fter Nixon . 
He inspected the set , sat for the camer as , which his advisers 
inspected, and then decla red he >vas ready . 
Then a few minutes later Howard K. Smith who acted as 
moderator f or th8 first deba te said~ 
The televis ion and radio stations of the United 
Stc;_t 8s ;.;-·r·e pcono to p1·ovide for· a discu~sion of the 
issu.es .1.n the eurrent political c ampaJ. gn , t.he two major 
can.d }.dc>.t(-> s i'o;t'o :..he Pre~~idency . 1'he c andida.tes need no 
i ntrodnc ti on . 2 
'l'hus the ~'fir· s t debate on na t1on-i~ ide t elovisi on by tv.Jo 
presidential candidat es \<.JaS on the air , and became histc.ryw 
THE D.!!.. BATES 
F'or the purposes of this thesis only the first debate 
will be covered i n de tail, as it was judged to be the most 
significant of the four debates . However statistics wil l be 
included i n the appendix that reflect the results of who won 
-: or lost o.ll of the de ba t es . 
20r tid ., 3 '>r:' p . t...::J . 
Several professional observers analyzed the debates , 
but for the purposes of this thesis t wo have been selected 1s 
r eprcsentatj.ve auth orities . They are Theodore H . \ihite , 
inte i ·na.tionu1ly known journali s t and author, plus author G<me 
Wyckoff an expert on pol i tical telev ision , who was a l so a 
member of Nixon ' s television staff in 1960 . 
According to Gene Wyckoff t h e fi r st debate wa3 the 
c riticaJ one in the 1960 pre~idential ca·.npaie-;n . He stated in 
h2.s analysig : 
1'h·3t l.,~- ··;hf: e:•d of the first 1iebat.e the i mage o f 
the p .,';') c:;;: r.ci~.ia~.: ,, s was pr in tee! on the mi.11i ons of 
vi.c -..;c, c ..; r.i5.nd. s . t· lus .it was tl1e imag6 of UlA canc\idatt}S 
thu~ cc81~ed ~o~~er thnn t he content. Kennedy looke d 
har!d:-oc:::w .. th•)l~ [:;i::t, fu.l, and gave the impression of 
conficE:nce , 1>1h L .Le i:~ ixo:1 looked 1r.ean , ug ly a.nd haggarci . 
He \.JH:J of com• se hagg.a.rd anci · tired after his acciden t , 
alld rlosp l talj za.t ion for his b1ee. Yet he fa iled to rest 
and ma i ntai n ed his trying schedule before the f j.rst 
debnte. 2 1 
Hepublican telcv Lsion adviser Ted Hogers tried to get 
J the vj.cG-r;·c :).:>ident to change his schedule and res L. Adviser 
RoGers P.. l.so -wa:.1r.ed lhxon to use ful l make - up for the f ir·st 
cJ.ebate .. Ii!-} felt the make - up \-Jou.1 d cover the fa.cial lines of 
Hixon , a.nci the sic:kly pa·~lor that emphasized the dar k area~ 
of N:.xw: 's heav-y be&rd . However· , the candidate himsel f ove1.·-
.....J rul ed 'l'ed Rogers a.nd refu sed the use of ful l make- up. 
•. 
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Nixon ' s advi ser Roger s also tried to ban reaction 
shots of Nixon listening to Kennedy , so that the contrast <f 
the two wou l·~.~J.'t be s o apparent . But h e ended up l etting 
the CBS dir8ctor use them , a ft er the director insis ted j.t was 
a normal television tecbni.que o 
The vi ce- president 1 s te l e vi sion adviser also wanted 
t he candidate to s t art the debate with a forceful opening . 
He thougrrt this vJOuld est~ablish at the start, who \-J as t h e 
experienced vice - president , and \-Jho rlas the young and untried 
politician of the t wo . How e ver , Nixon did not t ake Roger ' s 
advi<.:e and Has lm·i key in t b.e first 6.ebate , almost to t h e 
22 
point of "t;ei ng c:cn·~Lt:i.atoryQ 
fl.utr_ c.n• 'l'heod.oJ:·e 1dhite , o. prominent journalist who h a s 
written three books on }'h~ Nak_t_!2g of !Jle President 1 picked 
out :=.:e veral i mport ant d i.fferences betvwen the tw o candidates , 
in his ru1alysis of the 196 0 presidentia l debates . 
The major difference that White saw in the debates was 
j that Nixon vJa.s deh.s..tin g vl i th Kennedy like it was a real 
debate , hlh(~re jndges ~-Jere searing points . In the meantime , 
.Kennedy \\IUS concer-ne d with all the people \vatching television, 
o.nd no t ~ . 1.llS oppor-~en t . This was the crucial diff e r ence 
betv1een the ~ ·v-io presid.ent.i..al. ·~andida t es . Vice Pr e3 i dent 
Nl xon was 6onceraed with winning an argumen t with his 
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opponent, while Kennedy was concerned with ul l the peopl e 
wa t ching a television set . Subsequent l y to those people 
watchlng television , and no t Nixon , i s whe r e Kenn edy dir ected 
hi s views. On this l as t po i nt hrt.ite stated ~ 
'.f.'he Senat.or from Hassachusetts i gnore.d the di:t'OC". ~; 
i1~uiry when it suited him , used each question as a 
springboard for an appeal to tho 1:1j_nd and imagina t:Lon 
assembled before the countless sets . In contrast , 
the V ice-P~esident 1 s mind and attention were fixed 
t here in the studio. As one reads the text , one finds 
him over> and over again scoring excellently against the 
personal adver>sary in the studio beside him , yet for -
getful of the nee~3 to score on the mind of the nation he hoped to lead . 
Author h'hite also took up the question of the 
by si ~eJ hG felt th0 two candidates were evenly matched. 
')'his t 1u·r.:.~ ·.:! OLtt to b~ a ma jor · victot:>y for Kennedy , because he 
had been presented as the boy who was unexperienced and 
immatu.re . Ho>-Jever , on the screen before the nation) he c ame 
off as at l east the equal to the vice-president . 
Another :i.tem that turned out t o be in Kennedy ' s favor , 
was the contrast of the two faces on the screen . This 
contrast H €1-S to enhn.nc e l:he Ker.nedy iplat;e , and detract from 
Vice ~?ces :'Lclent Nixon ' s image . Senator .John F . Kennedy , 
n or::nally under tension ; · 11 flutters bis hands , a.d jus ts his 
n ecktie? sls.p;; his knee o r s t rokes his f'ace . 112 l~ HO\..Jcver , on 
23 Theodcre H. Whit e , op. cit . , p. 325o 
2l+ ' . I C.t ·:l. , D . 326. 
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the ni ght of t he first debate , Kenne dy appeared ca~n, not 
nervous, an d confident in his app earance on the television 
screen . Heanwhile, Nixon a ppeared tense, 11 was tense, a lmost 
fri gh~ ette d , a t ~ime s g lowering , and occa s i onally haggard-
.,25 l ook i. ng to the point of sickness . · ~·/hi te , in adding to his 
conmien t.s about the Hixon i ma ge sta tes : . 
~~hat no picture ).n Americ an politics t e lls a better 
st ory of ~he crises an d episode tha n t h e f amous shot of 
the c amera on the vice - president, as he half s louched , 
his 11 Lazy Shave " pO\·Ider faintly streaked vJi t h s'veat , 
hi s ey es exaggerat ed hollot-1 s o£6 b l a c knes s 1 his j or.vls and f ace drooping with strain. 
Practical ly everything that could have went wrong as 
far• :1s Ni x on 1·1a s con ... ~erned went wrong on the night of the 
f i rs t. de!bate. The v i ce-pr es ident s uffe r s f r om a h and i c ap 
that is se~icus only on television . First a television 
camera projects electronically , by way of an i mag e - orthicon 
picture tube, which seems to go beneath the skin , a l mos t l i ke 
an X-ray does . No~nally while on television , the earner~ on 
Nixon i s held away f r om him, because it will show even his 
i smallest hair after he has just shaved . To make matters even 
worse , bec ause of t he historical s i gnificance of the occasion, 
CBS had t~ken special precautions with every detail . Thi s 
• ! inclu. rl sd the ins taJ. l a tion of brand nevi tube s in the c ameras 
for pcrf0ct projec t ion . Howe ver , thi s turned out to be a 
disadvan t age to Nixon, as it depicted all of hi s bad featur es 
-:>c 
. :."'Tb' ' 
. \. J.n. ~ : P • 327 . 26Ibid . , p . 327 . 
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on the first debate , and greatly damaged hi~; television 
image ~ Also in the first debate Nixon -vwre only 11 Lazy Sha· c 11 
which did not really help much . I n the later debates the 
vic~-president was to wear theatrical ma ke - up . 
Some techni cal aspe ct s of the first deba te also hurt 
t he Nixon image . The television studio had been tense all 
day , as furnitu r e and lights were moved se·veral times to get 
just the ri ght setting for the debate . Earlier Nixon 1 a 
te l evision advisers had been told that the background wouJ.d 
be a relatively dai'k to!"le. Ho\..Jever 1 it ha d to be repe:.-:.inted 
f"R..VOt'cd Kennedy . 'l'he picture _ voters 
lr • • , • :lll..:<on 1 111 11J. s light suit 
v.1ho Cb.ll!E. .acros::> ~elevision f uzzy and unc l ear . "Meanwhile, 
Anoth0.r te chnical aspect of television, li ghting , is 
of major i mpor tance to the appearance a person pro j e ct s on 
t elevision. fhis ~ur~ed out to be a problem for Nixon during 
the flrst debate . Earlier in the day ) p r· ior to the start of 
the debate Nixon 1 ~ staff had adjusted all the lighting for a 
master l i gh t ing scheme favorabl eto their cw1didates image . 
Then, just a few minut es before ai r-time se veral photo-
graphers vJere allo\~ed on the set to take pictures . . Whi le on 
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the set they kicked over vJires, and displaced lights , hurting 
the general lighting scheme that projects the candidates 
imaee on the screen. 'l'his was to add to the technical 
problems Nixon was to experience in the fi.rst debate and 
detract from his ov er-all image tha t t he Amer i c&n public saw. 
'l'hen a s if' t he technical problems Nixon had in the 
first debate were not enough , finally , ther e was the problem 
that the vic e- president had still not r ecovered from his 
illness . Besides re-injuring his knee on the night of the 
debate , he ho.d not al1owed himself enough time to rest from 
hls prevj.ous illness, that he had su ffered duri ng the first 
27 
"C>vo \\'eeks of the c.::.r.:pai gn . 
~vHO WON Tlib: 1960 DEBATES 
Every major survey of the 196 0 pre s idential debates 
5_ndicated that. the vice-president had done poorly in the 
debates. Even the survey firm mos t respec ted by the Nixon 
Staff of tel evision advisers , The Schwerin Research Corpora-
t ion , scored the debates substantially :ln Kennedy ' s f avor. 
The public opinion polls contained jn the appendix of thi s 
t hesis l ndiceted the following result s of t he polls ; Kennedy 
outscored Nixon by 39 percent to 23 percent in the first 
debate; by 44 percenL to 28 percent in the second debate; los t 
to Nixon by 1¥ percent to 39 percent in the third debate ; and 
won 52 percent to 27 percent in the l as t debateo 
2? 
- l bid~ , p . 32'7-328. 
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In t he most ex tensi ve survey conducted for CBS by 
D:r. . Elmo Hoper ' s survey fi r m, fi f ty seven percent of those 
who vo ted believed t he te l evision debates had influenced 
t heir decision. Accbrding to the Roper survey , six percent 
or 4.ooo ,ooo voters attributed their final d ecision on voting 
to the debates alone . or t hese 1 ~ , 000 ,ooo voters ' 26 per cent 
or• 1 , 000 , 000 voted for Nixon , Hhile 72 per eent, or a l mos t 
) , OOO , OOO , _voted for Kennedy . I f t hese fi gures from the 
Roper sur vey are acc urate , then the 2 , 0 0 0 , 000 voters of t he 
Kennedy ntargin came from te l evision ' s impac t on the vote r' ~ 
mind . Th:i.s, then , ':-:es more t~:tan eno'.lgh by a substantial 
amount 3 if the fi gures of th~ survey wer e accurat e , because 
28 Kennedy Hon by only 1 12 , 000 votes . · So , \vhen Kennedy sai d 
on November 12tn after the election; 11 1 t vlas te l ev i s i on more 
29 
than anything else that turned the tide ,tt he was right by 
3 , 000 , 000 votes according to thA snrYey . 
Several other surveys , while not as exac t on t he 
number of voters i n fluenc ed by the debates , indi cated 
conclusively that Kennedy had won . The ma j or surveys dealing 
wi th the question of who won t he debate show a plurali t y of 
r espondants 1ndica ted Kennedy won . 'l'hese surveys are 
r ep roduced in the appendix of this t hes i s . 3° 
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)OJecob J . Fe l~1an , El ihu Katz , ( ed . ) . The Grea t 
!?_e._l.?~t- ~~- (Bloomi ngt on , l n dian& Uni versit y Press ~i9b2),-­
pp . l 9o- l 99 . 
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Thus , from all the evidence gathered by expert 
researchers , observers , and survey firms , the debates changed 
the election. Without them Nixon probably woul d have won , 
but because of them, Kennedy won . 
IMPACT OF THE DEBA'l'ES ON IHAGJ:t: CHAr-lGE 
Studies by the husband and vJife t eam of socioJ.ogists , 
Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang of Queen 1 s College , r•eveaJ.ed 
the following about the impact of the deba tes , on the i mago 
change of the candidates : 
'l.'hat eighty~nine percer .. t of those \vho w&.tched cr 
heard the first. debate t-hout!;ht Kenne dy had oested l'l :i.xon 
in the debate, cr at leas t fougbt him to a drh~ . The 
::d.nglc [!tO~' t, j_m!Jo rtant resul \.; of the d0bate lDy in lt s 
destrur;tj_on of the image so Hi. de ly held, of Biehard 
Nixo11 as ctH.t:nplo-:1 debater v.nd television poli t. :i. cian par 
excellence . 'lhi s re e vs.l:J.s t ion of the compar a Live 
ability of the two men as performers is ,,.Jhat he lped 
crystallize the votes of the undecided and caused 
partisans to revise their i Mages of the men a s persons 
and n.s presidential ti.mber . 31 
\>JHY NIXON LOST THE DEBA'fES 
Various theories have been advanced a-s to the reasons 
that Nixon lost the debates . The first reasons t6 be cove~ed 
are those ·g iven by Nixon and hiG staff' . This thesis will 
t h8n be c:onc~rned with the reasons g iven by profes sional 
obs6rvers of the 1960 campaign . 
3lrb · . 
.lQ., p. 319" 
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Despite the care tha t was t aken in the two areas of 
t echnical format and produc t lon, these t\-JO a.spect.s "L-Jere 
b l amed for the maj\"Jri ty of Nixon t s bad image in the debate s ~ 
Also for the first time in the history of tel evision , the 
make - up vJOl 'n by a performer, and the light if\g used on a 
television program, were matters for public discussion and 
debate. Hi xon 1 s staff primarily bla:ned the t echnical and 
p:eoduc t5_on gtaffs of t e levision for their candidate 1 s bad 
i mage .. 
:.:.t the valid ity_ ·of Nixon ' s staff ' s 
to :rely on other so1trces for a les ~; 
b) ased o·p :Ln ion . 'l'e)~;vis:i.on experts and authors in the fi e ld 
of pcli.Li..cal telcvi~j_on , He·rbert A . Seltz and IUchard Yoa.kam , 
1>Jri·clng in ~hQ. Qr_~§.t Debates , ca-:ne to different conclLlsions ~ 
Their critical analysis covered all aspects of the technical 
production of the debates s32 
ANALYSIS OF ?itODUCT ION OF THB DEBATES 
Profe~sional mo.ke -up services probably \Wuld have 
helped tbo vi:.:.f~ - pres:i.c"~nt . i\ccording to Seltz and Yoakam , 
Nixon 1 s appe t!.t·s.nce :i.n e -) 11 tra~ t:, to Kew1e dy 1 s vJas particu.la!'ly 
critlc&l to !'f::a~tion ~b.:>ts :f':eo:.1 the c amera . The vice-
presldent l coked uncomfortu.blu and unsure of himse l f' . Durlng 
32]. b. d 
. :t • , p 0 9 J •· 
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some of the r eaction shots , Nixon ' s eyes darted around and 
perspir at ion was cle a r ly noticeable on his chin . I n contrast, 
Kennedy came through the ·televis ion c amera ' s eye as a strong , 
self-assured personality.33 
Format of the Deba tes 
From a production point of view the format designed 
for the debates provi ded for a simple show . HovJever , :i.n the 
negative sense , the amount of t ime a candidate had to answer 
each que s tion was severely limi ted by the format. Yet the 
.format dtd g ive each can dida1; e the same amount of exposu1~e . 
~J:E.lP:.1ng . No .spec:i el lie;hting or s c enc~ry was u.sed for 
t he deb~t o s . The m~jority of the l ighting and scenery wa s 
t ypic a l fo r simple t:elevi.s ion shm-.1 :-: . 
D~!' e_9_~ i-~o The directing of the debates was simple 
and carried out with r es traint . Most of t he directing was 
bas ically objective . Yet the rea ction shots gave the power 
t o t he director t o reveal the candi date in a more detailed 
way to the televis ion viewers , who were the voters in the 
final analy~·~ J s . Nixon's advis e rs had tried to rule out the 
reac tion s hots earlier . However , they were convinced that 
the re action shots were necessary , for technical proficiency 
by the television t echnicians involved in the debates . 
33 Ibid., p . 3S . 
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~!!'ike-:~£· 'J.'}.e candi dates make-up hlas the cho ice of 
Nixon and his s t af f , but particularly Nixon . They probab l : 
should h ave used professional help for the applicat i on of the 
make - up . However, the actual make-up , did not affec t his 
appearance a s much as his physj.cnl. condition d i d . This 
aspect of the Nixon image on television and the debat es will 
be con sidered later in the theaiso 
SU£v1JvlARY 
Alt;hongh t n e netuorks were blamed for everything from 
pour mak G- •J.p , 1:\ g h ting , directing , t o Nixon ' s over- all bad 
image , faate rlon 1 t s ubs tant iate the cha r ges. Because the 
neb,•G r k s d j ([ n o t p r n duce the prog r arns , had no choice a s to 
the scr·ip t. c..:· c ::.ts t , t i me , p l a ce, dat e or even O'Jer- all 1'oP:na t . 
All the n e tw orks actually did was provi de the air-time , 
facilities and teclmical personne l for the deba tes , p lus 
pleasing bo t h side s , but heing as fair as possible at the 
same time. 
Two other things , however , did seem to hurt Nixon 1s 
imag e during the Lelevis ed presidenti a l debate s of 1960 . 
They >.vere his illness, and the g ene ral type of image Nixon 
project e d on television as con tra sted with the man himself .3~ 
34 Ibid . , pp. 95- 96 o . 
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THE EFFEC'l' OF NIXON 1 S ILLNESS ON HIS H1AGE 
Several professional observers of the 1960 
presidential debates have indicated they felt that the most 
l~portant fact or, t hat hurt Nixon 1 s j_mage , was h J s illness . 
The i llness vJhich had been caused by a ser.i.ous kne e infection 
sustained earli er in the campaign was still not cured when 
the debates were broadc as t. 
~his theory is supported by notes fr om the production 
diary of the debat es compiled by Her bert 1~ . Seltz and Richard 
Yoakam . According t o t he t wo t elevision experts , the major 
prob l.e!l< •.vas that Ni.Y.on \vil S not. feeling well during t he .first 
debat~ . ~lso he had a ddr as sed a hos tile union group earlier 
in the c: ::.:y·, and had a t e;nperature most of t he day . Plr.w he 
had lo s t :·J eic;ht bec ause of hi s knee i njury a~1d subsequer1t 
illness , and \-Jas tired from his arduous c&mpaign schedule . 35 
On e of Nixon ' s televi.sjon adviser ' s Ted Rogers h a d the 
foll owing to say about the image Nixon projec t ed on the f i rs t 
deba.te : 
No television earner&, no make-up man c an hide bone 
wearine ss and physica:L fat i gue . He vi aS actually sick , 
he had a f ever. because Nixon did not give vi ewers 
t he expected perfornwnc0 , del ive r ed the pre - determined 
ment al picture of what they expected, they looked 
ar· ound t.o find out \vhal was the mat ter .•. he was not 
the 1 f lghting c:ornmando of th8 lt epLlblicfm cause ' ~ 
So for (;he firs t time , they wer·e more _3gns cious of hi s 
appearanc e than of what he wus say i ng . 
JS . I bld e 1 P • 121. 36Ibid ., p. 121 . 
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Ano the r expert observer of the 1960 pr·es i dentj.al 
c ampaign, journali st t heodore Whi te , gave a siirl:i.lar analysi s 
of Nixon 1 s perfor mance in the firs~ debate o 
vJhi te felt tha t of a ll the e l ements t hat; hur·t Nixon 1 s 
c ampai gn the worst one \-J a s the strik:i.n g of his kneecap on t ho 
door of a c ar , on hi s trip t o Greensboro , North Carolina . 
As a resul t i t became infected . The infection vJas no 
ordinary infection to be cleared up in a c ouple of days . So 
Nixon h ad to be h ospitalize d for two weeks of valuable 
crur:paign time , tha t ccul d never be r e gainedo 
All the titne the vice - pres i dent wa s in the hospi tal 
he f·H~S i :11pa.tient 1;0 b::: out on the c arnpai [;n trail. 'l'he ftlll 
i rr:.pac G of the j.l:inc ~· ~; c c..u.sed by his injured knee , loss of 
ca11 pai gn time , and impatience to be c ampai gning , was t o sho\.J 
up in hi s first debate in Sept embe r . 
J Journalist h"hi te commenting on Nixon 1 s t elevision 
appearance e arly in the 1960 c ampaign , shortly after the 
j vi ce - president was discharge d from the hospital s t a ted : 
One not :i.ced as one followe d , st r ange things about 
the image of the man , a ll the more curious in one so 
interested i n 11 imagery 11 • One noticed, for example , 
t he h ar s hnes s of the te lev:i sion eye an d the electronic 
CPLle l ty of the camera to his countenance . 
l:lhit:e gav e the follo vJ i n g example ; Sitting one 
evening in tha pr ecs r anl<s a fe w feet from the c and:i.date 
in Union Square in San Fr ancis co as he spoke, I n ot:i. c ed 
t h a t one of the l ocal corres p ondents h~d bro ught a 
port abl e t e l evision se t with hi~ , so t hat one could 
observ e him a t once in person and on the s creen . The 
man on the stand before me iu per son Has a handsome 
young American only recently out of the hospital , he was 
a t trac tively slim, as li t he as Kennedy , a fine and 
he a lthy American , almost an athl ete . His face as he 
spoke to this fr ien d ly a udience was a smiling one , a n d 
Nixon has a broad, a l most sunny smlle when he is wlth 
fri en ds . His is a broad open face and the deep eye 
well s , t he heavy brows , the broad forehead , g ive it a 
clean, mascul i ne quality . Yet on t elev is i on the deep 
eye well s and heavy brows c as t shadows on the face and 
it g lowered on the screen darkly when he be c ame 
rhe t orically indign ant the tele vi sion s h owed ferocity ; 
when he turned , his apparently thick brush of hair 
showed in a g limmering balding \-1 idow 1 s peak; when he 
smiled an d his f ine white teeth showed , it· was a smile 
made meaningless by the grin of t he commerc i al 
anno~nce57 who appear with similar whi te teeth 
shO\vlng o 
Th is then , is how one observer , journalis t Theodore 
White, saw Nixon t he man , as contrasted to the Nixon te l e -
vis lon i~nage. In sn:nmary the man c &:!lle off much better ln 
person , t h an he di.d under the cri tic.al eye of the c amera 
during the debat es . 
Simi l a r views on the imagery of Nixon were offe re d by 
Gene Wyc koff in his book The Ima_g_~ ~1akers o \</yckoff was par t 
j of Nixon televisi on staff in the 1960 campa i g n , and from his 
t f i r s t h and vantage point , lat e r wrote extensively about 
Nixon • s imag ery . 
Imagery o f B_ix~ 
Televisio~ ac cording to Wyckoff, does more than jus t 
present political cand idates . It tran s forms t hem i n t o an 
image c andidat e , and the c andidate becomes a l eading 
3? Theodore H. White , op . cit ., p p . 309-313. 
-I 
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character in the p o lit ica l drama, p r esen t ed on t ele vj_s i on, 
jus t before an elec ti on . I'1 u.s the character that the specific 
polj_ t i cian present s t ends to be perceived universally regard-
l ess of the viewe~s political t endencies. Thj s is due t o the 
viewers 1 voter s' media p r edispos i tions t o s ee the candidates 
in t erms of t e levisi onts stereotyped des irabl e and 
unde s ir ab l e characters . These charac t e rs t hemselve s may be 
television ' s stereotyped charac t ers . Thus the politicians· 
themselves may be come projections of character s valued or 
detes t ed in the Uni ted States c u lture a t l arge . 
~hen since the candida t es t end to be perc e ived by the 
vi e •,Jer s as a ehr-.rac te r in a poli t i c &l dramatj c pr·esentRtj on .t 
political propagand ~ s t s by controlling the theatrical 
setting , of a ca n didat e on p a i d political programs and 
commercials , c an encourage v iewers t o ge t a favorable 
impression of their particular -candidate . 38 
Nixon hims elf subs t a nti a ted this television t heory 
when he later stated : 
I believe tha t I sperit too much t ime in the last 
c ampaign on su bstance a nd to little on appearance . 
I paid t oo muct. a t tention t o what I ~as goin g to say 
and t oo little to h ow I woul d look . 3 
Author Wyckoff who had Harked on Nixon ' s televis ion 
sta ff in 1960 adde d to the Nixon comment about appear ance and 
)8 
Gene viyckoff , op . cit .) p . 2 17. 
39Ibid. , p . $8 . 
1 
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imagery, with fur ther explana tion when he stated : 
What must be recognized is that tele vision has 
increasin gly become the medium through which the great 
maj or ity of the vote r s ge t the ir news and deve lop 
t.heir impressions of the c and j.do.tes . .. One bad camera 
angle on t elevis i on can have far mor e effect on the 
election outcome t han a major mistake in writing a 
speech which is then picked up ang0 cr i ticised by columnists and editorial writers . + 
-6o 
'J'his then , while not exhaustive , surmnariz es the vie\vS 
of some of the professiona l observers of the Nixon television 
image in the 1960 c arnpai gn o 
OTHER TH.LEVISION USAGE IN 'l'llli 1960 C.ANPAIGN 
Although the television debates were the most signi-
f :l cr.n t u.sE: of t eJ.r.1v ision in the 1960 presidfJntial c ampftigD , 
Nixon also used ~..;e::_.:; v :i.s ion in other Ha.ys to promote his 
c andid acy. 
Commerci a1.s .il! !_ixon~ Campai gn 
The format for the commercis.ls produced for the 1960 
Nixon preeidential campaign we r e simple . Usual)~ nothing 
showed on the screen except the vice-president ' s fa ce . Then 
Nixon was asked a question , to which he wou l d give a brief 
answer. 
- One member of Nixon's television staff Gene Wyckoff 
felt that the a!1swers on t he Nixon commercials did not convey 
Lj.OI\ . . 
l)lQ . 1 p . 58 . 
-. 
any substanc ~ to the viewers ·. 'l'his, he felt , was particu-
l arly true vJhcn t he pol i tical commercials , He re compared to 
the professionally produced consumer product commercia ls as 
progr am rnaterialb4l 
During national political c ampa.i gnss the ne tworks 
will provide five-minute time pe riods for paid po l itical 
a.nnouncemen ts , during prime vie\.Jing hours . The networks 
61 
make this time available by cutt ing short regularly scheduled 
show s , which will not be hur t , and inserting t he paid 
po l itical ~pots a t the end of the showsc 
'i'he vi(;~; -·prc~ ident 1 s t e l e,risl on staff purchased about 
thirt:~ ():.., U:te~ t:~ five minute time peri ods . Basically they 
were 'J.sed for ·cwo •Erect to camera talks bJI Nixon.. Als o used 
in the five minute t ime spots were two still pic ture image 
films . The t wo still pictu.re image films were originally 
scheduled during the day , and the dire ct c amera. te.l ks were 
scheduled for prime vi ewing time at night . However , the best 
f r esponse to the commercials that v1ere shown c ame from the 
-
' still image film . Subsequently , they were subs tituted by the 
Nixon televis ion staff for the direct to camera talksn42 
•rwo films \~ere made of President Eisenhm·ler prals i ng 
Nixon and Lo dge f or use in the 1960 campa:i.gn.. The production 
'·.1 4 l bid. , p . L~9 -5L. ! 2 l lbl' d .. I. Q 49 I pp . 4· • - t 
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of the .fi lms was made particularly dif.ficul t becv.use of the 
method used for their produc t ion . They were made by findin g 
a speech of the pres i dent' s praising the t wo candidates. 
Al though the pres iden~ probably woul d h a ve made spec i al 
recordings for the films , he was not asked to do so , due to 
an earli er decision of Nixon's t o run his own c ampaign . As 
a result the films were produced by using words from an old 
speech of the president 1 s and sychronizing it t..ri th appro-
priate film footage from past appear an c es of t he president 1 s~3 
produced by Nixon 1 R s taff was cons j. dered t o be an excel l ent 
prodtlc tjon, l t dcpi.c t ed Ni.xon as a man of strcng1·.h and 
characte r. Ho wever as was typica l of Nixon a t t h a t time, he 
c ance lled a scheduled uh.:nd.ng of the fi lm .for November 6th . 
Ins tead ho ctec j.ded to us e t he time , t o go on t e l evision J ive, 
for one more ha lf hour direc·t camera to the pe op l e talk. L~4-
USE Or' TELEVISION IN LAS'I' FEv! DAYS OF' 'I'HE 
1960 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
Each weekday , of the week prior to elect ion day in the 
1960 president i al c empaign, Nixon ' s t e l e vi s ion s t aff h ad a 
concentrate d t e l evi s ion effort p l ann ed . Tho expenditures fo r 
the Hepul:1.ic an te le vis i on efforts i n the la~1t twelve days of 
L~Jib · d 
l . • ' pp . 4B-49. 44Ibid ., pp. 56-57. 
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the campaign , ha ve been estimated o.t over J,OOO ,OOO 
dol larso 45 
'l'he ma jor i.tems that contributed to the estimated 
expense included a national telecest of a Nixon rally in 
Cinncinnati on October 29th, then another notion al. television 
r ally wi th Eisenhower , Nixon and Lodge out of New York on 
No vember 2nd . Then a follow-up everyday of the l ast week , 
with a live Nixon television show of fifteen minutes a t pr i me 
vi ew ing time , seven in the evening . 
Finally on Monday No vember 7th, one day prior to the 
election ( in what was then the most expensive and probably 
t h.<?. !l~ost ef.fGct.:i ve use of te lcvis i cn for an election a t t hat 
time) a& a cost esttmated to be 400 , 000 do llars Nixon gained 
national attention on the ABC network from Detr·oit in a .four 
hour · telethon. The vice-president r s telethon was fol lowed 
J for f ift een minutes by Governor Thomas B . De-r,-Jey 1 at an 
j estimated cost of 3),000 to 40,000 do llars . '!' hen a three-way 
half hour hookup , between Nixon , Eisenhower and Lodge at 
eleven o'cloek that e vening on CBS) was es t imated t o have 
cost between )0 1 000 to 90,000 dollars . Then a repeat of the 
same hookup on. the other tHo n e t "t-Jorks , ABC , NBC , cost a.11. 
addi t, ional 45 , 000 dolls.r• fJ on e ach ne twork . 
So on Honday one day priOJ' t o the e l ection , the 
Republicans spent an estimated one half million dollars , 1n 
l 
l.j._5Ibid ., p . 56 . 
a one day television effort, to try to elect Richard M. 
I+6 Nixon presi dento 
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Also during the l ast fel.-J days of the ca.mpaign in 1960 1 
N lxon \vas appearing on many one m1nute spots on television. 
He also made several t wenty- second spots , o1 the direc t t o 
camera type to carry his election message . Additionally a 
feH of the earlier discns1sed five minute spots designed for 
showing at the end of the network programs were being used . 
Another factor tha.t helped Nixon ' s campaign in the 
las t ferJ days of 1960 was the use of President Eisenhower on 
televi sj. on and el se~here . The president who had been largely 
i gn<)red .tn the c o.::lier campai gn eff orts had now been invited 
t~ ·!:; 9.ke part u.nd ~.-u:.~ attracting l a r g e crot-Jds to the rullies 
a~ which he af f ~a~~J . Th~se rall i ~ s were being covered by 
the ne t work news medi a , subsequently g j.ving Nixon valuable 
network expo s ure . So Nixon received more exposure in the 
last fevJ days of the campaign, because of television ' s 
coverage of the popular president's rallies, held in Nixon ' s 
1 behalf. Also paid pol i t5_cal coverage for subsequent s.howing 
on television of the Eisenhower for Ni.xon rallies supple-
mented the regular news coverage. 
The t•w major rallies were held at the NeH York 
Coliseum on Novembe r 2nd , and from the !'an l'aci fic Audi t orium 
in Los Angeles November the 5th. These were the major 
l~6 1'heodor·e H. \•/ht"Ce, .2.!2. • cit. , p. 353o 
. 
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rallies that were held on the last few days prior to the 
actual election . They drew nationwide news coverage and gave 
the Nixon campaign ef fort television time , free of chargeo 
Several of the smaller and local rallies were not 
l arge enough to attract network covernge . So Nixon t s staff 
bought local televisi on time for paid political coverage of 
L '7 
r allies that did not attract network news coverageo ~ 
These were t he major uses of television Nixon made in 
hi s 1960 presidential crunpai gno The choice of the one ' s 
covered in this thesis reflect only the judgment of this 
v:r-1 tor t s and for a ny oversight he aceepts the blame o Next 
thi.s thf·sis vJiLl briefly discus~ tl·1e major ml.stakes Ntxon 
mado :i.rJ 11.Ls ,,_se o f t.e1evi.s ion in his 1960 presidential bicJ.. 
SUl1t1ARY 
11::my mis takes Here made by 1Tixon in his usage of 
tele vi sion dur ing his 1960 pres-idential campaign . However , 
four of them were jud5ed to be mistakes of a major magnitude 
according ·co the vJri ter of this thes i s o 'rhe four HePe 
Nixon ' s attitude toward using television in a political 
campaign ; his lack of co-ordination t-Ji th hi s s t aff ; misuse of 
President Eisenbow<:ir~- .in his campaign ; ar1d f inally his per:.>onal 
failu~e to understand the use of televis ion, to pro ject the 
image , he wan try).ng to get across t.o the voter·s . 'l'hese four 
47 Gene \iyckof.f, op. cit. , p. 56. 
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major mistakes will now be covered in more deta i l , ln this 
swumary of Nixon 1 s usage of tele vision durine t be 1960 
c ampal gn. 
t hat damaged Nixon ' s u se of t~levis ion i n the 1960 canpa:ign 
was perhaps best s ummed up by one of h i s ch ie f televisi on 
advisers , Carroll Newton . Advi ser NevJton felt t hat what 
damaged the Nixon te levision strategy the most was two 
things . 'I'he tlf.Jo , were Nixon 1 s hesitancy i n giving approval 
to hi s television adviser ' s pl ans , and h is d~cision t o debate 
Kenne dy . 4.8 As covere d earli er i.n t .bJ. s th.es i s , Nixon had 
prom:i.s ed he vJ Oll 1<..l. not.; dc~bate Senator John Jl' . 1\en.ned.y under 
wn.y- circwJJs t.ances , Oi.l t as was t-ypic a l of t he vi ce - pres j_dent 
he changed h i s mind . Because of his de cision to debate 
Kennedy, the efforts of his television advi sers t o present a 
n ew i mage of Nixon , was subs t antial ly d~1aged by the i mage 
Nixon presented t o the viewers . 
Doc i s ion and lack of dec i s i on of when and how to use 
televisi on s eemed t o stem f r om Nixon ' s bas i c distrust, of the 
us e of t e l evis i on in political campaigns . Although he had 
ded.ded to i gnore the pres s to a major ext ent in hi s 1960 
campaign for the presidency, he still did not trust the image 
building potentt a l of television . Gene Wyckoff , who was on 
}.~8Hobert l1acNei1 , op. cit., p. l 99o 
67 
Nixon ' s television staff i n 1960, said voters did not get the 
i:npression of a strong leader in the Nixon campaign . 'rhe 
main reason was that Nixon did not seem to understand the 
concep t of image building and also distrusted t he use of 
television for image building purposes . !1·9 
or iginal theory had been to reach the voters by way of the 
mos t imagina.tive , creative use of te l evision , wi th a full 
staff of experts . But as the c ampaign progressed i t soon 
became clear t hat he v1as not adhering to his original plans., 
His television advj_s ers were consulGed less and less , and 
nf.!ver ha.d the O!)por·1.;uni ty to irnpJ.ement rnany sound :Ldeas t hey 
had de velop0d . ..H the sta.rt of the campa i gn Nixon did not 
use his television advisers for an estimated three months , 
although he earlier had indicated that they would be used 
extensively . Subsequently for three months , from the time of 
t he acceptance speech , not once did Nixon appear in a 
na tional television broadcast under hi s own or his staff ' s 
control of the circumstances o 
Perhaps the most important misuse of television in the 
! 1960 campaign '..Jas Ni xon ' s lack of use of qualified experts, 
he h ad personally se l ect ed to he l p guide his campaign . Nixon 
i nsulated himse l f to the extent , t hat his advisers se l dom 
49Gene \•Jy ckoff, op. c i t ., p . 51~ .•. 
j 
saw him • .5° 
A member of the Nixon staff' su.rnrned it up thi s way; 
The s t aff was composed of top not ch men who had left 
import an t posts to serve Nixon . Yet, what hurt th8 men 
the most was tha t jhey wore reduced by Nixon to a 
status of cle rks . S 
These men of' ability of course resented the status to vJh i Gh 
they had been reduced , and this became quite e vident in the 
overall campai g n . This also was true in Nixon t s television 
pla.n.ning for the 1960 campaign . He had sought experts in 
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the area of imag e building , ga thered some of the best around 
h: t:1 1 ther. failed to use them as effectively as he mi.gh t; have ~ 
President Eis enhower who h ad a good image with the 
A~1..e ri c<.~:·. pocple a.nd Has popular had agr eed that he ~;<J ould do 
ev~P} thl~s he c ould to fe t Nixon elected . He al s o conveyed 
this to Nixon at a mee ting a fevJ days after t he Hepublic a n 
convention closed o The president a greed to make three 
n a ti ona l t e levision appearances for Nixon . One would be on 
clo sed circuit television on Sep tember 29th, one in early 
November a n d the last one on elec t ion eve . Also he would 
make several ~lpea~ances around the country to impress the 
theme of prosperity t o the nation . 
However , the Nixon people had been wru1ting to run 
things , for s o long t hat they large ly ignored Eisenhower and 
so 
Theodore H. Vlhit e , op. cit., pp. 3.52-3.53 . 
~l 
:J Ibid ., p & 3.5!.~. 
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neg l ected Lo call on him until late in the campaign o P..s a 
result President Eisenhower was used very ineffectively 
throughout the majority of the campaign . 
'l'he president also was unhappy with Nixon, be cause he 
alloHed the first d8bate t o be scheduled the same ni{Sht 
Eis enhower was making a major address on n ation-wide 
television . ~hen when Nixon finally deci ded to call on 
Eisenhower for support, a White House aide learned accidently 
tha t Nixon was go ing to call on t he president for support, 
now tha t he was needed . The aide pointed out t hat the 
pres:i..de::1t could not be c ommanded 1vh8n he was needed, but must 
rcc~"::i ve 8 req_uest f()r help from Nixon o Subsequent] y , Nlxon 
C2 
arranced a meeGing and t he president agreed to help . ~ 
. . 
I t remains aJ pure speculati on , but ~f the President 
had been used throughout the campai gn t o help Nixon 1 ~., , and 
I t.he genera] Republicnn ' s image he may have swung the 112 , 000 
vote5 that decided the election . Also if he had not ignored 
Ei s0uho:\'er earlier in the campaign , his relationships wi tb 
~ t he President and his s t aff could have been more effective i n 
helping the Vice - Pres i dent ge t elected . 
If!l~.e.~. building" S t ill another factor t hat severely 
drunaged N i.x:on 1 f: televis i on c ampa i gn vJas the Vi ce- President ' s 
lack of understanding of the media of t elevision. 
s2Tb'd 
. • . • 1.1 . • ' Pf.' • 34-7- 31+9· 
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The majori ty of the de ci sions made not to carry out 
t he Nixon's . television advisers plans \ver·e rttled out by the 
c andidate h imself. .Nixon did not seem to realize that he 
needed &o use televis jon more persuasively . Even his ba d 
p erforman ce od the first television debate did not convince 
h i m to work more closely wi.th his television advisers. 
Ac c ording to Gene Vlyckoff, one of Nixonts television 
adv i sers 1 the v ice- president did not un derstan d such needs as 
t elev.i..slon imag e building . He felt that he k~1ew a better vJay 
t o reach the peop l e . Nixon seemed t o thinic that the best way 
to .:>'3gain his image. af t er· the debates vJas tc gc o~t and talk 
to t.hE- people , not to use i mage t.elcvi~;}.cn a.n r .is advisors 
rec cHl!Ci.e::-lded. . 'l'he m~joJ' problem was thn.t . .':i.xon had decided 
to u se televi s ion to get elected , bu t dis t r usLed the media 
f or ·i.r.mge buildi ng . S3 
Ano t her te l e v ision experc who obser ved and wrote about 
t he 1960 president i al campa i gn Rober t MacNeil stated ; 11 that 
t because Nixon ~.-;ns unwilling to leave the campaj_gn t o · lmage 
building , and decided t o talk to t he pEcple , i t p r obably cost 
h .im the election . 11 54 He added -~hat if Nixon vwuld hav-e 
f ollowed the thinking of his adviser s , to l et mass marketi.ng 
t echniques be uti lized in t h e calllpaign he coul d h&ve 'rJOn the 
- ----·---
53Gen e v/yc kof f , op . ~it . , p . . 5LI • 
54-nobert Mac Nei l, .QJ2. · ci1 . , p . 199 . 
t 
?1 
e l ection. Yet Nixon ' s hesitati on and fear of being labeled a 
Madison JWenue product undermjned the efforts of hi.s staff . SS 
These then , were the major television mjstake s the 
writer of thi s thesis judged to be injurious to the 1960 
Nixon television carnpaigno 
ss 
Ibid. , p . 199 o 
I 
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CHAPTER III 
CAt'tPAIGN 1968 
INTHODU C~~l ON 
This chapte r i s concerned with t he following questions ; 
How did Nixon use televis i on in his 1968 pres idential CMl~ 
paign? V.lhy did he use the media of television the way .he did 
in 1968? Finally , how did it vary from his use of television 
duri.ng the 1960 c o.mpaign?. 
To answer the above questions , it is also deemed 
necessary .to touch on Nixon's attitude about the use of tele· .. 
vis icn, pd.o:r to the 1968 pre::;ident i al campaign and during t be 
actual campai gn.. I'J.us it is conside r ed j_mportan t by the 
writ er of this thesis to take a brief look at the major issues 
that were in the political fore-front before and during the 
1968 presi dential campaign . 
Backg r oupq of the ,T-im~ 
At t he start of the 1968 presidential campaigi several 
pr·oblem.s a.nd is sues were of concern to political leaders on 
the national an d international political scene . The main 
isstJ.es included ; \.Jho could end the vJar in V'J etnam; were the 
nation's ci ties becoming undesirable, or could they be saved; 
hovJ could the poor peop l e be helped and the welfare rolls 
sti l l be r educed ; which one of the eandidates could handle 
tho problems of violence in i.;he s treets a.nd on tJ:HJ college 
campuses across the countPy; ·.vhen wo,.l.ld the dreanls of ful l 
1 
equality for the blacks be realized. 
NIXON 1 S TE LB:VISION A'l'TI 'l'UDE 
73 
Nixon's general attitude toward the use of television 
in his 1968 campaign was 111uch di f f e r ent than it had been 
during his 1960 c ampa i gn. Au thor Joe McGinni::.<> who \~rote 
'l'h~. :Se~ .. li_rl_g of. 1'h~ 1- !.'_esi£~!:!! 1968_, carne t o the follo\-Jing 
conclusions about Nixon 's attitudes toward the usage of 
television and his actual us e of the media in the 1968 
campaign. First about t he 1960 campaign h e Btated; 
He near ly bc ~ame pres i dent h1 1960 , and tha t year 
5.t 1..JO L1. l d not. h ave been by oefaul t. He failed b ncause 
h e Has t •rw :..·en.; o f the th i.ngs a pr esident had t o be 
8J1d bec&.m, e i1e l1.ad no press to lie about h lmsel f. I t 
was j us t Ni~on dnd J ohn F . Kennedy an d they sa t down 
t oge'Lh8r i n a tulevision studio an d a little reel light 
began to glow and Richar d M. Nixon was finishe a . 
Televi s i~n would be blamed, but for all the wrong 
reasons. 
In the analysis after the 1960 caxnpa i gn Nixon ' s staff 
had b l amed make ··Up and l i ghting as the tvJO ma jor factors in 
Nixon 1 s defeato Yet author HcGinniss after studying the 
carnpaign as a firs t hand observer jn 1968 came t;o different 
conclusions than Nixon ' s staff . His belief was that Nixon rs 
problems wer e much deeper than just make-up and lightingo 
1 
Relrrtan Morin , The J\~_::wct_~_ted P~§.. ~t <?EX. 2.!: E~~£.tion 
l 9f?_l2_ (New York: Simon ana ~chu.st.er· , 1969 ) , p . 6 . 
?. 
.Toe McGinniss , IJ:tt.~ ~~]-lil.~ of ~-!!~ Pre~i~ent 1968 
(New York : No~ York ~rident ~ress, 1969 ) , p . )2. 
He came to the conclusion tha t Nixon ' s major problem was 
himself, not what he saj_d, but _ the man tha t he was , which the 
camera por tr ayed to the public, who decided they d i d n ot like 
what they saw , and vote d accordingly . McGinn i ss elabor a ted 
furthe r on Nixon's us e of televi sion , an d gener al attitude 
t oward it s usage in any political c ampai gn . · 
That the content of the pr ogrruns made little 
difference , wha t r eally matte r ed was the i mage t he 
viewer receive d aooot the candidate himself . Nixon 
was afraid of t elevision and knew his soul was hard 
to fj_n d , considere d i t a ghmr,::. ck and its use in poli-
tics off ended hi~ . 1elevision had not been part of 
the game 1-JhC-"- he l aurncd ho~ t o play it , and now he 
suspecte d i t vJ!:ls an eastern liberal t.ric \: , one more 
way t o make him look sil l y . al~o it offcnde~ his sense 
of di~nity, one of the t ruest senses he has . 3 
So Nixon 1 s J8cision t o use t e levision exten s ively in 
his 196d ca:ni_)H i g n r,J ::J. s not a de ci sion he arr>ived at easil y . 
It was ~ de cisiori he made e ven though he had many r eserva-
t j_on~.> ;;J.bou"ti the use of t elevision in politica l carnpai gns . 4 
After the de cision to use t elevision predominantly in 
the 1968 campa i gn h ad been made, a staff of t op notch experts 
I \<JBN~ ga th.En't:d for the Nixon effort. Among those experts were 
Herbt.rt Kle:i. P- ; f orltler edit.or of the San Di ego Union vlho 
became Nixon ' s Director of Communic a tion s . The pos t carried 
with it a much wi der re sponsibility than a similar pos t had 
during the 1960 presidential c ampa i gno A second member of 
the Nixon staff who was to prove invaluable , was Patrick 
Jlbid ., P • 33 . 4-Ibid ., P• 33 · 
Buchanan a former St. Louis nev.Jspaperma.n. He became a 
researcher on the Nixon staff and it was primarily through 
his efforts that Nixon was kept up to date on all the major 
i sBues . His r· escarch allowed Nixon to appear as if he vJere 
on top of a ll. the i ssue s throughout the campai gn. 
The six ::nH jor fi g ures t hat headed Nixon ' s s trategy and 
planning for his 1968 television campa i g n; \.Jere Leonard 
Garment, Frank 3hakespeare , ~v :i. lliam Safi.re , Herbert Klein, 
llarry Treleaven , and H. R. Hal deman . 
Key of the six men vJho formed the Nixon strategy and 
planning board for television was Haldeman, who had pre viously 
been aJ1 <J.J\• F.:rtising execu tive vd.th the J Q Walter 'J?hompson 
agency . IUs percept.i on of the upcoT'ling 1968 campaign was 
based on bad memor·ies and hindsight of t he 1960 campaign. 
The former adver tising executive brought with him vas t 
experience. in all face t s of the mass media . Probably even 
more importan t, was the fac t that Haldeman had been devoted 
· t o Nix on ' s political causes and thinking for ten years . 
These then were some of the key men that were t o guide the 
1968 Nixon pres idential effort. 
In contr as t t o his 1960 pres i dential eampaign, Nixon 
developed a top crew all the way down the l ine , from his _New 
York he adquarters t o the bottom of his political organization. 
Then more importantly , he leaned he avily on his staff end 
used t.hel.r know l edge , vJh:i. ch he had not done during the 1.960 
I 
I 
~ 
campaign . :J 
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Turning t o the actual planning and strategy f or 
Nixon ' s 1966 presidential campa i gn his chief television 
ad viser Haldeman , thought t hat Amer i can pol iti cs had 
completely changed . He felt that the methods useo to get 
candida te s elect ed in the pas t were now tota lly obso l ete. 
In a memo he sent to Nixon late in 1967 he outlined the 
follovJin g thesis to Rix on , about ·how to ge t elected in the 
modern poJi tical world. 
Americans no longe r gathe r jn t h e streets to hear 
CFDdid a t es 1 they GD~her at their tel evision sets or 
vhore the media assemble their attention . A c andidate 
(·annot stcN•"'. r-l:H~ nP..tion , at most he can se e and let 
his voic0 bG ht2~!.r•i by no more than a million or two 
people in a President i al year. ' 'l' he reach of an 
individual c ampaign , says Haldeman doesn't add up t o 
diddly-squat i n votes .' One minute or thirt y se conds 
on the e vening ne ~-Js shows of Cr onkite or Huntly-Brinkly 
Hill r each more people t han ten months of barnstcrming . 
One i mportan t favo r able Washington column is worth 
more than t wo dozen press r e l eases or positi on papers . 
News magaz i nes l ike Li fe or Look are media giants , 
wort h a hun dr ed outdoor rallies . Therefore the 
candidate must not was te time storming the country , 
persona lly pleading for votes , no matter wh at he 
doe s , he can appear -in n ewsprin t or on t e lev ision 
only once a day . The j_nner s tr eng th and vita lity of 
the c r...ndidate mus t not be Y.iasteci ; if you do mo re than 
one thing a day , yo u make a mistake. If you test a 
man ' s physical streng th t oo far , you push h:i.m beyond 
the realm of good judgment; both the candjdate and 
t he fol lowi.ng pr ess mus t be given t ime to stop , r es t , 
reflect, and writ e . The importance of old- style-out doo r 
5 Helm an Morin, op . cit. , p .!l.5· 
campaig ning now lies less in wha t the c andidate tells 
the people than in \.Jhat he learns from them , with 
the important se condary value that outdoor exertions 6 
do provide the vi tal ra~J s tuff for television ca.mera.s . 
Tl 
Nixon ' s main televi sion advi ser Haldeman added to the 
above 1967 memorandum the follovdng s t atement; " He started 
N:i.xon off in 1960 sick and under medication and then we ran 
7 
his tail off ." He did not intend to let the same thing 
happen in 1968. 
This general strategy outlined in the 1967 Haldeman 
memorandum became the overall Nixon television strategy from 
January o.f 1968 until almost election day . It ~~ :~s to t.1e a 
c r~mr;a1gn based on ~be media of public influence , and th.roug~:>. 
the- med:i.a of t elevision in part icul ar· Hixon '.-Jin l.ld ret\ch the 
people .. 
Second in Nixon ' s chain of command of t elevision 
advisers for the 1968 campaign -was Frank Shakesphere ; a CBS 
executive on l eave . One of his tasks was t o examine th0 
a t titu de of t he par t y t oward Nixon in 1967 . Then in early 
1968 he presented the following evaluation to the Nixon 
s t aff . That while the party fel t tha t Nixon was capable and 
experienced , he was not electable , and mainly because he did 
not know how to handle television . Although Ni.x on was the 
ablest conservative the party had at it 1 s disposal, he still 
h ad to prove to the pa rty that he was electable, before ~hey 
6 ~ Theodore H. i<Jh.ite, op. cit ., pp . 16~.-· 16 ::J . 
'I r · · d J.6_r.:'. til . • , p. -.} 
-would offer their support. They knew th a t he could win 
primaries in the small s t ates without using television . 
However , that did not prove \1/hat they wanted ; they wanted 
Ni xon to vd.n big in the smal l states with the use of te le·-
vision . That was the only way that he could prove to the. 
party leaders tha t he was c apab l e of winning a national 
e l ection for the party . 
So it was with these probl ems in mind that Nixon 1 s 
te l evision advisers had to decide just how to present Nixon 
on t elevi sion so he would have a \~!inning image . One of hi::; 
adv.is-:>.r3, Frank S.hal-~eGphere , decided one c ould ~hape the 
Nj.xo~ c&mp~ign in o~e of two ways . You c6uld shape it in a 
mocharJi cal s tyJ e by pa ckaging him completely , or• you c ould 
do it through cont~nt and personality . 'I'he dec is ion ace or-
ding to Shakesphere was to do it through content and 
8 
per sonality . 
This approach the Nixon . staff l abeled the " Hillsboro 
Approach", 
Hhich was to shovl Nixon spontaneous, with no 
rehe a r sal, in a serious postur e ) wi t h a mixed bag o f 
questi ons , letting him ge t down to the one to one 
approach wher~ he 1 s mos t relaxed , and wh ich television 
is all about . 
The Hillsb~ro ~-~q_!! 
The 11Hi.llsboro Approach" was named af t e r the town lt 
-----··-- - -e 
Ibid., p . 166 .. 9 Ibi d .. , p . 166 . 
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originated in early in t he 1968 campaign . \<Jhi l e campa i gning 
in New Hampshire television adviser Frank Shakesphere had 
requested that a color teletape truck be sent t o Hillsboro, 
New Hampshire from New York . After the telet ape truck 
arrived for tw o days Nixon answered que s ti ons from a panel, 
selected by his staff. These were then recorded on teletape 
for l ater use in the campai gn . Then after the two day t aping 
session was completed the films were edited and chopped into 
fiv e minute segments o This was just what the Nixon t elevision 
experts wanted, now they had di r ec t convincing messages , 
short enough to ue D.sed i n New Hampshire and nat i onally as 
t.he ca.:np o.ign pro£re .-:.sed . Bas ically they .ha.d N l xon at t h eir 
dinposal just as t hey wanted him, packaged , but genuine in 
the message he port:'ayed to the public . 
The candidate hims elf was described as being grouchy 
j when he first tr :Le d the ne\..J form of t e l evi sion c·.ampaigninrs . 
j Then after newsmen were banned fr om the sessions he relaxed 
and even seemed to enjoy the new method . 
As the 1968 presidential c ampai gn progres s ed other 
t echniques t-!ere a dde d t o the basic approach of using pre- cut 
f i l ms an d commercia ls . Nine pane l shows were planned and 
c ar rie d out for specific region~ of the country . Also 
sever·al cornme r ciaJ.s using s till-photography were i::reated to 
help er1ha nce the Nixon image . Pl us during the campaign Nixon 
occas iona lly used radio , when he had a definite mess age for 
so 
a particul ar reg i on of t he country . Then at the end of the 
1968 presidential campaign he appeared on two telethons 
designed t.o promote hi s enndtdacy . 
Al tbottgh some changes \..Jere made in the strategy as t he 
ca.mpaign progressed the ma j or strategy as ex runined earlier 
~ms set during t he first \veek of the c ampaign . According to 
'rheodore Hhi te , 
The strategy would be t o show Nixon r eal , ye t 
controlled ; he wouJ.d reach the n at ion by spots , not 
by head-on c ommerci al half hours ; media , n~8 barn-
storming wo uld carry the campai gn message . 
'l'his basic s tra tegy and technique was not to change 
un t5.1 the las t t-;e ek and a half o f t tle c ampa i gn , . vJhen Nixon 
\-:as fo.r·ced :l.nto the adver·sary- type of appfHll'8.nce on televisl0n. 
Then h e used two wel l planned and execut ed tel~thons to 
strike back at his oppostion . 
So the ma j or televis i on str a t egy Nixon used in 1968 
was t o re a ch t he pub lic through pre-cut fiL"1ls pro du ced in New 
Hampshire e ar ly in the campaign , nine panel shows , c ommer-· 
1 c i al::; des 5.e;ned to enhance his image , an d for the finish, two 
telethons. This thesis vlill now examine the panel shovJs , 
couunorcials , and two t elethons o 
PANEL SHOV/3 
As a ma j or part of the 1968 media campaign for Nixon rs 
----- --
10Ibi d. , p. 166 - 167 . 
presidential bid , nine panel shows were designed , to form a 
major segment of the campa i gn . Each of t he shows were 
planned to reach a pa.r ti cular reg i on of the country, with a 
specific campaign message , of interest t o that area. The 
primary purpose of the panel shows was to enhance the Nixon 
image and get h im elected . 'rhi s the s i s vJill examine jus t one 
of t he panel shows to see how it was planned and carried out& 
Ex cept for minor changes the panel sho\vS vJere quite similar • 
'l'herefore it is deemed necessary to examine only one such 
panel show for the purposes of this thesis . 
Selected as typ ic a l. of the pa nel Shows was t h e first 
one te le ce.s t, one ~.JF:ek after the Democratic Na tiona.l Conven·~ 
tion. The format de ci ded upon for the pane l shows was to 
have Nixon standing on a platform facing six or eight men and 
women , who made up the panel , and were supposedly dr awn from 
a cross section of Americana . Each of the television pane l 
shows l asted an hour and practically all of the questions were 
predic-cableo 
Techniques for the format of the television panel 
shows had been worked out ;i.n advance during the Nev-1 Hampshire 
primary . They a l so had been tested extensive l y at t hat time, 
\.Ji th the production of the films co be cut and used in New 
Hampshire and l ater in the campaign . A panel format \oJas used 
at that time , so Nixon was famil:\. ar v1ith the type . of 
te le vi sion format be fore the actual t elevision panel shows. 
I 
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Also prior to the panel shm-1s , in New Hampshire , and 
t hroughout the c ampaign as it progr e .ssed , Nixon 1 s t e levi s ion 
appearances were consistently ana lyzed by hi s staff . These 
performances were analyzed le ss for c ontent , t han fo r makeup , 
lighting , bes t c amera angl e , an d other phys i cal de tails to 
make it as effective as pos sible . 
Nixon ' s t elevision advisers for the panel shows 
remembered 1960 when Nixon had made such a poor appearance on 
television , particul arly in the fir s t deb ate with Kennedy. 
As a r esult Nixon l ooke d and acted much different on t ele-
vision dur ing his 1968 c ampai gn. This was n ot by ac cident 
hmve ver , bu t becau sc of good p l anning , plus expert s in a l l 
phases of the technical end of televis i on ;..;e re cons ulted to 
see that the same mistakes were not repeat ed in the 1968 
. 11 
campa1gn o 
The televised panel shows were meticulously planned 
down to the smallest detail. According to Author J·oe 
McGinni ss who was a firs t ha n d observer throughout the 
campaign , the panel shows were designed in the follovling 
manner·; 
The j. de a of the panel shows was t o have Nixon i n the 
mid dle of a gr oup of people answering questions live . 
Each show would run one hour in length , it would be 
live to provide suspense , and there would be a studio 
audlence t o chee r Nixon 1 s answers , and make it seem 
that enthusiasm f or Nixon was so gr eat it c oul d hardly 
11 8 ' Helman Morin, op . ci t ., p . 1 3-ldl.j. 
-I 
J 
be controlled . Also there wa s t o be an effort to 
achieve a conversational tone t hat would get ri d of 
some of the stiffness Nixon projected on tele~ision . 12 
Al l of the nine pane l shovJS vJere planned t o be as 
politically effective as possible . I n divi dual panel shows 
would be seen only by the people who lived in s pecific 
regions of t h e lli1it ed States . For purposes of political 
effec tiveness this meant , tha t it would make no difference if 
Nixon rs statemen ts were not exactly the same from region to 
regi on , and panel show to panel show . Unless a viewer 
t r ave l ed extensj ve ly , he wou l d not be apt t o hear two 
different ans\..Jors t'J t he same qL:.es tion. 
Thi.s \.J as thE: major advant age o.f the regj onal type of 
panel show . During the campaign a question could be answered 
one way in one a rDa , and another wuy in the next area , on t he 
following panel showo Using t his technique Nixon could 
appeal to the vote rs i n one region of the country t-Ji th the 
right answer for them , but stil l not offen d voters in another· 
sect ion of t he country with the wrong answer . As an exampl e 
of this t echnique ; a ques tion about l aw and order -might 
provide one response in San Francis co and quite another in 
the hear t of the midvJest . In this vJay with his reg i onally 
designed panel s hows Nixon cou.ld appeal to a ll ends of t h e 
political spectrwn . 
12 J oe McGinniss, op. cit., p. 62. 
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Selected to direc t the television panel shows was a 
top-flight. network director Roger Ai l es . He had previousl: 
dire cted and produced the Mjke Doug las show, where Nixon had 
fi rst met him when he appeared on the Douglas show as a 
gues t. 
Prior to t he fir s t Nixon televi s iori panel. show , Ailes 
was sent t o Chicago to desie;n a set, t ake care of the 
technical detai l s , and to select a panel . The biggest 
problem t urned out to be the selection of t h e panel , which 
Nixon ' s advisers had decided should be balanced ethnically. 
CRr.e wi th wh:'L.eh the panel wac se l ected in Chicago and 
t he details for the panel worked out provides insight , into 
the detailed planni 11,3 that took place befor·e each sho\~ . For 
t he panel shows i\... \vas de c ided that they should have one 
negro , no t two , because t wo would be offensive to the whi t es , 
and possibly t o the negroes as well . Included in the panel 
for the fi rs t pane l show of the campaign was the Republican's 
version of a balanced panel whj.ch i ncluded ; one negro , a 
Je~rJish a.ttorney , the J:.>resident of a Po JJ.sh Hungarian group , a 
suburban housewife , a businessman , a represent ative of the 
white lower middle class , then for believability tw o newsmen. 
This was to be the general formula f ollowed to select future 
televisi on pane lists during the campaign t o elec t Nixon 
president . It was Nixon ' s staff of advisers conception of 
having an ethni cally balanced panel that woul d p rovj de wide 
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appeal and be lievability to the listeners in the particular 
region the show was being telecast to . 
Even the audi ences for the studios during the panel 
shows were selected with Nixon ' s total television imag e in 
mind . -For the first pan-el, the audience consis ted of three 
hun dred people r e cruited by the local Hepublican headquarters . 
Also selective aud ience included enough negroes , so that the 
press could not play on the is sue of no ne gro s upport for 
Nixon ' s bid for the presidency. This stacked a udience of 
loya l Republicans of course applauded every answer Nixon gave 
and helped h i m i n t~c1o i--J ays. 'l1h ey i ncreased his c onfidence 
r.nd they gave vieHers the impression that Nixon hac!. chari smao 
Finally the t elevised panel shows went off just as 
planned , with the audience swarmins fr om the stud io bleachers 
as instructed at the end of each show . So the last thing the 
tele vi s ion audience saw at the conclusion of each of the 
reg ional television shows, was Nixon in the middle of a big 
crowd of people who thought he was g reato13 This added to 
the illusion of a charismatic image Nixon and his staff h ad 
been trying to create with the shrewd use of television. 
Even if Nixon had not actually acquired charisma , an audience 
swarming around him at ~he end of a television show gave the 
impression that he had ch a risma. 
The basic format used for the first regional television 
shoVJ was a proto-type for the others that followedo They 
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varied only to the ext ent that minor pr oblems and det.a i.l s 
we re changed , with the basic format remaining the same for 
t he nin e shows . HoHever, extensive analys)s was performed on 
each shoi-J t o chang e e ven the smal l est det a il that rna.y have 
detrac t ed from t he Nixon image . 
'rhese nine r egional pane l s h ows were a. ma jor segment 
of Nixon 1 s media campaign des i gned for t he specific purpose 
of electing hlm president in J.968 . Another extremely 
import ant porLion of the t elevis i on n1edia campaign Here the 
commercials and spot announc ement s created t o promot e Nixon ' s 
image on t e levision throue;hout the campaigno 
C O!IJNER C l ALS 
'rhe se cond ma jor medi a efforc in t he 1968 president i a l 
campai gn were the con~ercials pro duced to promot e Nixon ' s 
c andidacy . One of Nixon 1 s t op advi sers Henry 'l' releaven had 
been an advertis ing executive a t t he J . Halter 'l'hompson 
Agency F.md had learned about the use of s tlll pho togr aphy . 
So for the l96Cl campaign he decide d to use s till - photogr aphy 
as the ba sic t echnique for produeing one minut e commerci als 
f or the Nixon image . He came to the conclusion that the 
still pi c ture t e chnique wou l d be perfect for the Nixon 
campai gn , be c a use Nixon did not have to appear on the screen 
at a ll. Primarily Nixon ' s voice would be use d t o accomp any 
the a t i l ls and hi s face woul d not be seen on the s creen . 
-• 
J 
! 
Ins tead of Nixon ' s face on the s creen there would be pictures , 
the idea being that the pictur es wo uld keep peop l e f r om 
paying tw o much att ention t o tl1e words tha t were conta ined 
- in the messages as a s i delight or ne cessity . 
'l'he words used in the background on the commercials 
Here -co be the same vwrds Nixon normal ly used in h is campai gn 
appearances . 'l'hey were basically the vlords of t he a ccept an ce 
speech . Yet for the cormnercials the same \-JOrds appeared to 
be n ew and J.ive ly , because they had been re -recorded an d were 
behind a ser i es of st i ll f lashing pictur es that appeared on 
t he screen 1r1hlle NL,:on spoke . Accor dj ng to the or:i.ginal 
p~L s.nning f o r the com.rner>cia.ls if they '~'ere produced right the 
f"ina.l result v1c:.J.lci creute a Nixon image that was entireJ.y 
independan t cf the word3 . t"\Lc'.Jl: ,,Jc) l l}d be suy inc; the same 
t hings , as he h ad been saying , but no one wo~ld be really 
l istening t o the words, instead tht3 J:mage 1--WU1 d be t he 
. lL~ 
t hlngo 
Accord!Lng t o the general plunninr; for the eommercials ; 
The f lashing pic Lures wou l d be carefull y se l ected to 
create t he i mpressions that somehow ~ixon re spe cted 
coinpe t Gnce > baa r espect fo r trodit:i.ona l serenity , had 
f a ith that the Americ:=...n yecple ~~Hre better" ~han peop l e 
a nyv.J here else , and that all the~ e problems o t:.hers 
shouted aboLt G mean t nothing , in a land blesse d vJith 
the tallest buildings , strongest armies , bigc,es t 
fact ories, c ute sL children, and rosies t sunse t s in the 
world . Even be~te r, t hrough associa tion with the JS 
pictures , Hi chard Nixon could bec oms chese ver y t hin gs . · 
14r b " d ] . . ' pp . 84-85 . 15 I bict ., P· a:~ . 
., 
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Selected to produce the Nixon commercials was Gene 
Jones a famous war photographer , Jones who \-Jas in his forties 
\-Jhen Nixon 1 s advisers selected him had made h:i.s name by 
taking war pictures during much of hi s adult life . He had 
a) so produced the rroday Show on NBC for eight years , plus a 
documentary series for the network about famous peopleo 
His basic technique while working on the Nixon 
commerclals v-ws to spread a hundred or more pictures on the 
floor . These were still pictures taken fr om various files 
l abeled , V:Letnam, Democratic Convention , Poverty , Harlem, 
C1ty Slunw , Ghettos, Happy Arnerj_can .t>eople a t Work and 
Le isure. Jone ~ would then select the category of pictures 
to fit the fi r 3 t Jjne of whatever script he happened to be 
working on Lha t day . The scripts used for t he corunercials 
would contain the words of Richard Nixon , and on sever al 
occasions were the same words he used i n the acceptance 
speech. Ho~ever, the words had been re-recorded to give them 
a better tonal qual:L ty, whi ch made them sharper from a. 
commercial E.mc. technical standpoint . 
The t echnique Jones used was to select the most 
appropr iate pictures for t he scrip t he was working with, t hen 
he \-JOuld arrange and re-arrang e them t o ge t t he exac t effect 
he \.Janted. \men he had achieved the effect he wanted Jones 
worked with a s t opwatch and penci l, marking each picture t o 
indic:;~. te the ane;le a n d aistance the camera should shoot from 
-
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and how long it shoul d be on each still. 
Interestingly , just about all of Nixon ' s staff was 
excited about the J-ones techniq_ue of producing conunerci als 
designed to help elect tHxon president . Ye t Nixon did not 
r eally tl1ink the method was effective , but went along with 
it becau s e his advisers thought it was effe ctive. 
There was nothing new in the way of a_message con-
t a ined in the Nixon c ommercials produced hy Jones . hlhat made 
them effe ctive was the c ombine d e ffort s -of Harry 'I'releaven 
writing the copy and Gene Jones produc ing the correct image 
to ~ upport t ho c~py. 
Forme1' anv c r V1.s ing exe c ut ive 'l 'r-e lea ven condensed 
Nixont s rn es~::ct_d;es on s uch subj e cts as law and order , plus many 
other t opics t ha t were to be c0me the words behind the images 
on the c om11e rcials. Then p r oducer-photographe r Jones 
combined the words \vith the appropri a te pictur· es . As an 
example if J.m,J and order was the me ssage , the words were 
c o~nbined with q uick flashing pi ctur·e s of cr. imina.ls, of 
policemen pa t rolli n g des~rted stree t s , or bars on store-front 
wind ow s , or disorder on a college c~~us , of parade demon-
strators beine; led b l eedin g into a _police van. The final 
result being ; tha t the words combined vJlth the image of the 
picture became much greater than they \._IOUl d have been by 
16 
t hemselveso 
l6J b' 1 
. l ( • , pp . 87-88 . 
90 
EiBhte en corruuercials were produced by Jones solely for 
the purpose of help.lng Richard M. Nixon become President of 
the United S Lates . They were on var ious topics, law and 
order , campus unrest and many other topics of concern to 
America at the t.ime . 'l'h e first commercial produ ced was about 
war and was slmply calle d 11 Vietnam" . Photographer Jones had 
been there fo r three 1nonths under fire watching me n get 
ki lled and wounded. Out of this personal experience crune his 
f irst co1mnercial ( Vietnam) designed to help Nixon be c ome 
president . i•1ost of the commercials t h a t \~ere subf; equently 
used throughout the Garnpaign ran for one minute , wi th one of 
thein lasting four minu t es .. 17 
Only one person who was close to the production of t he 
ccmmercia l s attempted to analyze them . He was Jim Sage , one 
of Gene Jones assistants during th~ production of the 
corrunercials o Sage had the folloHing comments to make about 
t he commercials ; 
The messages Sage felt were de signed as trite 
messages to mo ve the audience they \"aul d reach, vJho 
were people J,.Jho had triteness i.n every por·e of the it• 
bodies , and had never made original observations in 
their J.ives . That what we ' re really seeing h ere is 
a genesis ; we ' re moving into a period where a man is 
going to be merchandised on television more and more . 
It upsets you and me maybe , but we I r·e not. t y plcaJ. 
Americ ans . 1'he public sits home and wat ches GLmsmoke 
17 
I hid . , p . 89. 
an d when they 1re fe d this pap about Nixon they think 
'they ' re gettiHg some thing \VOrthwhile . lb 
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Lnter in conversations with other staff members after 
having he l:ped create the Nixon commercials Sage added ; 
\ Tha t man 1 s voice you h e:J. r•d over and over again 
might wind up to oe the pres i den t in n few weeks o 
He vJ.U l be Lh0 r.w st povJer• .ful ma.n 1n the vwrld and will 
h ave been ele cted on wh a c te didn 1 ~ s a y . , Al though we 
didn 1 t have to make vule;ar films ·' tJe cau.se l•JE'• are 
capable of be c ter things, these 1mages we produced 
for Nixon strike a note of recognition in the kind of 
peo~le we are trying to appeal t o f or the Wi xon 
vote.l9 
Analyz ing the Nixon comme rcials furt her' Sage felt . t hey 
were effective because people ~vere able to r elate to them . 
At t h e same ti~e they could insulate themselves from the 
T(~aJi t.y o.r Vt0tx:..~~:n , violoncc o r vlhatc vor e l se t:u::,v w an t. ~d tc 
b e p rc toct.ed f:r.J~~l . He bt;}j e ved t ha t the effects of the 
st:Llls could he almos t sublimina l , and t hat in l es s than a 
minute you could get up to forty image s . Each one of the 
images also had a differ ent time, p l ace an d face , so that 
you coul d cr eate an i mpres sion t hat is entirely different 
from what is being said . In r eality the viewer cun see .and 
20 
read anything t h ey want j_nto t he imu&es on the ~croeno 
Nothi ng ) however , was mo~e reve aling about the senti -
ments of the produce r of the cornrne rc1als than a f eH comments 
of Gene Jone:; o Aft e r he had m8.de the comme rc ials with the 
18Ibid ., p. 114. 
20 . Ib1d. , pp. 116- 117. 
19 Ibid ., pp . 116- lJ.?o 
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laughing children, green grass and sunsets , wlth candidate 
Nixon saying what a wonderful place America w~s o.nd what a 
great place we live in , Jones believed in his creative 
corrunercials so much he bou_ght land in the Carribbean and told 
member s of his staff; 111 don 1 t really see any choice , I don 1 t 
2 1 lvant my kids growing up in an atmosphere li kP- this • 11 
Selective example s of the commercials are reproduced in the 
appendix of this thesis . 
TELETHONS 
Although no ac tual de bate s were held during the 1968 
c ampaign the t wo c andida t es came close to being adve r sarie s 
on the r1 i g ht before the election . Two telethons were broad-
cast almost concurr t3n t l y by the Hepu bl:ic ans and t he Democrats . 
Bot h of the telethons originate d in Los _Angele s and both of 
t he candidates were on the air for four hours. Dqring t wo d 
the four hours the t e l e t hon was reaching the whole country 
except for the West Coast . The final t wo hours of the t e le-
thons were directed s pecifi cally to the ~est Coast. 
The Republican t elethons like t he panel shows and the 
conunercials used in the Nixon media campaign wer e well 
planne d dovm to the smal lest detail . By the time of the 
t elethons all the tec~1ical details such as lighting , 
21Ibid ., p . 119. 
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make-up , the best way to present the candidate h ad been 
worked out to perfection \vith the panel shows and commercials . 
All that remained \·Jas a selective f ormat for the t elethons o 
'I' he f ormat for the tHo Hepu.bJ.i cun te J.e thons was 
designed as foLLo:~~ ; one hundred and tvJenty-five telephones 
were installed f or the operators to take calls during t he 
show . The operators were recruite d by the local Republicans , 
and so was the audience of several hun dred spectators . 
Even the questlons that Nixon ans\.Jered on the ftnal 
night of the carnpaign during the telethons were handled in a 
special way . l\'i. embers of the Nixon staff had \·lri tten qi.1.es tions 
that rlixon wan t ed t o ans~cr . These 4ucs tions had been 
written in advance to make sure they were properly worded. 
Then dur· ing the telethon vJhen someone called in \.vi th a 
similar question , the question developed earl i er by Nixon • s 
staff would be nubstituted an d a tt ributed to t he caller. 
Finally coach Bud Wilkinson who acted as the go - be t ween wou l d 
be g iven t he question provided by the staff and he would ask 
NJ.xon the ques t ion . 
For the t wo telethons the Nixon staff and Nixon him-
s elf had comple t e control from s t art to finish, w1th no 
unexpected surpri ses . Y.'ir·st Nixon had complete c ontrol ov er 
the ques t ions that he . had to handle during the show bec&use 
they were ques tions that had been developed by his staff 
earlier . Also most of the questions were ones he wanted to 
-
answer because Nixon and his staff felt they would help his 
image by getting across to the public those l as t minut e 
campal. gn messages and promi ses . So for the t wo telethons the 
Nixon staff had complete control of the se t, the studio 
' h . 22 audien ce ana even t e quest~ons. 
This was r eally the major difference between the 
t elethons of the Republicans and the Democrats , vJi t h the 
Republie ans having comple te contra) from start 1;o fini sh , and 
the Democra ts having very little control . One experienced 
observer \.Jho cmnpared the two telethons , au t hor John Whale , 
r..Jho wrote 'l'he !:fa.l£ ~)u t ~_y_~ , stated; 
Ni xon l.Jas t he-:: undisputed star of his o~m sllovJ . 
Tricla P.nd J u li r.: i'lixon \•Jere di s cover e d among the 
tel ephone g trls :1nd briefly :i.nt ervleHed , and Julia 1 ::> 
fiance David Bi£enbow er read a wessage fr cm his 
grandfrither which co~nended Mr . Nixon ' s statesmanlike 
response to the Vietnam bombing halt . With tho s e 
exc eptions , l~ r . Nixon' s unruff led and und2Jailed 
re sponses flowed steadily for four hours. 
Comp aring the two television efforts further Whale 
added; thn. t on the one telethon you saH Nixon, vle ll advised , 
well staffed , using very little partic ipation f r om the rank 
and filo , and ending up with. a very good perfortnance . In 
contrast on the Democr·a tic side was Humph.1:•ey , i. ll s taffe<l , 
plus being overwhelmed with participation and l ack of control 
of the questions or fermat A Yet Humphrey survived the 
22Ibict. , pp . i 4B- lSO . 
23. John Whal e , op . citv , pp . 188 -]90. 
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the telethon in better shape than could have been expected . 
However, the ma jor di fference between the t wo parties 
t e l ethons was that Nixon ' s efforts (the Hepublicans ) wa s well 
planne d and executed down to the s mal les t de t ail. This could 
very well h ave made the difference that gave the e J.e ct ion to 
Nixon a t the fi.na l count, which s aw him winning by jus t over 
a half million votes. 24 
SUMfv'lARY 
During his 1968 Presidentia l c ampaign Nixon used 
te levision with extreme care an d all of his television 
appear·ar:.ces v.Jere ·pln.nned down to the last detai 1 .. 
The campaign i t self was based on televis ion t o a great 
ext ent as c ompared to the old metho d of barnstorming the 
country to ge t vo t es . Three major media thr usts were used t o 
complete the Nixon media c ampa i gn des i gned to elect him 
President of the United States. They wer e nine panel shows 
designed for specific areas of the country , a battery of 
coHUnf; rc i al s and films, p lus tw o t e l e t hons at the end of the 
1968 c~mpa i gn . 
One o t her major it:;em besides a we ll planned and 
executed media campaign tha t probabJ.y helped Nixon become 
pre s i dent was his decision not to debat e Humphrey. This 
Nixo11 decided not do for t wo r easons , because of sad memories 
2 Lt- ~l s Ibi d ., pp . l u -190 . 
of his debating experience with John F . Kennedy in 1960 and 
21.. 
it would be risking a lead he had in t he campaig n . ~ 
251 b. , J. a . , p . 188 . 
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CHAPTER IV 
PliliS IDENTIAL USE OF 'J.ll!.LEVIS ION 
INTBODUC'riON 
The purpose of this chapter i s to give a brief summar y 
of Prer·ident Nixon t s use of television since assuming the 
presi dency . t .. spec t s of hls t ele vi sion usage tha t \-I ill be 
touched on are; h ow much h as Nixon used television to build 
hi s president ial image; how has his usage of t e levis ion 
varied from pas t presidents ; and what criti ci sm has been 
leveled at Nixon t s use of t elevis ion . 
NIXON 1 S HlAGl<.; 
Since RJ.chard M. Nixon has been in the ~hit e House 
nwny coJ..v.m.n ists , journali sts and political writers have 
written about h is usage of t elevision o The conclusions, mos t 
of them have come t o, are perhHps best summed up by columnist 
J ack Anderson vJbo ~tated ; 
Never has there been a more te l e vision consc i ous 
p~esident than Richard Nlxo~ . He submits to e l aborate 
ma~:eup, rev:i.et.JS the caniera ang] es and .r>ehear·sas hi s TV 
ar:;HHH'i->..~~ces extensive J.y. 
He ha ~ also urgAd party leRders to t ake advant Rge 
o.i:' c-:ver7 O}Jpo.r'.:un.i.ty to usc L.elevi s1on to promote hi.s 
p o l5.c:\.es . H1::~ has sugr;er;ted t hat c e.binc t officer s dr aH 
up summ8.r i.es o.~· their Hccomplishmen t s , so they will be 
r eaay with ~~1ck answers for TV interview s o 
White Hou3 ~ ai des skilled j.n TV merchtindis i ng have 
b~en put at th0 uisposal o f party l enders . At a White 
House pol ley pow-wo\.J on September JO , f or example , 
Pres:i.<.lent Nixon i n s true ted GoO . p . l eEide r s ; I \vben 
Republicans go on television , notify Lynn rlofziger a t 
t h e White House .• 
The President expl ained tha t a i de Nofziger was 
preps. r ed to supply t hem \.Ji th p lenty of '.l'V ammuni 1;ion . 1 Urged !'l~ xon ; 11 L..ero in on the big issue ! 'l'a lk it up !'' 
Past pE:rformances throughout t-v10 p r esidential cam-
paigns as reflec te d in t his thesis show Nixon mov ing from 
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d i strust of the use of television for po litica l purposes , to 
an over re liance on the use of the med i a . He has gr adually 
be come t he mos t image minded president in the history of 
television . 
llo~ ?resident Nixon 1 a Use of Televi sion has Varied 
l·restdent tHxvn 1 s use of television h as varied 
su ·t:s tan l., iall y from pas t yre s idents . ·HovJever, the evolution 
of presiden~ial use of t elevision does not go to far back in 
modern history . Onl y three president s prior t o Nixon have 
used television to the extent t hat it is wor th mentioning . 
:i.~a c. b. of ~-he prev:i ous three presidents, Kennedy, "B;isenhm-.~e r 
f.m. ci. J oLnson h eW their mm ide as on the use of t e l ev:i. sicn 
duri~s t be1r terms a s president . Also they had t heir own 
i:1n.ov a t. ion~j as to what they ~wuld all o~-.1 .in the way of tele -
v lsit-:'1. -:.ov:. .. :· ,Jt·;e of' their J.H'f!sld en tial act ivities . President 
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press conferen c es . Then Pre s i dent John F. Kennedy advanced 
it. a step f'u1·the r b-y nllov-1 ing live t elevi s ion cameras at h : s 
pre~> s conferences . 'l'he one thi n g that a ll three presidents 
prior lo N.txon ; Eisenhower , Kennedy and ,Johnson h a.d in eommon, 
\~C:'.S tl:teJI i rw.dc direct te J.e vts i.on appearances to the e lec toru te 
when the occas ion dc~uncierl it . 
Now Pres ident Nixon , mor e than any previous president 
is ~~s:lng television to make direct contact "'li t h the Jl.merican 
pcoj/ .l.~ , .I a rnor·e than t\venty- f i ve n a tion a lly t elevised broad-
costs J'Ll .xon has •J.sed t elevision to go direct ly to the people . 
As & r-c~ ~.:u ·..!.l~ he ha.s made televisi on an i mportant part of the 
pu tl.ic ~ 
Pre:,i0J.:: l-:. t iHxon i s be coming the mos t televised 
pr esidE:n"l ir:. the his t ory oC ~ elevis ion . His admin i str a tion 
J s t .l"'..e rno:1t t,eJ.C!·vi.sed a.dllri.nls tra ti.on of the t elevision era . 
Since ~ixon has been iri of f ic e he his ~ppeared on t e l ev i sion 
11 i n liv e ney,;s conferences, day time and prime - Lime spee ches , 
live convcr·sati.ons with 'l'V commentator s of _ the rna,jo r networks, 
tol evlse~ formal &ddr esses t o Congress and to specific 
grc uf.3 . 11 J 
I r; one ma j or wa·.v Preside n t ~Hxon ' s use of televisi on 
r, 
c.:.. :0: .;i 1 Hickey , The 
Augus ~ 2~ , 197TIT: 
JJ"b • -l . ( " 
.. ' l :_ > • p • J. ) • 
1'c 'l" be Pcor:t:i.e 
·--- .t..-·--·-
PP• b - '·.i., 
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hns v ~ ri ed o He has used t elevis i on t o go d i rectly t o t h e 
peop l e o ver the head s of congr~ss . This h i storic te l e vision 
fi r s t , happened on Honday , J a nuar y 27th , 1970 . Presldent 
Ni x on HCnt on t elevision u:..r1d signed his me~sage ve t oing the 
19.7 b i LLion dol l ar cdu c: 2.t.i.on and labor appropriat ions biD o 
He thus , ue e e.me the first president to v e t o a bill on 
t e l evisicno 
CRl'riCI SM OF' NIXON 1 S USE OF ~'ELEVISION 
The cr i tic i sm of Nixon ' s use of television since 
becominG p rc~l den t has been in one ~a jor area . He h as been 
13.~ G!J21'd 0f v.~.Y:inr; u:: f a ir adv antage of the lfemor.rat.i. c process 
i.n his e:x ttH1sive n s <3 of ·television.. Cr iti c s claim he has 
gon~; ov~~r t.h0 he nd;.; of Congress and Ll:e Su.preme Cour t , thu::> 
L<iJ3~;t-.t.1n.; thE~ ehecks and balanc e~: orig inal l y conce .ived of in 
t he con :.:.ti.i;.\.ltJon by the f ounding fathers . He has done this 
by ~aidng h:i..s \'iews on leg islation antl programs directly t o 
t he p0oplc by u s e of n at i.on- wida television . The majority of 
the pol:L·.:,ic8.l Cl' :i.t:i.c.isf'1 of Nixon 1 s Ltse o f televisi.on h as c ome 
from the DeJ'1ocrn.tie pnr t y , i·Jith Sena. t or · b;dmund ~uskie lead:i.ng 
r.;hc att,uck . Hc.. ,~· evf:r, ~<.wer-P..l cojurnnists and political 
•n·:L ter- ::: [;~;.ve been cl'it.i.cal of' lHxon 1 s u se o f t e l e v isi on to go 
to t l!.e 
q. 
people . Se n a tor :i'1u ski e mad e the f o]J owi ng 
c oJrr;:ent..:3 \o;hj_le a-ppear ing before a c.ongres~;ional subc ommi tt ee 
I.; I b i d • , p • '7 • 
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studying p r oposed cha nges :i.n the communic a tions rules and 
r e gulati on s ; 
'l'bat the present d i spos it :i.on of the networks i s to 
allow the President such televis ion t ime as he req uests . 
'l'o my know l edge he 5. s never r e f used . .[ ti s t';iven to 
hi£r t~ecau:::e of' hls off ice a nd because a stateme nt by a 
Pre s ident i s cousldercrl newsworthy p er- se . 
~n t he pas t , t he process of r eaching the electorate 
with tho fa c ts and arguments has been much slower and 
fiH' :Less e f:Ce c t i ve . Before the wide use of t e l evi sion , 
1t <J.ctua1ly t. ook an immense effort on the part of t he 
el~ctoraLe to becc me informed , to obtaj n the i nformat i on 
upon •Ai:lJ ~h t.o bas e judgment. 
1hnt was especially true wh~n J t c ame to the 
ccm;J l} c :n~":d. i ssues of national and internal affairs . 
A gJ•f:a t c 1 f ort is s ti 11 involved in t he pro c ess , but 
n o r E- pe(;plo a r e a rriv:i.ng a t quic ker j Ltdgments a fter' 
an a l~o~ t e~clu 5 lve diet o f t el8 visi on informa~ion . 
~·ir·a t ··v e !n:.ls i.. <l. p s·~lre i s that the v ie\·Je r r e c eive a 
b a }.:atCf; \.1 d.l t: L 7 
The or~ti c i s~ o f President Nixon 1 s use of t e levis i on 
h<-1.3 rt':)t c cmo f'l' om j us t political leaders , it h a s a lso be en 
t~e t op tc ~f di s cus~i on by political wri~ers a nd colunmists . 
De~acracy 1 s tradi ti ona l bas is of che c ks and balanc es 
b~:.t. ·n ~-:::n the acir.li~ 1i sLr~.tiv e , leginlativ e and jud icial 
bi· ~.:·. (~hG::: (: f g ove r nme n t has b e0n lmo c kt-:d a .s lww by the 
te ~~ v~ ~ ~ cn age . As mat ter s stand , tb e Whj_ te House has 
all ~he ~dvuntages of gaining access t o the minds of 
t.he ·;ot:ing vievJ e r s vlhile , fo r p r a ct i ca l purp oses , 
;~cng:.:· e;.; s :."nd the Supreme Court a l'e blocked ouL . 'l'he 
;'i cr.u.re r) f govt;;rnment on the home sc:e een is badly 
\~ 
_ ··'u . :~ . 1 _Q_9lgr_ess i or~~.l: ~esc..?.£...c! , 9 lst Cong r e ss , 2nd 
..... · :"); ~ C' ··l'',." ( .l ... l .. c · ... -.--7~L'Iii)l S 1J5 .1'-' r>o J l i .J .. ,1 .-:'l • • hl . c 
. ; t. • ..:. '" •· • '· , , .1 •. : , .•• : \, . , L-; , '-' 1 , . . __ J , \J • • -· • , 1 ,..._r CJ.~r H p y - ;..J • 
distorte d p r e c isely ~-tt a moment \vhen the country fac e s 
a multitude of gruv0 i ssues . 
the Pr es i dent , wj_Lh ~ othing more t han a teleph on e 
c a ll f rom h is of i '..i.cC: C <--.ll or·der up networ!; co\'et•ag e 
whe ne ver he wan t s t o . ~ixon 1 s adroi t choi c e o f t ime s 
i n t he middl e of nerJscas t, s or mov i es fiL'- L~gg sts that he 
knows how r a tings can ser ve his purposes . 
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Th ese then are jus t a f ew examp l e s of Nix on's use o f 
-co lcvi sion sin c e be cominG Pt:'esi den t , and sorrie of the 
ct·~L t i e isrn that has bee n l e ve le d a t him as a re s u l t. 
6
,Ta::k Gou l d , 'l'he Distortion of Gove r mnen t ( San 
FP:mc :i~>CD Ch.I'on i cle, -s"lind.ay St]pplem€mt1?ebruary l.S, 19?0) , 
p . 16. 
CHAP'l'ER V 
CONCLUSION 
I . GEN:CRAL SUHMitHY 
'l'ht=; 1960 pren idential c ampai gn was the r eal begi.n.ning 
of n a t ionMwjde use of t e levision for the expre ss purpose of 
ele ct ing a p r esident . During t he 1960 c ampaign for the 
presidenc~ Vice Presj.dent Nixon made extensive use of tel e-
vi s).on fo:c .b:!.f. bi.<i for the p r es i dency, ¥-Ihich wns t o fail . 
Ho-vJevc.l' s !."-te -vws to try again in l 96o and be ;:: uccessful in a 
c c:w1palg.n t.h<H u..:; ~d t elevision even more extens ively dur·:Lng 
This the~;t ::; i s a n effort t o ana.J.yz.e and c ompare the 
way Nixon used the media of televisi on in both u f t he · 
preside~tlal campaigns . To accomplis h this obje c tive the 
au t h o r i;.as Dr! ~-l. J.yz e d t h e overal l stra t e g y fo r televis i on U ~> age 
in b uLh cDffipa j ~ns . AlDo spe cific television plans such as 
t he u.sr::. o f pun o l s h o\·Is , films , commercial ~1 , and tele.thons in 
r-u··l;:•8.l~3:t hcwe been sys terrw.t ic a J.ly evaluated to see 
. ' 
hovJ 
they d .Lf'fet'ed in both G[J:lpa i gns . 
The method of a n a lysis h as been a s i mple c omparat ive 
stL'.dY of ~he t.·\o c m~paigns , t o se e hm·J t hey \<Je r e the ~mne and 
hot~ t:ht:y d i ff e .t'ed i n 1960 an d l 96c3 . All of the illajor 
1-t.-::•:i.tln gs of ~~olitical scient i ~>t s , jou.rna1ist s . t.elevj_ sion 
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fin d the key differences in t e levision us ag e during the two 
campai gns . 
Chap t e r two of this thesi s de a ls with how Nixon used 
te l e vis i"on :i.n his 1960 presidential campaign, and \vhy he used 
.it in t he rr.anne r he did . Prior to examining the two basic 
questions i t wa s considered important to provide a background 
of . the time s and to ana lyze t he c andidates political 
personality . ·This was deemed i mport anL be c ause both .items 
affect e d some of Nixon ' s decis i ons in the use of television 
during the actual. campaigno 
While a l l a spects of Nixon ' s televisi.on stra tegy were 
i mpor t n.n t d ur )Jlt; the 1960 pre s i dential caxnpaign , h .i s deci s i on 
to de bute SRn a t;o r J oim F' . Kennedy wa s t he mo s t i mportant from 
the standpoint of th.i.s thes is . 'l'wo major concepts were 
propos e d f or Lno u.se of t c Jevision in the 1960 c ampaign . l 'he 
f:ir:~ t c oncept ·was to produce films and commerc i a l s that woul d 
create a fav0ra ble ima ge fo r Nixon . Then, the second concept 
wa s to use t h e mass marketing technique of the communi cationr~ 
media, for t he general strategy of the campaign to advertise 
the candidate . 
At the s t art of the campaign t op-no tch experts in the 
field of political t elevision wer e ga t h e red t. o c:arry ou t the 
conc ep t s for Nixon 1 s presidential hi d . However , e ven though 
Nixon had expert s a t h:i. s di sposal , the ma jor s trategy for the 
use of te l evision in t he 1960 c ampaign was t o be l argely 
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lgnored . It was to be i gn or ed for one primary r eas on, 
beca use Nixon n e ver a cte d on t he ma jority of the s ug g e s t i ons 
for the usage o f te l evi s ion in the c ampai g n . Nor d id he 
seld om contact h i s st a f f o f t e l e vis ion strategi s t s to 
co-cord ina te the p l a n s . As a res ul t Nixon ' s t elevision 
stra tegy turned out t o be wh a teve r Nixon de cide d it wo u l d be . 
Also most of the tim~ he made his de cisions in pri v a te, and 
seldom informed his st a ff of expert s what he was going to do 
next . 
One major factor that undoub tably hampere d Nixon ' s use 
of t e l e vis-ion in the 1960 president i al c ampai gn was his 
a t t itude t o \J a r d t he u se o f tele vi s i on in po l i tic s . Altho ugh 
h e looke d u.pon t he pre ss as his enemy, and de c ided. to u s e 
te l e vision extensiv e l y i n t h e c ampa ign , h e \Jas no t c omfort ab l e 
using tele vi s i on , a nd mistrus t ed i t as a polit i c a l v ehicle . 
Then , a ccording to politic a l e xpert s cited in the bo dy 
of the thesi s , Nixon made wha t was consi der ed by t h em, the 
most critica l mi s t a ke of the c ampai g n . He broke a political 
rule of hi stori cal p recedent , tha t ma y hav e cost him the 
election. the r ule bein g , that wh e n you ar e a p oli t ica l 
candida te and in t h e l ead , you shou l d not shore your pla tfor m 
with a nyone . However, as was typica l of Nixon throughout the 
c ampai gn he i gnore d the advice o f his sta ff , and eve n 
President Elsenhower, and de cide d to deba te Kennedy on 
nation-wide t e levi s ion. Negoti a tors for the t wo c a ndidates 
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finally de c ided on four debates . 
All of the major s urveys tha t ana lyz ed the 1960 
presidential debates indicat ed that Nixon had done poor ly in 
the t elevision deba t e , and h ad give n Kennedy a nati onal 
podium. Even the survey f i rm most r espec t ed by t he Nixon 
staff, The Schwerin Research Corporation , scored t he debates 
sub s t antially in Kennedy ' s favor . 
From all the e vi dence gathered in thi s t hesis , exper t 
r esearchers , observers of the c ampaign , an.d major research 
firms who .put out surveys , indic a t ed that the debates changed 
the election . Without them Nixon probably would have won, , 
but because of them j Kennedy won~ 
Several theor ies were advanced by Nix on ' s s t aff as to 
~-~hy he lost the election . Most of the blame was d irected a t 
the debates a nd the way they were produced . Everything from 
lighting to direc ting , and even the candidates make - up was 
blamBd for his poor showing against Kennedy . However , the 
experts failed to substant iate the cla ims of Nixon ' s s t aff ~ 
'l1hey felt that t1vo i terns seriously damaged Nixon r s image on 
t elevision during the debates . The t wo were ; his illness 
that he h ad suf f ered earlier in the campaign fr• om wh i ch h e 
had not fulJ.y recovered ; and the general type of . Dnage h e 
proj e et ed on t e levision as compared to Kennedy r s image . 
Although the debat es we r e considered to be t he most 
signi ficant ufle Nixon made of t elevi-sion during the 196-0 
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presidentia l campaign , he used television in ot her ways also . 
During the campaign films, co~nerci als and political endor . e-
ments were also used . However , many of these e fforts were 
not co-or di na t ed with Nixon 1 s staff a s they had origina lly 
planne d , and a s a result were not as effective a s they mi ght 
have been in promoting his candi dacy . 
"'.rihi.l.c many mis t akes were made in the us age of 
t e l evisi on during t he 1960 pre sident i a l c ampa i gn , four were 
judg e d by t he author of thi s t hesis as be i ng the ma j or one s . 
They wor e ; Ni x on t s a t titude towar d us ing television in a 
po liti ~ a l c ampaign ; his l a ck of c o- or di nat i on with hi s s t aff 
of tele v i si on advi.s e rs who had been hand-picke d f or t he ir 
knm·Jledg e of commuYl i ca t i ons ; misuse of Pres:l.dent Eisenhower 
in his e ~..unpaign ; an d f i na1ly his person a l f ai lure to under-· 
stand t he use of televi s ion , to project the image , he was 
t rying to ge t across to the voters . 
Chapter thre e of thi s thesis is c oncerned with three 
questions~ fhey are ; how did Nixon use television in hi s 
1960 .vresi.denti a l c ampaign ; 1-Jhy di d h e use the me dia of 
t elevi s i on the way he did in 1968 ; finally , h ow did it vary 
from hi s us e of t elevis i on dur-ing the 1960 campaign . 
'l'he rna jor fact or tha t changed Nixon 1 s us e of tele -
vis ion during t.he 1968 c ampai gn a s contrasted. with t he 1960 
campaign , vJ a s h:i.s att itude toward usin g televi s ion in a 
pol i tic a l campa i gn . His attitude toward the usage of 
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tele vis ion in t he 1968 c ampaign, was that while he still did 
not fully trust t he use of television in a poli tieal campai gn, 
he decide d to us e it in the e ar ly s t r a tegy sessions with hi s 
staff, and then carried through with the original plans f or 
televi s ion usage throughou t the c ampai gn. Also Nixon 
developed a top staff all the way do-vm tihe l ine , from hi s New. 
York h eadquar ter• s to the bot tom of hls polj_ t i c al organization. 
Then, even mor e i mportant he le aned heavily on his staff of 
t e l evi.sion experts , and us ed the ir krl OvJ ledge , v-Jhich he had 
not dono during the 1960 c a.mpai gn o 
As a result during the 1968 presidential c ampa i gn in · 
c ontrast to the 1960 c ampaign h e used television with extreme 
care and d6tailed planning . Each one of his t elevision 
:;l.ppearances were plann ed do•-1n to the smallest detail, Hi th 
good co-o rdination between Nixon and hi s s taff . Subsequently 
h e pro j e ct ed a better image throughout the c ampai g n to the 
ele ctorate than he h ad i n 1960 . 
'I'he 1968 c ampa i g n was base d on televisi.on , rather t han 
the tradi tj_onal poli tica l me.thod of barnstormin& t h e count ry 
to get votes . S tr ategy for the camp a i gn was s et at the start 
of the c mnpal gn , and fo r the mos t part was followed by Nixon 
throughout the c ampaign . 1-'hre e ma.jor media programs , all a 
part o f the gen e r a l media s t rategy wer e des i gned to help 
elect Richard M. Nixon pres ident. 
'l'he three ma jor segments of the general t elevisi on 
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strategy were ; nine pane l shows design ed for specific regions 
of the country ; a battery of commercials and films to be u sed 
throughou t the c ampai gn; plus t\·Jo telethons planned for the 
end of t he 196 8 campaign . So in 19 6G each t ime tha t Nixon 
appeared on television it was an app e a ra.11.ce . tha t had be en 
planned down to the l as t detail . As c ontrasted to the 1960 
c amp a j_g n nothing \-vas left to chance , and Nixon did not change 
the p l ans a t the las t minute , leaving his staff uninformed . 
As an example of the c a r e in planning , du ring the 
t e J.ev:Llion pane l show s , which h ad been planne d for specific 
area;3 of the country, Nixon cou l d ans\ver a que s tion one way 
i n one part of the country and another vJay in another reg i on. 
In t his vJD.y he could appear \vi.th the use of television , the 
candidate. for all of the voters . This was not by chan c e , but 
because CJ f c areful pre-plann ing designe d for tha t very reason. 
Even tho audiences for the panel s ho>-lS vJ ere pre- select ed from 
l ocal loya l Republicans , a nd at the en d of the panel shows 
t hey surrounded Nixon , g iving him the impression of having 
developed ~harisma since hi s 1960 effort . Then for t he 
c orr..tne r c i a l s rtnd films produ ced for Nixon 1 s television image 
bui.ld ing d uring the c ampa i gn, the best Hriters, producers and 
dl.c ·ector s were used extensively to produce the mos t effe c tive 
films and commercials to elect Nixon p r e s l.clent . 
Finally during Nixon's l ast big t e lev ision effort , two 
t e l ethons at t.he end of the campaign , everything H £LS planned 
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down to the smalle s t detail . · The studio set, light ing , 
directing, make - up of the candidate, technical details , anl 
evon the ques t ions , whi ch were supposedly spontaneous 
q ues ti ons from caller s we re predic t able. The questions for 
t he t eJ.ethons \-Jer·e p r edi ctable, because Nixon ' s staff SLlbstl-
t uted their own q ues t ions , for callers ques tions, when a 
simi l ar question was asked . In this way Nixon and his staff 
h a d complete control ever y t ime the c andidate appear ed on 
t elevision , t·lhich was not the c ase dur ing t he 1960 campa i gn . 
One othe r ma jor i tern besi des a \-Jell planned and 
executed c ampaign. on television that probably helped Nixon 
win, Has his dec.i. :·> ·ton not t o debate Humphrey on t elevis i on . 
Th:Ls he decided not. to do for t-wo reasons , b e cause of pas t 
experlence when .he deb a ted Kennedy in 1960 , anO. he felt he 
woula be ri sking a lead he had in· the c runpa i gn . 
Chapter four of the thesis deals very · briefl y Hith 
Nixon's use of television since becoming president , and could 
very easily be the basis of an other thesis . Since he hns 
assu~0d the Presidency Nixon h as used television more than 
any pre vlou:=; pres i dent , and ne ver has t here bee n a more 
t e 1 evir> i en cons d.o us president . Also he has used televi s i on 
a s a poli~ical vehicle t o carry his pres i dential message 
directly to the electorate , ove r the heads of Congr ess o 
F5.na.lly it is on this las t count, of using television to 
eppeal to the public , that he has been most severely 
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criticized . Crj tjcs have asserted that he i s upsettjng the 
democr at ic bal a nces of power , by his direct use of televis'on 
to reach the people , while Congress does not use television , 
except on rare occasions . the president according to his 
cr it. :L cs can c.ommand pr lr1e- time on r adio and t elevision by 
just picking up h:Ls phone and dialing the net1t.•orks and asking 
for the time. Meanwhile Congress h as to wait for the tradi -
tional method of the press and i ts reporters to report their 
nide of an is sue . Thi s they feel tips th~ scales of democracy 
in fav or of the executive br anch of the government , 
8pecificu1ly the president. 
II., CONCLUSION 
~'!est of' t.he mistakes that Nixon apparently made in his 
us e of tolev:ision dur j_ng his 1960 campaign t urned out tc be 
asset s in t he 1968 crunpaign . Al t hough he s t il l mistrusted 
the use of television in po l itical c ampaigns , he became more 
real:i.s t.i.c. lo. his approac~h t o it 1 s use·' and su bsequ en tly used 
it moc•e e ffe cti vely in his 1968 campai gn. \</bi le he · ha.d n o t 
r elied on his staff of exper ts during the 1960 crunpaign , he 
n ow relie d u.pon them extens ively and follo vJe d t heir advi c e . 
Ev en wh~n he di d not par t icular l y believe i n the effective-
ness o f a s pecifi c te l e vision c ampaign plun he still foll owed 
t he advi c e of h is t elev ision staff of experts . As a r esult 
hi s 19 68 campaign me.dc ex ttmsive use of television panel 
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shows , films , coJn.rnercials , and two t ei('i'thons to vJin the 1968 
campaign for t he pr·esidency of the United States . 
I II. FUrl'l'Hbn S'J.'UDIES 
rhe s t udy of President Nixon' s use of te levision 
durir.g the 1960 and 1966 presidential c ampo.i gns has stimulated 
t he author 1 s mind for t he nee d of further studies in this 
areao 
Thi s particular study does not emphasize Nixon ' s ~so 
of televisi on since he has become president . Nor does it 
critically eva.luate the usage his adminis tration has macie of 
the t.elevi.s io.n me~ss.ge to carr y out their proe;rams . T\-JO 
other studi es also are sugges t ed as a result of this study o 
They are ; docs the usage of television t o go directly t o t he 
Americ an publlc over the heads of Congre~s upset the ba lances 
of po ..., er conc;e i ved of in the cons t:i. t u t i on by our founding 
father· s? Also , \vould the changing of the "equal time pPovi -
sion" in t he Federal Communications .r ules change the na t ure . 
of pol itical use of tel evis i on fo~ the maj or offices of the 
nat ion? 
TABLE I 
THE DEBATES I N TID.: LIGH'l' OF RL!.SEAR CH 
( ?ER CENT OF' ALL VIBi\TERSa ) 
First Se c ond 
Le bat e uebate 
;~!~iN JFK RlVIN JF'K 
3 Cal ifornia ::?ell 11 Hade better i mpressi0nq24 3S 5 Carter !:Who benefited 11 
7 Deuts cr-'-"Tlann ''Hen votes" 7. 26 
9 Gallup Poll nBe tter job" 23 43. 
ll Iowa Poll "Gained mos t 11 23"!) 3Sb 
14 Kr af.t 31 40 42 41 
18 Minnesota Poll " Gained the most" 
21 Opin.ion '1Bes t job stating 25 39 31 36 
Research his c as6 11 
Corp . 
22 Rope r " Best ~ ob 11 J 
23 Schwerin noutscored" 23 39 28 '·4 t.t ·
25 Sind linger 11 1tibo lrJ on" 24 26b 31 28 
29 'l'exa s Poll " Best job" 26b 46 
31 Wallace ~~Be tter i mpression 11 
third Fourth All 
Debate Deba te De~ates 
.KNN J?K RN.t~ JFK rlM.N JF K 
ll 49 
30 42 
21 32 
39 34 30 42 
17 .... ., ;u .. 
46 28 39 35 
31 36 21 37 
42 39 27 52 
40 23 3.5 36 
23 54 
a . The difference be t ween sum of totals an d 100 represent s "no cho i ce . " 
b . Ques tion was as ked following second debate and referre d t o first t wo debat es . 
!-' 
~ 
"VJ 
TABLE II 
" WHO WON 11 F 1.1-tS.T DEBA'l'E : Pl!..HCEN'l'/I..G.E DIS'l'HI BU'l'I ON OF 
CHOICE OF ltHNNhR ACCOHDING 'l 'O VOTI NG 
INTENTION OH PARTY AFFILlhtlONa 
( EACH ROW h QUALS 100%) 
--·---
-·- ·------ Winner 
114 
-
Intention or ----··------ No-
s t, u dy_ ____ Ques tio.n Affili a ti.on N ixon_J.~cnne.S,y_ Chois:._~b 
3 California 11 Made better rlepublican 39 17 44 
Poll impression 11 Democratic ll· Sl 38 
7 Deutschmann 11 Won votes 11 Republican 10 27 63 
vemocratic 4 30 66 
Independent L~ 19 6? 
9A Gallup 11 Better j ob 11 .Pro-Nixon 4S 17 38 
Pro-Kenne dy 3 ?l 26 
Undecided 12 26 62 
ll I O ',-J a Poll c 11 Galned Pro-Nixon 39 16 ~s 
mo s t" Pro- Kennedy 3 62 3S 
Undecide d 8 30 62 
1 1.~ Kr af'tc Pro - t"ix on S9 17 24 
Pro-Kennedy 7 6S 28 
Unded.d ed 2S 31 hl+ 
21 Opin i on 11 5e s t job Pro-Nixon )2 8 40 
H.esea.r· ch st a t i.ng hi s Pro-Kennedy 2 73 2.5 
Corpo c ase 11 Unde c ided 4 22 74. 
23 S chi·J f.; rin 110rl ts cor e d" Pro--Uixon 1+7 6 47 
Pr'o - I\enne dy 4 79 17 
Undeeided. 7 39 S4 
31 Walla ce it Bet; t er Republican 28 ).j.6 26 
Impres s i on n Democr·at ic 2 87 J.l 
Independen t -26 !.j.8 26 
----------·-----------------------------L··---··--------
------·---· ---------· .. ---·----- - - ·-
a . Informat ion on voting i ntention and pa r ty a f filiation was 
obt a. in(•d during t he s ame intervie\,1 a s evalua tion of' the 
deb a te s . It i s c once i vub l e , therefor e , th a t some people 
aligned the ir p arty aff ili a ti on or vot i ng intention accor-
ding to their cvaluatlon of who won t he de bate . Although 
several s t udies h a ve pre - de bate :i.nforHw.tion ava i lable, only 
the K.r•a.f t st Ll.<iy a e t ~Hllly employs vot lng intent ions ob t uine d 
in an ~ arlier inte rview . 
b . No C.hoi ce anct/ or Do~1 1 t Know. 
c. Q.ue~;ti o:l r"'as a s ke d following s econd det:a te Hnd referred 
t o first, two deba tes . 
ll) 
TABLE I II 
I MPAC1' OF DEHA'l'ES ON FAVORABILITY rr m·IARD CANDIDATES 
ACCORDING TO POLITI CAL PREDIS?OSI TIONS 
( VIEWERS ONLY ) 
Note : Re ad t h is t able as fo l low s : Consi der ing t he Cali fornia 
Poll, for exampl e , 3 3 ~~ of .Ke pub l i c an v iev.Jers rHi: came more 
f avor abl e t o lHxon , 8% l ess f avor able , and (no t. shovm in the 
t able ) 59% rema in ed un chang ed . 1-1.mong .uer11o c r a t i c vi ewer s , 1 )% 
becsme mor e f a vorabl e t owa rd ~ i xon , 33% l es s f avorable , and 
( not sho1rm i n t h e tab l e ) 52% r emained unchanged . 
Study Ques tion 
------ ·- -- --------- - - --
3 Ca lifornia 
Pol l 
( Fi r s t 
Debate ) 
5 Ce.r t er ( a f t er f our 
deba t es ) 
18' 1'1innes ot a 
Pol l 
( a f t er three 
de bat es 
2( .~~?werin8 
f 1.r .:.t 
de bat e) 
" Did see ina t h e 0 
debat e make y ou 
more f a vor able 
or less f avor -
able t owar d 
Nixon ? 1'ovJ ar d 
Kennedy ? 11 
11
.]H d you r f e e l -
i11gs a'Jout e i ther 
candi dat e change 
in a ny way a s a 
r esul t of t he 
'l'owar d 
Ni xon 
·r ovl[.:..rd 
Kenne dy 
'l' m.JDrd 
Ni xon 
To \-J a r d 
Ke nnedy 
te l evi s i on de ba t es ? 
I n what way? 
11 Has y our opin i.on TO\IIa rd 
of Kennedy Nixon 
( Ni xon) changed 
i n . any way a s a 'l'ovJar d 
re sult of t he Kennedy 
de bate s ? I n v.1ha t 
Y.J a y ? u 
" Havi ng seen this 'l' oward 
de ba t- e , wha t is Nixon 
Y(JL.t r a t r, itude 
t ovw.r d Vir.e- 'l' o vJ a.r d 
Pres ident N:Lxon? Kennedy 
'l'owe.r d Sen ator 
Kennedy? 
---- -- - -- ---% Hor·e % Le s s 
Favorabl e Favorable 
Hep Dem _1 n d H £~rri1riCf"' 
33 15 8 33 
2 C' :;.> SL~ 19 lt-
25 1~. 17 ':>0 <... I 
19 39 32 16 
29 13 20 2 12 8 
6 23 19 17 2 11 
57 13 1.6 2 31 11 
25 72 36 l l.j. 6 2 
TABLE III (Continued) 
27 Survey 11 Wo.s your feeling 
Research (Nixon) nny 
Centerb different after 
(after j' ou,;r.· . _yo u. wa.t.che d 
a·e bates) . those proe;rams?"n 
'l'o.vard 
Nixon 
( agaJ .nst 
i\.enne dy ) 
'l'ov1 a rd 
11 17 
Kennedy 19 56 I~ 
(ae;ains t 
Nixon) 
Neithe r 41 JJ 43 
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·-·-~---­
-·--------
a . In the Schwerin study , political predi spos ition was 
indexeJ by preference for candidates rather than for 
party . 
b . Whereas the other studies percentaged changes in 
favor2.bili ty _ separately for each c andi da te, t he SH C study 
c ombjned pro··Ke::1nedy and anti-Nixon C'hang es Hlld pro- Nixon 
and ant5.- Kenne<iy ehe.nees and per centage d these over . th.:: 
t otal vie ~er s of each party . 
---·- ·-----
1 Jacob J . Feldrnan and EJ.iho Katz (eds . ) , op . cit ., 
pp . 196 , 199 , · 206 . 
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APPENDI X 
SAMPLb COHME.H CIALS FOR 1968 
PHESIDEN'.eiAL CAMPAIGN 
SCHIPTS 
On t he pages t hat f o llow are the complete scripts of 
a representative sampling of the spot comme rc ial s made by 
E . s . J . Productidns , Inc . , for Hichurd Nixon o 
Eo S. J o #2 
1 . OPENING NETWOR K DI S-
CLAI!Vl'b,R : 11 A POLIT ICAL 
ANNOUNC'EMEN '1' . 11 
2 ~ FADEUP 0.:-I RAPI DLY 
MOVING SBQUBNCE OF 
RIOTING, UH BAN MOB 
MO'll VNriNG ;1'0 CHOv/DS 
ORDE.R 
AUDIO 
SFX UP FULL . 
TAUN'l'ING POLICE AU'l'.HOHI -
'l' IES . SFX UNDER . 
H. N . 
TWO VERSIONS: 
: 60 seconds 
: 40 seconds 
3 o FLAMING AP'£ .. HOUSE DIS-
SOLVING TO POLICE It :ts time for s ome hon es t t a lk 
PA'l'R OLLING DESEHTED about the probJ.em of order i n 
VlDEO 
S'l'HEE'l'S IN AFTBI1HATH 
OF VIOLENCE . 
1+. PERPLEXE D FACES OF, 
AHERICANS. 
_5. SEQtlliNCE OF SHO'TS OF 
PEOPLE HOVING 'l'RROUGH 
BA'i'TEHED S 'J:REBT~:, 
OHi;l!.:RED BY DF.:S'l '.:-WYED 
SHOPS AND HOM.8.S. 
6. ELOQUEN'I' FACES OF 
ANBHI CANS WHO HAVE LIVED 
'l'HROUGH SUCH EXPEHIE.NCES, 
CLIHAXED BY SINGLE SHO~r 
OF CHARrmD CROSS BEAHS . 
F'RAtlfiNG A RIOT RUIN . IN 
CEN TEH OF PICTURE IS 
BA'I"I'ERED Ml-~.CHINE ON WHICH 
CAN S 1'I LL BE SEI<..;t'IJ IN RED 
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AUDIO 
the United St ates . 
R . N. 
Di ssent. i s a neces sary ingredi-
en t of change. But in a sys tern 
of government t hat provides for 
peaceful change--
--there is no cause that 
justifies resor t to violence . 
~here is no cause that justifies 
rule by mob instead of by reason. 
LB'J~TEHS ~~H~ vJOP..D 11 CHANGE. 11 MUSIC UP AND OU'l'. 
FADEOUT. 
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VIDEO AUDIO 
7. FA DEUP 'l'ITLE: " THIS 
TIME VO'ri~ .. LIKE: YOUR 
HHOLh v/ORLD DEPENDED 
ON P i'. II 
Bo DISSOLVE TO TI TLE WORD 
lt NIXON . II ZOOl-'1 'l'O c u . 
HOLD , FADEOUT . 
9 . CLOSING NETWORK DIS -
CLA IMhli. : "rrHI:1 PRECEDING 
PHE-HECOHDED POLI'I'ICAL 
BROhDCAS'r WAS PAID F'OR BY / 
'l'HE NIXON"- AGNJ2.\•J CAMPA IGN 
CONMI 'f''l'EE . u 
'l' ltlO VE HS IONS : 
: 60 seconds 
: l~ .O seconds 
E . s . J . liS 
" CRH'lE 11 
VIDEO AUDIO 
l . OPENING NI<.;'l'WOHK DIS-
CLAIMER : 11 A POLI'l' ICAL 
ANNOUNCEMEN'l' . 11 
2 . FADEUP ON PAN IN'l'O t'IUS I C UP AND UNDER . 
LO NBLY POLICEI'1 AN A'l' 
VIDEO 
CALL BOX . MOTI VA'l'E 
SUDDEN LY '1' 0 SI<..HIES OJ? 
SHO'l'S OF BXPLOSJVE. 
CRIMINAL ACTIONS WITH 
POLICE RESPONS~ ~NDING 
SHATTERED J,U'rOiJJOBilli 
WI NDOW , WHl CH SPINS 
l.N'l.'O A BLUH . DISSOLVE . 
PAN UP ROW OF ~EAPONS--
'I'H.E.N CON'fiNU.E 'l'I L'.l' UP 
Fl ~{ALLY TO HUGE CU OF 
HAND HOLDING AN OPEN 
JAC K KNIFE . 
3. CU'l' '1'0 NONTAGE OF 
FACES OF J.\J1.ERI CANS . 
THEY AH.E ANXIOUS , PER-
PLF..J<.ED , FR 1 GH'l'bNED. 
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AUDIO 
MUSIC UNDER . 
R. N. 
In recent years crime in this 
country has grown nine times as 
fast as the populat ion . At the 
population. At t he current ra t e , 
t he cr i me s of violence in Amer i ca 
will double by 1972 . We canno t 
accept tha t kind of future . 
We owe it t o t he decent and law- . 
abiding citizens of funerica to 
t ake t he offensi ve agains t the 
crimi.na l forces that threa t en 
their peace ~nd se curity- -
1.~ . SEQUEN'l'IAL S TORY BRIEFLY -- and t o r e bui l d respect for l aw 
J.LLUS'l'RA.'l.'ING CR D1ES 'l'HA'l' across thi8 country . 
1 25 
VIDEO AUDIO 
PLAGUB; '£HE ORDINARY 
CB'I Z~.N ~ Tllli DILEMMA 
I HPOSED UPOi~ US BY 
INCREASE OF DH UG SALES 
1'0 THE YOUNG ; YOUTHS 
FIGH1'1NG POLICE ; CAPTURE 
OF ROBBLRY SUSPECT BY 
POLICE • 
.) . DOLLY IN lVILS ON LINE OF R~ N. 
W\NDCUI<'FED CRIEit'l"ALS I ple~ge to you that the wa ve of 
S'l'ANDING BY Bfi.l8K WALL, crime is not going t o be the 
'n1EJ. H FA CES CCN :~EALED wave of t he futur e in Americ ~ L 
BY 'l'IlliiH HAHDS OH COA1'S . 
FADEOUT . MUSIC UP AND OUT . 
6 . FADE UP TITLB : " Tl-US TIIVIE 
VOTE LIKE YO UH ltJHOLE 
\vORLD DEPENDED ON I 'I'. 11 
7. DI SSOLVE ·ro r l'I'LE WORD 
" NIXON. II ZOQ.l\1 INTO cu . 
HOLD .. FADEOUT . 
8 . CLOS ING NETWORK DIS -
CLAH'i:Er{ : 111'HE PrmCEDING 
PRE-H.i!.CORDED POL1 'l' ICAI~ 
BHOADCAS'l' WAS PAID FOH BY 
THE NIXON-AGN};W CAH PAIGN COHMn~'l'Ei~ .• 11 
1 26 
rl'WO VERSI OHS : 
: 60 s ec onds 
:40 sec onds 
E . S . J . #6 
11 \VB.ONG ROA D11 
VIDEO 
1 . OPENING NETWOR K DI S--
CLAI M:B.R: 11 A POLI TICAL 
ANN ou N c:E:H:cN·r . 11 
2 . DOLLY DOWN LS Bi·1iP1'Y 
ROAD AGHOSS '.-JBS'l'HJW 
ARBA e DISSOLVE: TO 
- ~TI L'r Ii~ OIJ DBJEC'l'bD 
l"!Al'J J~SLEEP ON PARK 
.. 
BENCH . THEN INTO 
SCEN ES OF JJO'.l:H UR BAN 
AND RUHA L DECAY . 
) . MOTIVAT~S INTO SEQUENCE 
OF' F'ACES OF M1l~RICA -·-
ALL HACE:S , ALL BACK·· 
GROUNDS . THERE IS A 
QUALI'l'Y OF DB'r:ERMINh.-
TION TO 1'.tiEt1 , BUT 'l'HF;Y 
AP.F'EArl SORELY THIED . 
AUDIO 
HUSI C UP AND UNDER . 
R . N . 
For the pas t f ive years we ' ve 
been deluged by programs for the 
unemp l oyed progr ams for the 
poor . And we have reape d from 
t hese progr ams an ng ly h a rvest 
of frustr a tions , violenc e and 
fa i lure across the land . 
R . N . 
Now our opponents will be 
of fe r ing more of the s ame . But 
I say we are on t he wron g road . 
I t i s time to quit pouri ng b i l -
li ons of do l l a rs into progr ams 
t h a t h ave f a.iled 9 
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VI DEO AUDIO 
THEY AHE 'l'HE . HUNGRY OF 
APPALACHIA--'l'IIE POOH OF 
AN UR BAN GHE'J"l'O--'l'HE ILL-
HOUSED t1I<~l"iBERS OF A 
FAHILY ON AN INDIAN 
RESERVATION . SLOI~LY BUT 
FIRNLY 'l'HE. PI CTURE LEADS 
TOVJARD A SCE~E. OF 
FRUSTRA'l 'ED ANG.SR , vlhiCH 
IS EXPf\ESSl!:D IN 'l'HEIR 
FACES • R. N • 
SIGN ON S~RbbtS WHICH What we nee d are not more 
SAYS , 11 GOVEHi:~l'·iLlll'l' CHECKS millions on wel fare rolls -- but 
CASHED HERE ." more people on payrolls in the 
United S t ates . 
4. SER I ES OF QUICK , EFFEC - I believe we should enlis t 
TIVE CUTS OF CONSTRUC - private enterprise, which will 
'f iVE vJORK SCB:NES - - A SHIP p roduce , no t promises in solving 
UN LOJ DING- - A TOi.~TER BEING the problenw of Ameri c a. 
HAISED--A Fi\C'fOHY LINE--
A BUILDING EH~CTED . 
S. DISSOLVE. '1'0 SHO'l' OF CHIL·A MU SI C UP l~ND OU'l' . 
DREN S'l'ANDING JN THE MUD 
OF APPALACHIA. THEY S'J'ARE 
VIDEO 
AT 'l'HE CAMEHA . 'l'ILT 
DOWN FOH MATCH JVIOVEMENT 
DISSOLTh '1'0 SILO OF 
LI'r'J.' Lh NEGRO BOY ( BACK 
TO CAtvlEHA ) AS HE LOOKS 
OUT OF \HNDOW. HOLD . 
F'ADEOUT . 
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AUDIO 
'rHO VERSIONS : 
: 60 seconds 
:40 seconds 
E . S . J~ # 11 
11 A CHILD ' S FACE" 
VIDEO 
lo OPENI NG NETWORK DIS -
CLAD1ER: 11 A POLITICAL 
ANNOUNCE~1EN'r . 11 
2 o PULLBAC K FROM CU OF' 
MO'l'HER AND TIL'r ~:0 
CHILD WI'I'B DISSOLVE 
TO ECU OF LA'l"rEH . 
3 • MO Wl 'AGE CHI LlJRE.N 1 S 
FAC}..S. 
AUDIO 
MuSIC UP AND UNDER. . 
R . N . 
I see t he face of· a child ~ • • 
What his c olor is . . • what his 
ances try is , doesn 't matter. 
What does matter is he is an 
American child. Tha t child is 
more import ant than any politi-
cian's promise . 
VIDEO 
4· BABIES INTO CHILDHOOD 
AND 'l 'lfr_;N F'n Oi"l YOUNG 
ADOLBSCt;NCE INTO 'f.Illi 
WOKLD F'OR A FR OLIC. 
S. ESTABLISH WALL ON Wri iC H 
CHILD IS l)AINTING BOTH 
WORDS AN D SYMBOLS. 
6 e l'10NTAGE POOH c :HLDREN . 
7o F INAL SHOT OF CHILD 
AND MATCH TILT DIS -
SOLVE I NT O 2 - SH OT OF 
CHILDR1~N S'l'ANDING AT 
EDGE OF POND . 
F ADBOU'l' . 
8 . FADEUP TITLE : " THIS 
TIME VO'rE LIKJ~ YOUR 
WHOL£ viOHLD DE.PhNDED 
ON I T ., 11 
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AUDI O 
MUSIC U .P AND UNDER . 
R . N . 
He i s everything we have ever 
hoped t o be and everything we 
dare to dream . 
R . N . 
This child must no t have his 
dre &'il be c ome a living nightmare 
of poverty , neg l ect and despair . 
He mus t n o t be t he victim of a 
system that feeds his stomach 
but s t arves his soul . 
I as k you to help me make the 
American dream c ome true for 
those t o ~hom it seems a n 
impossible dream . 
MUSIC UP AND OUT . 
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9 . DI SSOLVb '1'0 '.L'l'l'LE WOHD 
11NIXON. 11 ZOOH IN'l'O CU . 
HOLD. · FADE.OU'l' . 
10 . CLOSING ID,'l'WORK DIS-
· CLAH1hR: 11 THI!, PRECB.DING 
PRE-HECORDED POLITI CAL 
BROADCAS'l' WAS PAID FOR 
BY THE NIXON - AGNEitJ 
CAJVIPAIGN COMHI'J'TE~ ." 
E. S . J . #13 
11 BLACK Cf,PITALISI-1 11 
VIDI:;O 
2 . ES'l'1'.BLISH HJ:<..I.N--LOOKI NG 
GHET'l'O AREA . 
3 . BRIEF I1JDIVIDUAL SHO'l'S 
OF Jv!EN , \-!OMEN , AND 
CHILDREN . 'l'l:lliY HAVE A 
WEARY LOOK ON THEIR 
FACES. 
4. LONG AND MEDIUM SHOTS 
OF Sf-1P.LL CROWDS OF 
PEOPU~ I N FRONT OF 
CLOSKU STORB;S OH IN 
Sn~UA'l'I.ONS W.t!E:HE 'l'rm 
AUDIO 
H. N. 
The face of the ghetto i s the 
f a c e of despair . 
If we hope to l i ght this face , 
we mus t r es cue the ghetto from 
its despair . 
But not more promises . Not 
with the ol d solut ion ... the 
handout. We mus t offer a new 
so lution • the hand-up . 
VI DEO 
MOOD IS ONE OF' WAU~ING . 
THEY J\1\E POORLY DH.ESSED . 
S. ESThBLISHING SHOTS OF 
S'l'ORES OBVIOUSLY 0\-mE.D 
AND/Oli RUN BY BLACK 
AM}:<.HI CANS .. A BUSY 
BANK- ··A CO-OP I1AhKE'l'··-
A CLOTHLfG SHOP. 
6 . MON'l'AGF~ OF AN H'IJ. 'l'E.D 
FJ.I.Gl'.S OF BUSY MEN AND 
\vOl'-IEN·" -EN'l'HUSIJ..S 'l 'I C 
TEENAGERS , E'l'C . tHE 
MOOD lS OF BUSY AC~IV-
I'l'Y·· ~BUYING , SELLING , 
\r/OBKING . 
7. HEDilii'f: SHO'l'S OF PEOPLE 
IN GROUPS WALKING ON 
STREETS . STOREFRONTS, 
LIGliTh0, FILLED WITH 
PHODUC'l'S Cl~N BE S.b.11N . 
THERE IS A FEl:.LING OF 
SUCCESS AND PROGKESS IN 
'r HE HIO'l' OS • . 
8 . Sl!:Vl!.HAL SHOTS OF BLACK 
AND viHITE AMERICANS 
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AUDIO 
With your help , I will begin a 
ne w progr a m to get p riva t e 
enterprise into the ghetto and 
t he ghetto into priva t e enter-
p r ise . I call it 11 Black 
Capitalism." 
MUSIC UP FULL . 
R . N . 
More black ownership of bus ines s 
and land and homes can be the 
multiplier o f pride tha t will . 
end our r acial strife . 
The black man t s p ride is the 
white man ' s hopeo 
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VIDEO AUDIO 
'l'OGETHER . rrHEY ARE 
TALKI NG , WALKING , 
WORKING. ON ONB WE DO 
A LONG PULL BACK AN D 
FA DEOU1' . 
'1'\vO VERSIONS : 
: 60 seconds 
: 40 se conds 
E . s. J . /flS 
11REACH OU~' 11 
VI lJEO 
CLAIHBR : II A POLI'l'I CAL 
AN NOUNCEMEN'l'. 11 
2 . FADEUP ON ZOOM INTO 
CROWD . NIXON IS SUR-
ROU NDED BY PEO PL:&. . 
3 . NIXON MOVES 'l'HROUGH 
CROWD , VARIOUS SHOTS 
FROM DI FFEHE,NT PE.R-
SPEC'J.'IVES . 
4 • MCU 1 S OF' ABOVE 
SEQ.UE.NCE . 
AUDIO 
MUSIC UP PULL . 
R. N. 
What h as to be don e , h as t o be 
don e by the Fres ident and peop l e 
tog ether ; or it won ' t be dono a t 
al l .. 
I mn asking no t t hat you g ive 
something to your c ountry , but 
VIDEO 
5. WS NIXOH AND CROWD 
SEPAHA'l'ED BY ROOF OF 
CJl.H • ZOOI"i lN •.ro HANDS 
AS THEY HEACH TOHARDS 
6 . HON'l'AGE OF REACHING 
HANDS , Stv!ILING FACES 
--NIXON AND PE OPLE. 
INCBEAS ING TEM PO . 
8 . PULL BACK l<1HCN CL/-~.SPED 
HANDS OF NIXO~ AND 
PEOPl.,l;; . T I LT fo' rl OIV: 
P.ft.:O PLh IN v./I N,..,O 'I 'l'O 
SIGN . PAN TO CU OF 
NIXON . 
9 . ZOQi\1 OUT FR.OI"l CU \vORD 
11 NIXON 11 '1'0 REVEhL S IGN 
11NIXO NtS THE ONE " ABOVE 
NIXON CAVALC/.DE SUR ... 
HOUNDED BY CHEERING 
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AU DIO 
t hat you do some t hing with y . Ll r 
c ount ry ; I am asking not fo r 
your gif t s , but for your hands . 
MUSIC UP FULL . 
MUSIC UNDER . 
H. N .. 
Together we can ha r dly fail , for 
there i s no for c e on earth to 
match the will a nd s pi r it of the 
people of 1-uueri ca. 
HUSIC UP FULL . 
· THRONGS . IIDLD. FAD~OUT . MUSIC OUT . 
10. FA D.b.UP 'l'I'.I'Lb : "ThJ.S 'l'IME 
o or a 
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VID?.:O - AUDIO 
VO'l'E LI KE YOUR \-/HOLE 
WORLD DE.PJ.o.NDED ON I'l' . 11 
ll. DISSOLVE 'l'O TI'l'LE HORD 
11 NIXON ." ZOOH IN'l' O CU. 
HOLD. FADEOU'l'. 
1 2 . FAVEUP ON NET\vOHK 
CLOSING DISCLAH1ER : 
11 Tllli PRECE DING PRE -
RECOHDED POLITICAL 
BHOADCAS T I:JAS PAID l''OR 
BY THE NIXON- AGNEW CATvH:-
PAIGN CO~'Ii"i.I 'rTE2 . 11 
TWO VERSIONS: 
:60 seconds 
:40 seconds 
E . S. J. # 16 
"WOMAN" 
VIDEO AUDIO 
l. OPENING :t-I'E'I' vJORK DIS-
CLAI MER: 11 A POLI TICAL 
-- --
At~NOUN CE"VtEN 'l' . 
2 . FADEUP ON DIAGONAL VIEW FADE UP viT TH LOW BACKGROUND 
DOWN ON SI DE\-JALK . IT SOUNDS OF' THE CI'l'Y. SOUND OF 
IS A l•.fET NIGHT. FE.c;•r CLICKING HEELS .. 
nm 
VI Df;O . 
OF WOf.t /\N COME IN'l'O VIBW . 
3 . SHE IS DRh SShD IN A 
CLO'l'H COA'l'. LOOKS TO 
BE ABOU'J' AGE li-5 , 
APPAHEN'l'LY COMING Hotlli 
LATE FROM SHOPPING OR 
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AUDIO 
ANNCB : Crj~es of violence in 
the Uni t e d States ha ve almost 
doubled in r ecen t years . 
\\IOHK . THE CAMEHA BEGINS 'l'oday a vio lent crime i s com-
'I'O TRAVEL vJI 'rH HER . 
l~. BEHIN fD HER HOVING 
F'IGUHE FLOit/S BY 'l'HE 
:t-1ETAL··GA'l'E COVEHING OF 
A LOC KED STOREFRONT . 
IT BEG I NS TO GE'r DAHKER 
AS \ili MOVE IN FOR IVI CU 
WHILE TKAVELING WI'rH HER . 
5. MOVE IN 'l'O CU FOH FINAL 
•rRAVELING SEQUENCE . 
6 o viE ARE IN CLOSE-UP . 
CAJVIBRA HOLDS • WOH.AN 
WALKS OFF DOWN . THE 
SIDEWALK . HOLD ON 'l'HIS 
FlEW AS HER I<'IGUHE GROWS 
SMALLER AGAINST 'l'HE DARK 
NIGH'l' . 
mitted every 60 seconds . 
A robbery every 2l minutes . 
A mugging every 6 minutes. 
A murder every 43 minu t e s , 
And i t will ge t worse unless we 
t ake the offensive . 
ANNCR: 
Freedom from fe ar is a basi c 
right of every Americ an . We 
mus t restore i t. 
DIS'l'ANT HEEL CLICKS . 
n*'t•• 
' 0 
' VIDEO 
1 7• FADEOUT. 
8. FADEUP ON TITLE: · 11 '£HIS 
'l'IME VO'rE LIKE YOUR 
WHOLD WORLD DEPENDED 
9• DISSOLVE TO TITLE WORD 
"NIXON." ZOOM INTO CU. 
HOLD. FADEOUT. 
. 10. · CLOSING NETWORK DIS-
. CLAIMER: 11 THE PRECEDING 
PRI<.:-RECORDED POLITICAL 
BROADCAST WAS PAID FOR " 
. BY THE NIXON-AGN~W 
CAfvlPAIGN COfvfl1I TTEE. 11 
, .. 
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